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Kutokuwa na subira ni fursa ya kijana. 
Impatience is the privilege of the young. 
- Swahili proverb
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This is a dissertation about Kibera, a large informal settlement on the margins of 
Nairobi, Kenya. Based on seven years of ethnographic fieldwork and related participant 
observation, this thesis explores the interactions between young people, grassroots groups, 
and national and international NGOs in Kibera and how these influence youth journeys to 
adulthood. International development practitioners working in Kibera have focused their 
efforts on young people, especially given Kenyan census figures documenting that 78% of 
Kenya’s population is below the age of 35. This demographic trend poses both challenges 
and opportunities, but Kenya’s gerontocratic leadership has, for the most part, failed to find 
solutions to improve opportunities for young people. Population increases have resulted in 
increases in crime, income inequality, and un- and underemployment. These changes are 
exacerbated by protracted liminality, a long period of ambiguous status, experienced by 
young men and sanctioned by custom as a way to moderate inter-generational tensions. 
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) fill in the gaps and compensate for the failure of 
public policy by providing basic social services to improve the systemic political, economic 
  xi 
and social issues affecting Kibera’s youth. This study follows a group of young men who 
have discovered that they can alleviate their liminality by practicing resourcefulness in 
Nairobi’s vast informal economy, an action colloquially referred to as “hustling.” Specifically, 
these youth hustle the “shadow aid economy” that has emerged as a byproduct of Kibera’s 
saturated NGO environment. The outcome of this is not an upending of the traditions of 
age and seniority in Kenya—these young men will continue to experience liminality in 
certain contexts and situations. The ultimate result is that youth create networks of 
reciprocity and build internal hierarchies in the settlement as they hustle, which leads the 
most successful NGO hustlers to create alternate means of advancement and shift the 
criteria of respectability to accelerate their progress towards adulthood.   
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INTRODUCTION: YOUTH AND THE SHADOW AID ECONOMY IN KIBERA 
 
How does one begin to tell the story that has not been voiced—of the forgotten and the 
seemingly insignificant? For years my struggle has been to justify paying close attention to 
the messy and contradictory actions of young people coming-of-age in an equally messy and 
contradictory place. My focus has never been on the revolutionaries or the rebels.1 Instead I 
have been engrossed with the everyday realities of young people driven to survive in a place 
where small incremental feats have the power to transform their lives and the lives of others. 
These were young people, easily dismissed as irrelevant, who consistently made significant 
contributions to maintain equilibrium in a locality that always seemed to be on the brink of 
chaos. These individuals were the community development workers and leaders of the 
(in)famous Kibera —the largest of Nairobi, Kenya’s informal settlements.  
I belong to the lions whose voices are drowned in the ruckus of ‘sponsored progress’ 
by the hunters. I have been a resident of Kibera slums for more than 20 years and I 
have lived in more than 5 of its villages. I have also been at the centre of the struggle 
of the little known crop of visionary young people from the slum, the self-taught, 
non-political and literary products of the slum. For years we have carried the burden 
of every stigma associated with slum life...There are thousands of personal stories of 
courage and resilience by people whose names will never appear on a newspaper, 
people who had the vision to do what was actually the role of government. There are 
actual NGOs, churches and even individuals who have been playing various roles of 
government in places like Kibera, there are informal courts that have been 
dispensing justice to the residents, activists who have lost their lives while fighting 
for the rights of the residents and hundreds of several successful initiatives that have 
made life livable for these famous yet forgotten residents of Kibera. I wonder if their 
names will make it to the final narrative of Kibera’s story.2 
                                                
1 This is in response to the Chicago School of Sociology whose focus on youth studies was more likely to 
examine young deviants and starting a tradition of seeing young people as apart from society. See Getis (1998). 
2 Blog post written by Kepha Ngito “Clash of the Titans -- Whose Name Will Write Kibera’s History?” on his 





So says Kepha Ngito, a youth leader and activist I first met in 2007. Since our initial 
meeting, Kepha has been an active and ardent supporter of young people in the settlement, 
serving in various roles at grassroots youth organizations and larger non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs).3 The account above appeared on Kepha’s personal blog in March 
2015 and aligns remarkably well with the main themes of this monograph. The “ruckus of 
‘sponsored progress’” he refers to are the actions of the “hunters” who serve as the power 
brokers and actors in Kenya’s development field—an expansive network of NGOs, 
government initiatives, and smaller local community-based organizations and self-help 
groups and the growing network of foreign social innovators, foreign and domestic 
volunteers, and researchers participating on development’s fringes. The visionary young 
people are the individuals who have been left out of the narrative of Kibera’s progress, but 
have been instrumental to its development. Kepha’s account matches my firsthand 
experience in Kibera. In the decade since I first visited, the residents there have been used as 
props in a spinning narrative of physical decay and social crisis.  
The following is a typical example of the story told in the development field: 
Kibera needs land/tenancy rights, housing, water, electricity, health clinics, 
education, employment, security plus much more. All these issues are being 
addressed to a lesser or greater extent by many organizations including the Churches, 
UN-Habitat, MSF, AMREF etc. Money is finding its way through from many 
international organizations including Gates Foundation, Bill Clinton Foundation, all 
the well-known charities and of course the churches both in Africa and 
internationally. However, money cannot help without people to direct it – all the 
organizations require assistance. They all need intelligent, keen, willing, and 
compassionate people to help. 
  
                                                
3 NGOs will be used throughout to refer to the civil society organizations registered under this moniker with 
the Kenyan NGO Coordination Board. 
  
3 
In the western world it has become common for many students to take a Gap Year 
out before or after university...Many could work in Kibera where they would achieve 
a real sense of doing some good. Kibera is crying out for people to help (my emphasis).4 
 
The account begins with a problem statement explaining the issues plaguing Kibera and 
leads to a plea for “sponsored progress,” in the form of volunteer assistance. This mirrors 
prevailing neo-colonialist ideas that Kibera, and maybe even all of Africa, will not develop or 
progress without foreign intervention.5 And as Kepha insinuates, the young “lions,” Kibera’s 
local leaders, gatekeepers, mobilizers, and activists who are the center of social change, are 
left out and their role diminished.  
During one such international volunteering experience, a foreigner in Kibera kept an 
online blog and wrote of her challenge in reconciling the contrasts in project narratives with 
on-the-ground experience. She wrote, “they all seem to tell the stories of what Kibera is 
missing, the gaps that need to be identified and filled, usually by outsiders. The stories they 
don’t tell are of the things Kibera is not missing, has never missed.”6 Densely populated, 
diverse and vibrant, it should not be surprising to find that Kibera is not the caricature of 
urban poverty described by NGOs. Indeed, for every hard-luck truth about the effects of 
poverty there is a contrasting truth about the entrepreneurial spirit and ever-evolving 
adaptability of the young people surviving there. Youth migrating from all across Kenya 
enter the settlement each year seeking out opportunities. Upon landing in Kibera these 
young migrants find high rates of crime, poorly constructed and hazardous housing, and 
                                                
4 As reported on the Kibera UK “Facts and Figures” page (undated) http://www.kibera.org.uk/Facts.html  
5 Or as Colin Leys pointed out, neo-colonial policies and foreign intervention may not be leading to progress, 
but to underdevelopment (Leys 1974). 





unclear paths to secure economic opportunities. The gaps are real, but youth find ways to 
overcome challenges both as individuals and in groups.  
The following dissertation explores the intersection of young people, grassroots groups, 
and national and international NGOs in Kibera and how interactions between these 
ultimately played out in youth journeys to adulthood. Specifically, what explains the 
participation of young people in the development field when they are not credited for its 
successes? As will be explored in depth, young Kiberans generally saw that the available 
economic opportunities were extremely limiting. These opportunities emerged mostly from 
Nairobi’s large informal economy—economic activities taking place outside government 
regulation and taxation—which offered options that appeared to increase youth’s 
powerlessness and intensified their feelings of “liminality”—a disorienting state of 
ambiguous status in society. Insecure kibarua work, the local term used to describe 
piecework or day labor jobs, did little to help youth secure freedom from Kenya’s persistent 
gerontocratic, or elder-based, power structures. The aid economy that emerged in a place of 
NGO saturation was hidden, but it was valuable as a new industry in which young people 
could “hustle,” a label young people used to describe the highly creative and adaptive skill 
urban residents needed to find informal opportunities. Some hustling was nefarious; most 
was benign. Beyond the obvious altruistic contributions they made to their communities 
through engagements with NGOs, “hustling” in the aid economy also introduced young 
people to opportunities to learn leadership, gain global awareness, and test out organizational 
skills. It also, frequently, resulted in some form of monetary gain. All of this increased 
youth’s power, eventually accelerating their transition out of the liminal state of youth. 
  
5 
My first visit to Kibera was during the summer of 2005. I, too, was a foreign volunteer 
working at a non-governmental organization focused on youth empowerment. While it was 
not my first time to Kenya, I took the position seeking to broaden my understanding and 
focus on the experience of youth in grassroots organizations. Young people were an 
important topic in Kibera in 2005, partly because those between the ages of 18 and 35—
deemed ‘youth’ according to the official national definition—constituted almost 40% of the 
population. In the urban informal settlements, this number was even higher and it was 
expected to keep growing. Almost 80% of the total population was below the age of 35 and 
Kenya’s urban growth rate, a result of both organic growth and high rates of in-migration, 
was nearing 5%.7 The focus on youth was timely and trending. 
During that initial period of time in Kibera, I started to recognize that members of the 
development field had missed something significant in their planning processes. The field 
had overlooked putting real trust in the young people and enabling them to have control and 
influence in the projects in which they were involved. Youth were consulted—they were 
even hired in low-level positions as field workers or researchers—but they fought to be 
entrusted with the power to make decisions. Certainly, the young emergent leaders in 
Kibera—and there were many—lacked basic capacities and appear unqualified. Few were 
able to complete various forms of tertiary education. They lacked clear tools to match the 
needs of NGOs and donor agencies who demanded satisfactory financial and program 
reporting. Creative misappropriation of funding was common when young people needed to 
                                                
7 The Kenya population pyramid for 2010 shows that people below the age of 30 make up 78.7% of the total 
population. Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. World 
Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision, 2012; the growth rates for Nairobi are outdated but last reported at 4.8% 
in The World Data Atlas, http://knoema.com/atlas/Kenya/Nairobi-City/Population-Growth-Rate. For more 
on reasons for migration see Adepoju (1995); Oucho (1998); and Beguy, Bocquier and Zulu (2010). 
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meet basic needs in housing or food. However, what they lacked in skillsets that contribute 
towards institutional capacity, they made up for with their innovative approaches to 
community impact and a general, shared drive to make change. Even more so, these were 
young people with the charismatic skills to draw crowds—they possessed oratory skills that 
transformed the minds of their peers and networking skills that mobilized the wider 
community. And still, they were given too few chances to fly. In situations where they would 
try to implement projects based on goodwill and without funds, the community and the 
development field rejected them. When they tried to secure funding from donors, they were 
outfoxed by larger, more established, and institutionally robust organizations. 
Young Kiberans were continually accomplishing noteworthy tasks like developing civic 
campaigns for peace or collaborating with each other to do community outreach—activities 
that will be detailed in the pages to come. It is easy to tout the accomplishments of 
individual young persons in Kibera for their contributions to community or youth 
development, but what is less easy to understand is why youth were hidden, both figuratively 
and literally. Alex DeWaal has written “young people are the principle actors in Africa's 
social and political creativity today... [U]nder the onslaught of a range of adversities—
HIV/Aids, unemployment, political repression and conflict, and the collapse of education 
systems—young people are actively fashioning new social orders"  (DeWaal 2002, 18). While 
this is true, there is still a misunderstanding about how much youth inform positive civic 
participation. Daniel Hart has concluded that in child-saturated communities young people 
are less likely to be civically engaged because citizenship and a sense of community pride are 
not passed down generationally (Hart et al. 2004). They may be transforming the social 
order, but is it for the good? One of the ways that DeWaal explains why this is worrying in 
  
7 
Africa is that youth associations, while abundant, are "too weak, too poorly organized and 
financed, and too transitory to offer anything of substance to their members other than a 
fleeting sense of belonging and solidarity" (DeWaal 2002, 22). And yet my findings show 
that the fleeting, transitory institutions that young people in Kibera constructed were key to 
understanding how young people navigated the world and engaged in social change. I 
watched as youth organizations cycled through periods of emergence and decay more 
quickly than institutions established by older adults. This institutional fragility affected the 
bond that tied youth together and that, in turn, was the perfect jumping off point to better 
understand the significance of their interpersonal relationships. Each young person was 
deeply influenced by these relationships as he or she participated in Kibera’s informal 
economy. Additionally, the fragility of the youth associations unveiled adaptability; it helped 
young people refine what really mattered to them. 
To begin, there are three assumptions that help to better understand the processes and 
roles that youth played in this world of civic change. First, it is important to emphasize that 
this dissertation is a snapshot of a time past. I did participant observation, focus group 
discussions, surveys, and in-depth interviews in Kibera between 2005 and 2012. The young 
people I knew, including Kepha above, are currently not as youthful as they once were and 
their participation in Kibera’s development processes has evolved or disintegrated over 
time.8 It is my understanding from subsequent and frequent visits to Kenya since 2012 that 
political shifts in the country have also increased physical and social change in Kibera. When 
I was still working there and visiting Kibera, a paved road that had only just begun to be 
                                                




built now traverses the whole length of the settlement. I am told, and have read, that water 
and other infrastructure projects have improved facilities for residents.9 There is even a 
chance that the Kenya Slum Upgrading Program, or KENSUP, which began in 2002 as a 
partnership between the United Nations and the Kenyan Government, might eventually lead 
to a total gentrification of Kibera.10 After all, as it is just 5 kilometers to the southwest of 
Nairobi’s city center and nestled amidst middle and upper class housing estates, Kibera really 
is prime real estate in a rapidly growing and constantly transforming city.11  Whether these 
changes have impacted the way young people organize and contribute in Kibera’s economy 
is a matter for another researcher to tackle. I write here what I observed for seven years. 
During this time the cliché, “the more things change, the more they stay the same,” often 
held true. 
The second assumption is that even when young people had significant impact, they 
remained hidden as actors in Kibera’s development—a point made above. Ironically, this 
was true despite annual investments of development agencies in youth empowerment and 
youth enterprise programs. It was true even when some young Kiberans were lauded in the 
national and international press for their independent contributions to development 
                                                
9 Pumza Fihlani. “Kenya’s Kibera slum gets a revamp” BBC News (2/22/2015) 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-31540911 
10 The sentiment that Kibera would be taken over by middle-class Nairobi was widespread. See “The Genesis 
of the Gentrification of Nairobi” from A Chiselled Cornucopia, written by an anonymous Kenyan blogger. 
(https://natekev.wordpress.com/2013/06/18/the-genesis-of-the-gentrification-of-nairobi/) 
11 Indeed, housing prices in the Nairobi market rapidly rose during my residence there. See Julie Zeveloff, “An 




programs.12 Those young people were exceptions in a place where values rested on mutual 
and community triumph. The youth in the pages that follow, and more generally across 
Kibera, were more often regarded as beneficiaries even if they held leadership roles. What I 
learned, and what will be explored here, is that the fact that their stories were hidden and 
their voices unheard, played an indirect role in improving their ability to survive, which was 
an unintended benefit of their exclusion. But I’m getting ahead of myself. 
Finally, Kibera’s young leaders depended on the hidden presence of the shadow aid 
economy. It was undeniable that the non-governmental organizations operating in Kibera 
fed its informal economy. This truth was understood by most residents and long-term 
development practitioners, but rarely received any public acknowledgment at the time.13 
Large top-down international organizations provided basic services like healthcare and 
education through health clinics and private schools and they played the role of providing 
“aid” in its most traditional sense—responding to the crises of poverty, health epidemics, or 
violence. Other international NGOs were engaged on more short-term bases. They operated 
as sub-contractors for large sector-specific programs within multilateral agencies. These 
programs shifted depending on the latest development trends. Kibera’s young men and 
women found economic opportunities they could capitalize on in all these institutions. Their 
actions looked like “hustling”. These same activities also translated to how young people 
engaged Kibera’s shadow aid economy. An example of this comes from Erica of Map 
                                                
12 Most notably is a young Kiberan named Kennedy Odede who won a scholarship to Wesleyan University and 
subsequently founded an organization that has received quite a bit of international attention, including being 
featured in Nicholas Kristof’s 2014 book A Path Appears: Transforming Lives, Creating Opportunity.  
13 There does appear to be a more international public conversation about the role of NGOs in the Kibera 
economy, but this is a new development (for instance, a journalist from NPR’s Marketplace recently contacted 
me on the subject). 
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Kibera, an organization that has used GIS technology and worked with citizens to “map the 
unmapped.” She wrote, “ask any Kibera resident about jobs they’ve held in the past and 
most will mention volunteering with aid agencies or small NGOs in the community. And by 
‘volunteering’ they mean getting paid to do a job.”14 Volunteering, but actually getting paid, 
was a common illustration of Kibera’s “shadow aid economy” in action.15  
The shadow aid economy flourished in Kibera because of the sheer number of actors in 
the development field. In 2008, it was said there were over 300 non-governmental 
organizations operating there to serve a dubiously defined population ranging anywhere 
from 150,000 to 1 million people.16 This figure for NGOs does not include the purported 
2000 self-help groups, community based organizations, and religious associations that were 
also registered with the Kenyan government.17 With a population-to-institution ratio this 
saturated, it would seem Kibera should have been well on its way to effective large-scale 
growth and development. And yet, the high density of civic organizations and development 
institutions in Kibera never created clear, evident, or widespread physical changes. Nor did it 
create greater economic opportunity and equity for citizens.18   
                                                
14 Written on the Map Kibera blog “Livelihoods and the Kibera Economy – Part I” 
http://www.mapkibera.org/blog/tag/economy/ 
15 It is notable that the use of shadow mirrors what James Ferguson (2006) has observed as the term has come to 
be a descriptor of the hidden processes at work across Africa, especially in relation to the perpetuation of 
Africa as a place of darkness.  
16 The NGO figure is derived from the figure most often bandied about by the development community in 
Kibera and several online sources also use this figure. Real data from an official source is untraceable. The 
population figures vary widely depending on the source. This issue will be examined further in Chapter 1.  
17 Like many of the figures on Kibera, this one may be conflated. I could find no disaggregated data for CBOs 
and YSOs in Kibera, but this was the figure most people quoted. Even if an organization was registered, it did 
not mean it was active. 
18 This is information based on the observations made between 2005 and 2012. Development projects 
implemented since 2012 are outside the purview of this project. 
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It was easy to assume that the development field told the Kibera story very specifically as 
a way to justify NGO saturation and donor funding in the locality. NGOs encouraged 
narratives that oscillated between the tragic, littered with a common imagery of Kibera’s 
“flying toilets,” stinking open sewers, idle youth, and children playing on mounds of un-
retrieved rubbish, and the heroic stories about the few Kiberan residents who rose above 
their disadvantage to make a difference. As one cynical journalist described it in 2013, these 
kinds of stories looked like propaganda or “poverty porn,” meant to compel continuous 
donations of aid into Kibera annually.19 As Kepha described, rarely did these stories mention 
the presence of a community of local practitioners consistently working to solve the issues.  
The puzzling question was why these community members found themselves in the 
shadows. For one, a widespread belief had been formed that the way development projects 
were operating in Kibera had ruined the settlement because the intended beneficiaries no 
longer voluntarily participated in programming. By the end of the aughts, new foreign 
development workers who came to Kibera to implement or test out new ideas to combat 
urban poverty found it difficult to work with the community because the demands from 
potential participants appeared to be symptoms of a “dependency syndrome,” recognized in 
this case as an unwillingness by the community to participate in development programs 
without remuneration.20 But the “dependency,” was also evident when residents did not 
continue projects started by NGOs after the projects ended, which was a common 
                                                
19 “The missing millions of Kibera” is the first in a five-part series on “Africa’s Propaganda Trail” written by 
Martin Robbins in The Guardian (8/1/2012) http://www.theguardian.com/science/the-lay-
scientist/2012/aug/01/africa-propaganda-kibera 
20 Even though dependency as a political-economic approach in theory has been challenged, it is a persistent 
paradigm in development practice. For further reading on the economic debates concerning Kenya and 
dependency theory, see Bienefeld (1988); Bradshaw (1988); Kaplinsky (1980); Leys (1980, 1996).  
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occurrence. Kibera’s residents were not interested in either “volunteering” to build better 
toilets or engaging in projects to clean up garbage-filled open sewers without compensation. 
They did not see how an afternoon spent in a social hall participating in a focus group 
discussion on gender-based violence or youth employment provided them stand-alone value. 
The history of aid and development in Kibera had informed them that NGOs would 
compete for their engagement and they knew that if they waited long enough compensation 
would be offered. Remuneration came in forms like transportation reimbursements, 
“facilitation fees,” or honoraria. To the well-meaning foreign social entrepreneurs, 
researchers, and development workers who hoped their pilot projects or new social ventures 
would have lasting effect, Kibera’s residents looked stubborn, shortsighted, and unwilling to 
see the broader social value when they asked outright for these. Therefore, the local 
residents developed language and actions that kept their true economic needs hidden in 
order to continue to appear altruistic and civically engaged. As we will see, the reality was 
much more complex and most of the young Kiberans who hustled NGOs did so because 
they were driven by a passion to serve their communities as well.  
Residents very much knew that the reputation of their community as “ruined” could 
cause economic opportunities to diminish or to be moved to lesser-profile informal 
settlements in other parts of the city. So they walked a fine line between not wanting to 
participate for free and hiding their economic intentions from potential clients or 
employers.21 Young people who were connected to opportunities in the development field 
                                                
21 I am using terms like ‘client’ or ‘employed’ to illustrate that participation in the development field was 
actually considered work, though the young people would never had framed it this way since they felt a need to 
hide this fact.  
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knew it was imperative to maintain an appearance of eagerness to participate until 
negotiations began. Then, the individual or organization would push for certain conditions 
of association. It was a delicate balance between showing need as the beneficiaries of the 
program and controlling the terms.  
The Institutional Cycle of Birth and Decay 
The whims and constraints of the development field contributed to the cycles of birth 
and decay in grassroots youth organizations. The process usually began like this: an 
international NGO or a foreign volunteer created a program to teach young people about 
the latest trends in economic development with the objective of introducing better economic 
opportunities. Entrepreneurship and business training sessions were especially popular 
because they promoted self-employment in an environment of informality. To facilitate easy 
implementation of the project, NGOs looked for young people to pre-sort into groups—
most easily found when young people participated in community-based and self-help 
organizations. These groups would then be enrolled in training sessions. The training 
sessions might consist of a multi-day meeting in a social hall or retreat center where young 
people brainstormed economic gaps and opportunities in their communities. They would 
learn to write a business plan and be given training in budgeting and fiscal responsibility. If 
they were lucky, they might get a loan or start-up capital to begin a new venture. Some of the 
businesses might even work, but, in my extended observation, many of the groups would fall 
apart or have their membership reshuffled before the next development project approached. 
This might seem like a cynical conclusion with regards to the effectiveness of development 
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programming, but I discovered that the young people who participated in the projects did 
not see the progression of birth and decay as detrimental or deterministic.  
To explain this institutional cycle, it is valuable to identify the three main underlying 
factors. The first was that the development practitioners who introduced programs in Kibera 
failed to correctly categorize the beneficiaries of their programs. “Youth” were frequently 
described with legal and policy definitions that focused only on age range. For example the 
United Nations defines a youth as a person between 15 and 24 whereas the Kenyan 
Constitution uses an age range category of 18 to 35.22 These specifications were useful for 
identifying when citizens were eligible to receive ID cards or drive a car, but in the context 
of development programming, age range definitions tended to be limiting. Instead, “youth” 
was actually a life stage between adolescence and adulthood, which some young men and 
women transitioned through more quickly than others. As one public policy scholar has 
pointed out, “in African societies, responsibilities such as marriage are more important in 
defining the category where one belongs—adult or youth” (Muthee 2010, 5). This definition 
made it possible for a 34-year-old to be a youth and a 26-year-old to be an adult. Youth was 
dependent not on age, but on the decisions and actions that defined their progress. The goal 
for all young people was to graduate into adulthood quickly, because youth was liminal. It 
was an uncomfortable period marked by insecurity, negative stereotyping, and a lack of 
tangible societal status. Unfortunately, practitioners who were trying to fill seats in training 
halls and show impact in funding reports seemed to (at least from the perspective of young 
                                                
22 See United Nations. “Definition of Youth” http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/documents/youth/fact-




people I met who attended such trainings) be less worried about a youth’s struggle to attain, 
or earn, adulthood and more concerned about whether or not he or she fit an age criterion. 
Understanding the point where a young person is on the path to adulthood might have 
better informed the kind of programming and type of engagement the NGOs designed.  
A second issue I observed was that the achievement of adulthood had become a 
personal struggle in Nairobi’s informal settlements.23 This was truer, as we will see, among 
young males than females. Young men built networks, maintained ties to extended kinship 
groups, and voluntarily participated in associational life in the ever evolving, fleeting self-
help groups and community-based organizations. But there was a clear schism between what 
they were expected to attain in order to be an adult and what they could conceivably achieve 
in the existent economy in Kibera. These were expectations derived from the conservatism 
of elders and the persistence of gerontocracy. Half a century earlier, many of these young 
men would have been inducted into adulthood together in an age-grade system that ensured 
their inevitable graduation and set them on a path toward elderhood. In modern Kenya, this 
age grade system was maintained, but in fragments. In the Kibera I knew, young men were 
still expected to work toward informal induction into a council of elders, but the way they 
were told to achieve it—a new house, marriage, children, or cattle and livestock—had not 
been adapted to the economic options available in the urban informal settlements. Marc 
Sommers saw this in nearby Rwanda as young men getting “stuck” and unable to meet the 
                                                
23 A classic example of scholarship about adolescence is Margaret Mead’s work in Coming of Age in Samoa (1928). 
Her study looked at the relative freedom of young people in Samoa. Research such as hers “has usually 
approached adolescence from the perspective of adulthood, downplaying youth-centered interaction and 
cultural production in favor of an emphasis on the transition to adulthood” (Bucholtz 2002, 525). For 
comparison, see Derek Freeman’s book Margaret Mead and Samoa: The Making and Unmaking of an Anthropological 
Myth (1983) that argues that Mead’s characterization of youth transitions was more fiction than reality. 
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unrealistic expectations set upon them (Sommers 2012). These were not achievements that 
were procured by joining a Kibera youth group, where everyone else was suffering from the 
same expectations. Later we will see that the constantly shifting youth groups offered 
advantages to youth, but consistent economic stability was not generally one of them. So 
while young men found themselves attracted to group membership to broaden their 
opportunities for personal achievement, maintaining the group was not a priority in the 
struggle for adulthood.  
The third observation was that the ebbs and flows of the development economy heavily 
influenced the fragility of youth groups. What might appear to be a vibrant and locally 
engaged civil society was also an economic industry for Kiberans. As has been hinted at 
above, the young people learned to not define their participation in explicit economic terms 
even when development organizations created a separate sector in Kibera’s informal 
economy. Subsequently, young people were very aware of the opportunities that the 
organizations offered. Many youth-centered groups were formed and reformed based on the 
trends in development agendas and they actively strategized to create a façade of a vibrant, 
engaged, and active civil society.  
The rise and fall of youth membership in groups had less to do with weakness, as 
DeWaal suggests. Instead it was a result of youth adaptations to the reality of opportunities. 
As was mentioned before, these institutions, and hustling NGOs more broadly, provided 
youth with a chance to gain varied skillsets even when the opportunities were fleeting. They 
learned to be better leaders and practice formality. In the process, they procured power 
within the Kibera community and gained influence in local decision-making. Personal and 
community needs were also being met by youth organizations. Membership in a local group 
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helped a young man navigate a new world of work and urban relationships and this was 
especially important as the skills and tools they acquired were not learned during the 
childhoods spent in rural villages or peri-urban towns. While the youth groups did not 
directly enable the economic stability necessary to achieve adulthood, they did help young 
Kiberans create networks of reciprocity and exchange.  
The story that young Kiberans were actively inventing opportunities stood in sharp 
contrast to narratives peddled by NGOs and touted by the media, which told of 
marginalized residents and victims of macro-economic forces. These assumptions failed to 
account for the internal agency of residents and so one of the key arguments that follows, 
influenced by Janice Perlman’s work in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro, is that despite the 
appearance of chaos, the poor organize and use a complex logic to maneuver around their 
perceived lack of resources and instability (Perlman 2010). Like the informal settlements of 
Rio, it was the kijiji, or “urban village” in Kibera, that was both the source of residents’ 
problems and of their solutions. The more time I spent in Kibera, the more I understood 
that this internal logic and individual strategizing was central to advancing the field of youth 
economic development. It was also critical to understanding why Kibera’s young, unvoiced 
leaders remained in the shadows—unrecognized for their adaptability and problem-solving 
capacities and unrecognized for their “work” in its civil society.  
Themes 
In order to peel away the layers of how Kibera’s young people evolved to understand 
that the development field opened up opportunities to alleviate liminality and accelerate 
transitions to adulthood, three main themes will be weaved throughout this monograph—
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youth empowerment, critical development, and the emergent city. Below I define how these 
themes provide crosscutting influences. 
Youth Empowerment 
Many international development organizations claim that the key to unlocking Africa’s 
potential is in the salvation of its youth population. Africa is home to the largest population 
of young people in the world and the demographic figures are staggering. The mean age of 
youth in sub-Saharan Africa is 18.9 years.24 According to population projections, African 
youth will make up 50% of the world’s youth population by the year 2030. Of the 
unemployed in Africa, 60% are youth (World Bank 2014). These dramatic figures demand 
attention since an increase in a youth population, historically, has been found to correlate 
with higher rates of violence and civil unrest (Huntington 1996). Relatedly is the worry that 
youth-saturated communities are less likely to be civically and socially engaged. The 
continued missteps in Africa’s young nation-states, such as instances of state fissure in 
Northern Nigeria or Somalia demonstrate that youth development should be key for 
ensuring a more prosperous and peaceful future for the continent.  
Youth development in Africa often begins with the word “empowerment,” a theme that 
will be explored in its many forms in this text. The word is applied to any development 
project focused on the promotion of youth as independent agents and implies that young 
people lack the power or agency to influence decision making in societies that orient 
                                                
24 This figure comes from Claire Schaffnit-Chatterjee “High population growth in Africa: A mixed blessing” in 




hierarchies on the basis of age.25 Youth empowerment programs aim to motivate youth to be 
more engaged in problem solving in their communities and to feel less dependent on older 
family members or the government. More specifically, the disempowerment of young people 
in Kibera is often blamed on education systems that teach young people rote memorization 
or on family and cultural structures that demand young people to be seen and not heard. 
Advocates of youth empowerment programs assume that the cycle of poverty has created a 
culture of dependency and powerlessness that is passed on from parents to children (Min-
Harris 2010). It is thought that the only way to break this cycle is to encourage young people 
to play a more active role in their own development. 
My inquiries in Kibera painted a slightly different picture of youth disempowerment. 
Young people, on the whole, lacked the ability to make large-scale policy shifts. Even the 
most civically engaged youth suffered from the frustration of being left out. However, the 
situation was not dire for the youth of Kibera. Political life in Kibera was vibrant and young 
people carved out positions in associations. They belonged to church groups, youth groups, 
community-based organizations, savings clubs, ethnic associations, sports clubs, or self-help 
associations. There were those who could afford to live outside of Kibera in safer 
neighborhoods and with better quality of housing, but preferred to live in the informal 
settlement due to the level of control and influence they earned through their associations. 
We will see that even when the groups fell apart, as they often did, the leaders of the groups 
were left with prestige and social capital that they could use to further their economic goals. 
                                                
25 Anthropologists in Africa have studied the outward performance of powerlessness – see Burke 2000. 
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The Culture of Development 
I do not wish to become another anthropologist decrying the cultural insensitivity of 
international development programs—some of which I took part in earnestly over the 
years—and so this dissertation actively seeks to be less about the effect of badly designed 
programs on an urban slum community and more about the youth’s reaction to, and active 
adaptation of, the programs that existed. By the year 2000, Kibera had become ground zero 
in the global battle to combat youth violence, apathy, and unemployment. It appears as a 
case study in numerous articles and texts. That attention brought with it a remarkable 
saturation of organizations, projects, and interventions. The range of this saturation is 
diverse—there are institutions dedicated to promoting peace and citizenship, educational 
foundations providing scholarships or creating independent private schools, health 
organizations conducting long-range studies about infectious diseases or providing anti-
retroviral medicines to the HIV-infected, and environmental agencies trying to reduce waste 
and improve sanitation. A high proportion of these organizations focused on, and depended 
on, the young people living in Kibera who served as stewards, beneficiaries, volunteers, and 
part-time contractors as well as partners in program design. The relationship was certainly 
not equal, but what emerged from the saturation was interdependence between NGOs and 
youth groups. 
It was important for me to understand the core relationship between young people and 
NGOs because the youth were not just passive recipients of development aid. It was also 
clear that an evolving social structure had emerged to govern that relationship. The youth 
had rules for engagement with foreign entities and kept strict hierarchies within their groups. 
They developed complex forms of reciprocity and tracked their social and economic capital 
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closely. Culturally, the interaction between NGO and youth also had symbolic ramifications. 
For instance, the youth language, Nairobi’s slang argot called Sheng, was often adapted by 
the youth to code what outsiders understood. 
The Emergent City 
At the end of the day, the saturation of NGOs in Kibera was a direct result of the 
settlement’s rapid growth. The larger city of Nairobi plays a central character in the 
discussion because of its role in the psyche of young people across Kenya. For youth 
languishing in Kenya’s rural upcountry, Nairobi represents a heaven on earth and a shining 
city on the hill. For those struggling to survive in its numerous informal settlements, the city 
is a dream fulfilled—even when it disappointed. The best example of this was the response 
of young Kiberans one day early on in my research. After a particularly heated discussion 
with a youth group about all the problems that needed to be fixed in Kibera, I asked, “then, 
why not go home?” [to the rural village they migrated from]. The answer was then, as it 
always would be, “because everything happens here.”  
Nairobi is a city of physical and symbolic walls that Kibera’s actively engaged young 
people both relied on and dreamt of breaking down. The figurative wall between Kibera and 
the rest of the city provided them an excuse for why they had not yet succeeded while at the 
same time providing a safe and necessary haven for young people to develop the skills and 
networks of reciprocity necessary to enter and succeed in the informal economy. Meanings 
about what the city would, and could, provide for young people who were navigating their 
liminality played an important role in the choices they made. The city provided a backdrop 
for shifting ideas of what adulthood could look like and enabled many young men to escape 
  
22 
the trappings of traditional ethnic and cultural definitions in favor of modern urban 
adaptations. 
Structure 
The dissertation is structured to show the context of both place (Kibera and Nairobi) 
and people (youth and practitioners in the development field) in order to intersect the above 
themes. I will first explore the systemic barriers that have stood in the way of young people 
accelerating their adulthood and then show how young people, through hustling in the 
development field, have reacted to and adapted their societal status. Chapter One explores 
the logic of informality and the way actors in the development field contextualize their 
problems. The chapter then dives more deeply into an examination of how young Kiberan 
residents “put the slum on” both physically and mentally. By acknowledging and accepting a 
marginal status, young people begin to build social networks and tap into the unpredictable 
and unlikely resources associated with living on the margins. 
In Chapter Two, I discuss a second systemic barrier delaying young people’s coming-of-
age in Kenya. Economic development reports originating in sub-Saharan Africa often claim 
that alarming rates of unemployment and high rates of violence are the result of a 
demographic surplus of young people, also known as a “youth bulge.” The theories about 
these phenomena do not fully explore the inter-generational expectations, which result in the 
extension of youth, or the period during which young people are categorized as ‘youth’. In 
turn, this delays their adulthood and intensifies their liminality. In age-segmented East Africa 
where the categories of age and power have been strictly defined for generations, it is not the 
demographic challenge of large youth populations that is the main cause of violence, crime, 
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increased poverty, and high unemployment, though these certainly are factors.26 Instead, it is 
the generational divisions that put youth at a disproportionate advantage and extend the 
period of time they live through the liminal and tumultuous period of youth. It is in this 
chapter that I show how cultural, legal, and policy definitions of youth end up restricting 
rather than empowering young people.  
A third systemic barrier also amplifies the culturally and legally protected discrimination 
of youth—the narrow manner in which ‘work’ is defined. Whereas we’ll see that “youth” has 
become a catchall category for any young person between 15 and 35, the category of “work” 
also limits what young people feel are acceptable and meaningful career options. Work has 
been used to refer to the formal private and government sectors in Nairobi and this leaves 
out the kind of economic opportunities engaged by the majority of the population. Chapter 
Three defines this barrier and explores the economic strategy of “hustling.” For the new 
migrant to Kibera or for a young man or woman coming of age there, hustling provides an 
important way for them to create alliances and discover allegiances. It is these networks that 
provide the real training required to enter the informal economy. Learning to hustle is as 
important in the evolving informal marketplace as are hard skills like numeracy or tailoring. 
In both Chapters Four and Five, I explore youth agency by showing how young people 
build power, prestige, and status in the development field. Many of the NGOs in Kibera do 
not interrogate the internal politics and social dynamics of the community groups they 
engage with when they enter the field to treat the symptoms of poverty. This avoids having 
                                                
26 The Comaroffs paint a gloomy portrait of intergenerational antagonism in South Africa. Youth blame their 
inability to secure their futures on aged elites. This insecurity increases the likelihood of youth to engage in 
ritual murder and the occult economy, all of which “erodes the conventional social, cultural and moral 
margins” (Comaroff and Comaroff 2000, 290) 
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to dig into the messy underworld of slum politics and culture. Residents learn to use NGOs 
based on what they need—to secure social services, supplement income, or to gain political 
favor. The youth policies and youth programs designed within NGOs often fail to consider 
young people’s own agency in designing a system that contributes to economic subsistence. 
Over the course of years of participant observation and observant participation in Kibera, I 
saw this was a flawed approach. Young people were in fact continuously engaged in a 
process of creating power, gaining experience, and becoming experts within the location they 
lived and especially through the institutions they continually formed. These young people 
might not participate in national or regional political life or have the ear of local councils of 
elders within their ethnic group, but their long years of youth were not spent completely 
disengaged and powerless. Chapter Four explores how hustling NGOs helps young men 
redefine work to fit their needs. Chapter Five shows how young people manipulate the 
politics of community development organizations to rehearse “power” and exercise their 
leadership in order to gain critical skills to improve their employability and accelerate their 
adulthood.  
Chapter Six discusses the collective learning that emerged from youth’s participation in 
the development field. They graduated, in their own words, from a University of Kibera that 
was created at the intersection of hustling and the development field. This learning taught 
them to conceive a different purpose for their lives and was both a physical transformation, 
in that they must find ways to “put the slum off” in their manners, gestures, and language, 
and a mental shift away from marginalization and exclusion. Hustling NGOs gave rise to 
symbolic transformations and created an environment where these young people could see 
past the myth of meritocracy, the gerontocratic order, and the abjection of their social status 
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to conceive of a new state of wholeness. 
Finally, there are several vignettes throughout the text of Steve, who is written as a 
fusion of many of the young men I knew in Kibera. From Oscar Lewis’s classic Children of 
Sanchez (1969) about a family living in a Mexico City slum, to the historical biography of a 
South African sharecropper in Charles van Onselen’s The Seed is Mine (1996), life histories 
provide an insight and depth of knowledge into the everyday decision-making of people as 
they live through larger political or social events. Stories of individuals help to enrich and 
inform the historical record. They also help to “make the strange familiar and the familiar 
strange” (Miner 1956). The disadvantaged youth I knew sought ways to accelerate adulthood 
through hustling. They stumbled frequently along the way and were exploited by their kin. 
They invested in a wide array of reciprocal relationships only to watch them crumble. Steve 
serves to symbolize all of them as a fictional character struggling to come of age in Kibera 
while dealing with the systemic barriers of protracted liminality and narrow definitions of 
work. Steve’s story is not a perfect trajectory of a young man graduating into adulthood 
because of the youth development programs available to him in Kibera, but rather as a 
byproduct of them. The saturation of NGOs and intense focus of resources in Kibera 
created an environment where Steve and others like him could utilize skills of adaptation 
that they acquired by hustling to alleviate their failed adulthood. 
The Evolution of Thinking 
To begin at the beginning, my research in Kibera was inspired by a desire to understand 
the emergent youth culture of an increasingly urban Kenya. I initially proposed that identity 
formation among young people living in Nairobi’s largest informal settlement was 
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complicated by the multiplicity of options available to them in the liminal world of urban 
informality. I see now that I was also naively hopeful that the emergence and popularity of 
urban and global youth culture in the form of music videos, fashion, and other consumer 
products was a signal that their primary identifications were shifting away from natal groups. 
In Kenya, a country where a few of these groups have, over time, amassed wealth and land 
in unequal proportion to others, the disintegration of ethnic ties would suggest a significant 
shift in social networks and connections. The culture of youth, regardless of individual 
ethnic backgrounds would lead to the formation of “new ethnicities”, as Les Back had seen 
among diaspora youth in the UK (Back 1996). Recognizing the formation of these new 
ethnicities, I thought, would add nuance to the dominant story that young Kenyans were 
inherently and negatively “tribalist”.27 
The presence of new cultural forms was the supporting evidence I used in my original 
research hypothesis. The most noticeable of these was Sheng, the urban slang language that 
was a mix of Kiswahili, English, and various native languages playfully combined in order to 
maintain secrecy from elders, signal neighborhood identification, and give young people the 
status of being “cool.” But there were others. An emerging arts industry, which included 
rising popular musicians, graffiti artists, and other local celebrities, signaled that Kenya’s 
youth were finding new ways to voice their culture in the urban environment.28 Some had 
even argued that there were lessons about changing ethnic allegiances to be learned from the 
growing middle class (Spronk 2014). All of this I expected to be playing out in one way or 
                                                
27 Back’s work was part of a larger school of youth cultural production at the Birmingham Center for 
Contemporary Cultural Studies. See also Rampton 1999; Procter 2004; Willis 1997. 
28 For more on Kenyan youth culture see Ntarangwi 2009 and Samper 2004. 
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another in Kibera and idealized that I would be able to recognize and record a transforming 
Kenya.  
Of course, everything changed in 2008 when Kibera erupted into disorder. Sporadic 
outbursts of protest and violence were spurred by inter-community conflict and running 
clashes with the Kenya police. The economies—both formal and informal—ground to a halt 
and schools were shuttered closed. Worryingly, Kiberan residents were displaced and tight 
economic and social bonds between neighbors were severed. The chaos actually began on 
the last day of 2007 upon the sudden announcement of incumbent President Mwai Kibaki’s 
swearing-in—an event that took place during a privately held but televised ceremony. The 
inauguration was quickly planned following a botched General Election rife with allegations 
of voter fraud and corruption. As Kibera was the home ground of support for opposition 
leader, presidential hopeful, and the area’s Member of Parliament, Raila Odinga, sporadic 
violence and persistent chaos ruled during the two months that followed.  
The first few weeks in January saw the burning of the large Toi Market and the 
displacement of members of Kenya’s largest ethnic group, the Kikuyu, from areas 
predominantly inhabited by their rivals, the Luo. It also saw looting, vandalism, and 
destruction of houses and shops, primarily owned by wealthier members of the Kibera 
population. A clear mix of ethnic and class warfare was fueled even further by the stalemate 
between political parties over election fraud. By the time a national accord and power 
sharing agreement mediated by former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan was signed on 
February 28th, perhaps up to 300,000 people had been displaced and over 1200 people were 
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killed across Kenya during just two months of violence.29 The damage done in Kibera was 
only a fraction of the total destruction that took place across Kenya which saw rioting in the 
cities of Mombasa and Kisumu and horrifically tragic incidences of ethnic cleansing in the 
agricultural towns of Eldoret, Nakuru, and Naivasha in Kenya’s Rift Valley.  
Much was written about the ethnic element persisting in Kenyan politics that appeared 
to be exemplified during this moment in time (Atieno-Odhiambo 2002; Wamwere 2003; 
Ogude 2002; Omolo 2002). But despite the post-election violence happening in the midst of 
my dissertation research, ethnicity did not emerge as a major theme—a fact that surprised 
me. The violence had a major effect on my thinking and direction, but only because it 
allowed me to see from the vantage point of development response. Throughout the 
violence, while Kenya’s young men were vilified in the national and international news 
cycles, with images of them throwing stones, beating their neighbors, and destroying 
property, I spent time with the young men (and women) who picked the stones up, mediated 
peace, and donated time and effort to rebuild. There was a suspension of ethnicity as much 
as it was thickening of the lines between ethnic groups. And yet, for numerous political and 
economic reasons, these stories of creativity and vitality paled in comparison to the dramatic 
violent ones.  
After the post-election violence, instead of looking for “new ethnicities,” I began to pay 
greater attention to the shadows. What lessons were there to be learned in looking beyond 
the tropes and stereotypes? What would be gained by unveiling the hidden structures 
                                                
29 This is a conservative estimate based off media reports. A briefing by Sheila Mwiandi from 8/1/2008 says 
that more than 600,000 people were displaced during and after the violence. See Mwiandi (2008) and Report 




directing people’s lives? I focused on these other aspects of the youth experience and 
eventually discovered ethnicity mattered to the young people active in Kibera’s development 
field less than I originally presumed. The roadblocks to success and progress inside Kibera 
did not stem from the fact that they were from the Kikuyu, Luo, or Luhya ethnic groups or 
were Catholic, Pentecostal, or Muslim. In fact, time and again, I found that in spite of the 
media’s persistent discussion about Kibera’s dangerous ethnic tensions, young people wore 
ethnicity like a garment—a symbol of their identity easily taken off if a different symbol was 
more useful. They hustled using their ethnicity in much the way they used religion, age, and 
membership in community organizations to find opportunities for advancement. The 
identities of young people were important but as I moved forward with the dissertation, it 
became impossible to ignore that the greatest influence on the young people I was meeting 
in Kibera was the saturation of NGOs and I wanted to tell the story of creativity and 
adaptation that emerged out its failings.  
Approach 
The information in this dissertation was culled from a decade of research activities with 
young people in Kenya. As an ethnographic researcher, I shifted between participant 
observation and being an observant participant. Whereas the former involves entering into 
the research with a specific intention of answering a research question, the latter was to take 
the insider approach and to observe after participation had already commenced. While it was 
impossible for me ever to fit as a Kibera resident, I came having cut my teeth at the Youth 
Agenda, a national civil society lobby organization, and was conversant in the language and 
protocols of Kenya’s larger civil society and development field. 
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The observant participant method gave me time to gain acceptance over an extended 
period and this was especially important in a community highly suspicious and critical of the 
intentions of a mzungu, a common Swahili word for foreigner or “white person”.  Especially 
since I offered no remuneration, except in the form of the occasional gift of tea or lunch. 
“With observant participation there are no problems of resocialization, acceptance or 
misunderstanding, since it is a familiar role…but the observer must have a suitable role in 
which to observe where probing questions can be asked without appearing unusual or 
untypical” (Brewer 2000, 61). My original forays into the national civil society served as a 
good introduction to youth activism and development, but I was eager to get closer to the 
young people who were truly being affected by the anti-youth policies and practices that 
organizations like the Youth Agenda were trying to change. My first opportunity to do this 
came with a fellowship and attachment at Carolina for Kibera (CFK) during the summer of 
2005. CFK was a non-governmental organization that provided basic services as part of their 
vision to empower youth. They ran numerous successful programs: a sports program to 
combat cross-ethnic tensions, an adolescent girls program which provided young women a 
safe space to learn about reproductive health, and a clinic operation combined with youth-
friendly voluntary counseling and testing for HIV. The organization was co-founded by an 
mzungu and usually hosted at least one or two mzungu volunteers. The presence of other 
white people contributed to my ability to be accepted and the organizational affiliation 
granted me access to community development events and meetings. 
I returned to Carolina for Kibera in 2007 to begin my doctoral research and continued to 
provide administrative assistance on various projects with the understanding that CFK 
would serve as a base for my reentry into Kibera social life. The Executive Director granted 
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permission to hold focus group discussions in the community hall and I divided my time 
between CFK and the offices of a development-consulting firm where I was serving as an 
assistant on a series of projects mostly focused on strategic planning for civil society 
organizations. Doing both kinds of work concurrently ensured that I reestablished contacts 
and retained a more global perspective of development. 
Six months after my return, the violent protests of the 2007 election erupted across 
Kibera and broke the initial timeline of my research. During the period of violence, CFK 
distributed donations of non-food items such as mattresses, cookery, and first aid supplies to 
their beneficiaries and its staff were drawn into mediation. An anonymous donor asked CFK 
to cobble together a community mediation and peace campaign in an attempt to compel the 
wider Kibera community to stop the violence and I was recruited to help run the logistics of 
this campaign. In conjunction with other local non-profits, we formed teams of local leaders 
and trained them in mediation techniques, eventually giving them a mandate to go to their 
communities to stop the looting, burning, and displacement of residents. We developed 
community forums and recruited youth from several self-help groups to form a participatory 
educational theater team. As unsettling as the environment was in which we operated the 
project, Jamii ya Kibera (the Community of Kibera) ended up giving me the opportunity to 
meet youth who were not normally cast in CFK’s wide net. 
Between May 2008 and April 2012, I also served as the director of the American 
University study abroad program on Issues in Sustainable Development, based in Nairobi. 
This afforded me the ability to engage in an extended study of youth leaders and 
development institutions and enabled the mining of fresh observations and insights from my 
American students. As part of their studies most of them were engaged in small grassroots 
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NGOs across Nairobi’s informal settlements giving me another opportunity to gain 
insights—the students provided a wider breadth of knowledge about development trends 
city-wide and subsequently, I gained insights about Kibera’s uniqueness within the city.  
From mid-2008 until I left Kenya in 2012, it was mainly the youth of small self-help 
groups and community-based organizations who directed and redirected my research 
inquiries. I was impressed by their relentless pursuit of community change and what seemed 
to be an egalitarian dedication to community assistance. These were bright, engaged, 
enthusiastic youth who defied all the stereotypes about how “slum” residents behaved. They 
did not discriminate based on ethnic affiliation when forging friendships. They constructed 
organizations that included both rural migrants and the Born Tau, youth born and raised in 
Kibera. When I could help some of the young men by connecting them with opportunities 
to work, I did. I dedicated time to helping youth write resumes and cover letters as part of 
their never-ending desire to find work outside the informal economy. It took almost two 
years to take one of these community-based organizations through a comprehensive 
strategic planning process. The process yielded a small contract with an international NGO 
to do continued program work. It also promised steady administrative funds.  
Throughout the seven years that I maintained contact with young Kiberans—at varying 
levels of intensity of engagement—I utilized traditional research methods like interviewing, 
focus group discussions, and surveys, and my less traditional mode of observant 
participation. I was also able to get a close read on the structures of youth development from 
the ground up as well as how those structures eventually created alternative rites of passage 
that accelerated youth’s transitions to adulthood.  
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The following has been written to reveal the shadow aid economy and the shadow 
leaders in Kibera who created an environment in which it became possible for young people 
to come of age. Some of the realities of Kibera were, and still are at this point, heartbreaking. 
The paths the youth in this dissertation took were not necessarily the same paths many of 
their peers had laid before them, but they were also not trajectories that resulted from the 
efforts of development institutions and aid money alone. This is the final point. The agency 
exercised by young people through their creativity, their passion, their “hustle,” and their 
constant and continual efforts to work together—even when the institutions they built fell 
apart—provided a necessary complement to any youth development advances that happened 
in Kibera. When I commended Kepha, the lion from the above quote, on his astute 
observations, he responded to me quickly saying, “if no one says it, it may never be known.” 
And so my promise to him, and the countless others who serve as the core of this story, is to 


































CHAPTER ONE: ON THE MARGINS OF NAIROBI CITY 
 
An American volunteer at a small grassroots organization once described Kibera to me 
as a beating heart. She wrote of the children running around playing tag, the women 
gossiping, the bright laundry waving in the wind and saw hope and promise. Not, she 
specified, “misery or despair.”30 If one stands on the railway between the conjoining villages 
of Gatwekira and Kambi Muru before reaching the food stalls and bars of Darajani, one can 
view Kibera from above. People move and rush throughout the day, but even more so at 
dawn or dusk when the pathways and main roads are clogged with residents traveling to or 
from their jobs in Nairobi city. Men with pushcarts whistle behind pedestrians to warn of 
their approach. The occasional car beeps its way through the throngs. It may, as the 
volunteer said, be the beating heart of Kenya’s capital city. Not because of its economic 
output or the status and power of its large population, but for symbolically embodying what 
all of Nairobi is—dirty, dusty, crowded, colorful, and clogged.  
There are over 130 informal settlements in Nairobi, housing more than 60% of the 
population of the city.31 As such, the residents of these places constitute a “marginal 
majority”—living outside the formal city, but comprising most of its population. Indeed, 
most of the city’s residents make a living, or somehow depend, on the presence of the 
informal economy and Nairobi’s informal settlements are part and parcel of its history.32 
                                                
30 From an assignment completed by Annabel Hogg, my student during the Fall 2009 semester with AU 
Abroad Kenya, who volunteered in Kibera as part of her studies. 
31 As reported by IRIN in “Nairobi’s People’s Settlement Network Interview” in In –Depth: Tomorrow’s Crises 
Today: The Humanitarian Impact of Urbanization (8/30/2007) 
http://www.irinnews.org/indepthmain.aspx?InDepthID=63&ReportID=74026 
32 Percentages of how many people live in Nairobi slums are variable as its population. UN-Habitat’s Kenya 
Slum Upgrading Strategy Document reports that over 60% of the Nairobi population lives in slums that 
occupy 10% of the land (Syrja ̈nen 2008, 10). 
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Since the first railway station was built in 1899, the un-housed have been drawn to the city in 
search of jobs and services. They responded to chronic housing shortages through building 
squatter settlements and informal shanties on the edges of the city. Of this early period, 
David Anderson writes, “European speculators who had acquired plots cheaply in the early 
years of the settlement did not want to blight their investment by permitting African housing 
to be built, and so a shortage of African housing was apparent from the earliest years of the 
town’s development and became increasingly acute as the town grew in size” (Anderson 
2001, 140).  
When Nairobi’s winding roads, green belts, and suburban neighborhoods were being laid 
out during the colonial period, the city was dubbed “The Green City in the Sun.” The trees 
at the arboretum on a hill above Nairobi’s downtown, founded in 1907, flourished in the 
fertile red soil. The country’s first national park, established in 1946, was only a short drive 
from the city center, offering a nearby safari option for tourists. The colonial municipal 
government invested in parks and water fountains and golf courses. The Nairobi City 
Council ensured the streets were clean, infrastructure was well maintained, garbage was 
collected, water was delivered, and electricity was installed. This was, of course, only the 
situation for the European-designated areas of the city. On the other side, in areas that had 
been set aside for Asian and African residents, the population was more densely situated and 
its housing stock inadequate for the numbers of people who needed a place to live. 
After the conclusion of World War II, Woodley Estate was constructed as a 
neighborhood of government houses built for Europeans. In a settlement nearby, at a place 
called Kichinjio, or the slaughterhouse, Nubians from Sudan and Chad who were retired 
members of the King's African Rifles grazed cattle and sold meat to their European 
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neighbors. Nubians also found work at the Royal Nairobi Golf Course, where they were 
revered for their caddy skills. Today, that same golf course abuts the sprawling slum, Kibra, 
which in the Arabic-based creole language of KiNubi, means “the forest”. The Nubians, 
who enjoyed special status under colonialism, eventually stayed on this land to build 
structures to rent to migrants from all over the country.33  
Kibra, or Kibera as it eventually came to be known, sits at 1.31 degrees south of the 
Equator and 36.78 degrees east of Greenwich. With the equatorial sun and a high elevation 
of 5,800 feet, the temperature is comfortable year round. Two rainy seasons, a shorter period 
in October and a longer season that starts in March, wreak havoc on informal settlements 
like Kibera because of flooding and mudslides. On foot, the Central Business District of 
Nairobi is 5 kilometers away from Kibera’s easternmost villages. The industrial area of 
Nairobi, where many residents find work, is almost equidistant. From the eastern edge at the 
village of Soweto East to Kibera’s western edge near the 42 bus stage and the Ngong Road 
Forest, the settlement stretches approximately 3 kilometers. It is made up of three 
administrative wards and divided into twelve distinct villages.34 NGOs will often compare 
Kibera’s size of 630 acres to Central Park in New York City. The streams and tributaries of 
the clogged Motoine River flow into the Ngong and eventually the Nairobi rivers.  
                                                
33 Timothy Parsons (1997) has written the definitive history of the establishment of the Sudanese of Kibera and 
Johan de Smedt’s (2009) history of Nubian Gin fills in gaps.  
34 Laini Saba, Soweto East, Silanga, Lindi, Mashimoni, Kambi Muru, Kisumu Ndogo, Gatwekira, Makina, 
Kianda, Soweto West and Raila are the main villages, though some also include the more formal areas of 
Ayany, Olympic, Fort Jesus and Karanja Road as Greater Kibera. 
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The residents call Kibera a slum, the kijiji (Kiswahili for “village”), or ghetto. They know 
it is more politically correct to call it an informal settlement.35 In Sheng, the language of the 
youth, it is called Kibich. According to various reports, development propaganda, or 
mapping analyses, it is the “largest slum in Africa,” but in reality it has a size comparable to 
the slums and townships of other large African cities like Lagos, Accra, Cape Town, 
Johannesburg, Cairo, and Kinshasa.36 Despite these excessive claims, Kibera’s human 
numbers are unclear. The widely disseminated UN-Habitat report on The Challenge of Slums in 
2003 reported that there were 400,000 people. Mike Davis (2005) wrote of the 800,000 
people in Kibera struggling for dignity. Kenya’s questionable census numbers from 2009 
show a population of 170,078.37 And when Dr. Jill Biden visited in June 2010, the White 
House website reported a population of 1.5 million.38 Some of these numbers were 
determined by counting the structures that could be seen through aerial photographs. The 
number of structures was then multiplied by an estimate of the average amount of people 
living within them.39 Another guesstimate comes from the Integrated Regional Information 
                                                
35 I will use kijiji, the Swahili word for village, throughout this text, as it is the least politically charged term to 
describe the area. 
36 Khayelitsha township outside Cape Town, South Africa most often competes with Kibera for the “Largest 
Slum in Africa” title, though there are significant environmental differences in how each has been built which 
call into question how comparable they are. See Daniel Tovrov, “5 Biggest Slums in the World” in International 
Business Times (12/09/2011) http://www.ibtimes.com/5-biggest-slums-world-381338 
37 Available from the Kenya Open Data Initiative https://www.opendata.go.ke/Population/Kibera-
population-2009/fzpq-tia8 
38 See Annie Tomasini “Audio Slideshow: Dr. Biden Sees the Neighborhoods of Kenya” in The White House 
Blog (6/08/2010) https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/06/08/audio-slideshow-dr-biden-sees-kibera-kenya 
39 This information came from personal communication with other researchers in Kibera, but the use aerial 
photography in mapping settlements was a common approach to mapping these locations. See “Putting 




Networks (IRIN), which estimated that there were 2000 people per hectare.40 This would 
mean that Kibera was home to just over 500,000 people. The variability in the Kibera 
population figures was explained in 2010:  
"In the absence of actual data (such as an official census), NGO staff make a back-
of-envelope estimate in order to plan their projects; a postgraduate visiting the NGO 
staff tweaks that estimate for his thesis research; a journalist interviews the researcher 
and includes the estimate in a newspaper article; a UN officer reads the article and 
copies the estimate into her report; a television station picks up the report and the 
estimate becomes the headline; NGO staff see the television report and update their 
original estimate accordingly.41 
 
The figures for Kibera indicate that until data collection is improved country, and indeed, 
continent-wide, the population size may never be known. What is known is that no official 
restrictions or enforceable laws regulate individual house densities so any given home, 
averaging in size of around 10 feet by 10 feet, might house up to 10 people. It is that 
possibility that makes it so sensational. 
For the tourist, volunteer, missionary, state envoy, or development donor who visits 
Kibera, the population numbers are secondary to the sensual assault of the location. 
Accompanied by community leaders acting as visitor security, guests will descend into the 
village’s valleys, where the worst shanties have been constructed along the choked river. 
When they reach the railway line, the visitors will be treated to a view of the wide expanse of 
the slum before they even reach the clinic, school, or women’s project they are visiting. They 
will see rows upon rows of poorly built one-room mud and corrugated iron shacks linked by 
winding and dangerous pathways lined with open sewers and illegally tapped electrical lines. 
                                                
40 IRIN, “In-Depth: Running Dry: the Humanitarian Impact of the Global Water Crisis: Kibera, The Forgotten 
City” (9/13/2006) http://www.irinnews.org/in-depth/62409/13/kenya-kibera-the-forgotten-city  
41 As seen on the Map Kibera website, http://mapkiberaproject.yolasite.com. The Map Kibera Project, which 
in 2006 set out to come up with a better method for figuring out the real numbers, includes this quote.  
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TV aerials suspended from precariously attached poles block the views of the forest and row 
houses of middle class Langata beyond it. Visitors will usually remark at how many aerials 
they see, indicative of a consumerism they would never have expected.  
Plastic bags clog the open sewer ways and stagnant water becomes a breeding ground for 
mosquitoes—a problem that also explains outbreaks of water-borne diseases. The smell 
from these sewers is nauseating and the small streams that pass behind and below 
precariously positioned homes, shops, and pit latrines remain dammed by litter. During 
intense rain storms the dams will break and flood surrounding areas. The utilities are 
generally poor. There is a severe shortage of toilets and water is a commodity that is sold at a 
premium at neighborhood access points. Electricity, like in the rest of Nairobi, is frequently 
shut off.  
It is not quiet in Kibera. The sounds of reggae, ragga, and rap stream from radios inside 
the dukas (vending stalls) and barbershops lining all the main paths. The occasional 
commercial marketing roadshow, civil society training, or political rally adds to the drama 
that is Kibera. The tour guides will hope the visitors do not witness more shocking situations 
like a crowd administering vigilante, or “mob,” justice or individuals who are high on illicitly 
brewed alcohol or industrial glue.  
The initial response of the Kibera visitor tends to be outrage and disgust. How can 
people live like this? Are these not human rights violations? Why is it impossible for the 
Kenyan government, the United Nations, the City Council, or bilateral agencies like USAID 
to address the injustices of life here? Why does it seem so insurmountable to pull these 
people out of such poverty and create jobs and formal sector opportunities? These questions 
emerge not from the experience of visiting with and talking to residents, but rather from the 
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assumptions derived from the “poverty porn” media coverage that slum visitors and tourists 
are exposed to before they ever get there.42 A single walk through Kibera is hardly long 
enough to overcome the very human urge to believe the worst of, and for, the people living 
there. 
The answer to these questions is rooted in a long history of informality in Kenya—a 
history that has never been resolved up to today.43 The earliest informal settlements in 
Nairobi were squatter communities that sprouted on the edges of the town to meet a 
growing need for low-income housing for rural migrants during the colonial era. The 
governments of both the colonial era and post-independence period considered the presence 
of slums to be a nuisance and enacted eviction and demolition policies that did not offer real 
solutions to the low-cost housing shortage in the city (Anderson 2001). In the beginning 
colonial officials assumed that native Africans had not interest in urbanizing. Housing was 
provided only for male Africans who entered the city as short-term migrant laborers. But 
after World War II, policies began to encompass women and children into urban planning—
though only within specific locations based on race. The city grew in fits and starts at the will 
of local political and economic interests. Little attention was paid to the low-income housing 
sectors, especially areas where shanties and slum settlements inevitably emerged. When 
                                                
42 Matt from the Aid Thoughts Blog notes that “Poverty porn is any type of media, be it written, photographed or 
filmed, which exploits the poor’s condition in order to generate the necessary sympathy for selling newspapers 
or increasing charitable donations or support for a given cause.” “What is Poverty Porn and why does it matter 
for development?” (7/1/2009) http://aidthoughts.org/?p=69. This is an issue that Christopher Odhiambo 
Joseph addresses deftly in his article about the imagery of poverty as seen in the movie The Constant Gardener 
(Joseph 2012). 
43 For more on informality and living conditions in Nairobi see Gulyani and Talukdar (2010). 
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shantytowns got in the way of formal urban growth, they were cleared—a cycle of building 
and demolition that continued into the twenty-first century.44 
After independence in 1963, various low-cost housing solutions were experimented with 
across the city. Site-and-service schemes were introduced in locations around Nairobi’s 
Eastlands, like the Umoja Estates. The Nairobi City Council further developed low-income 
housing estates modeled on earlier colonial designs. None of these approaches focused 
specifically on residents whose entire existence was connected to the informal economy 
because people who lacked formal employment were not equal in the eyes of the law, and 
informality continued to be denigrated.45 It was not until political changes shifted the one-
party authoritarian state to a multi-party democracy in the 1990s that ideas about how to 
address slum settlements in Nairobi shifted from demolition toward upgrading.46 Since that 
time, Kibera has been the experimental site of interventions to provide slum residents with 
better quality housing, more services, and greater security. While laudable, these attempts see 
continued resistance from locals (Omenya and Huchzermeyer 2006).  
The assumption that informal settlements are marginal, and residents are exploited by 
larger macro-economic and political forces, is complicated in Kibera by phenomena like 
slum tourism and NGO saturation. Certainly the case can be made that housing quality, 
                                                
44 For more information on colonial and post-colonial slum eviction practices see Gatabaki-Kamau and 
Karirah-Gitau (2004); Hake (1977); Macharia (1992); K, awesome. 
and Otiso (2002; 2003).  
45 Explanations of failed low-income housing policies, much of which were based on the 1948 Nairobi Master 
Plan, can be read in Otiso (2003); Obudho (1997); Huchzermeyer (2008); and Harris (1972). The Mazingira 
Institute’s comic book by Terry Hirst and Davinder Lamba, The Struggle for Nairobi (1994), also does an excellent 
job, among other things, of detailing constraints to decent housing over Nairobi’s history. 
46 The most notable of these for Kiberans was the Highrise project instituted by the National Housing 
Corporation in the 1980s to provide low cost housing for slum residents, but the project ended up in the hands 
of politicians. Rodriguez-Torres shows how an upgrading project was hijacked in the Mathare slum in her 
article in Nairobi Today (2010). 
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physical insecurity, educational opportunity, and economic uncertainty perpetuate a “culture 
of poverty.” From Oscar Lewis, “the culture of poverty is not just a matter of deprivation or 
disorganization, a term signifying the absence of something. It is a culture in the traditional 
anthropological sense in that it provides human beings with a design for living, with a ready-
made set of solutions for human problems, and so serves a significant adaptive function” 
(Lewis 1966, 19). But for the increasingly young population of Kibera, that “design for 
living” has never been static and youth perceived a great deal of fluidity in their present and 
future prospects. This was especially true in the segment of the population that was active in 
the voluntary associations connected to the larger development field. Slum tourism and 
NGO hustling indicated that this crowd possessed a great deal of flexibility in how they 
seized opportunities. 
This remainder of this chapter discusses the “marginality” of Kibera and the role of 
exclusion in leading young people to hustle—generally as participants in the informal 
economy and more specifically as actors in the development field. There were no real 
physical walls drawing a line of exclusion, but the mental walls between Kibera and 
surrounding neighborhoods were high. The chapter will also contest the perception that 
marginality is illogical and instead show that the social systems in the informal sphere were 
fiercely hierarchical and the rules to navigating these systems were unspoken, but firm. The 
first thing young Kiberans did was learn these rules on their pathway towards hustling. If 
their actions looked ambiguous and shadowy, it was because the art of hustling required 
these fuzzy edges.  
In Kibera, patterns of systemic inequality increased marginality and exclusion. For 
example, in the last decade, the planners of development interventions have justified 
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numerous projects and programs by highlighting Kibera’s uniqueness. This exceptionalism 
has been based on an idea that Kibera was the largest site of gross human right violations in 
Nairobi; its sheer breadth and concentration is striking. But how exceptional is Kibera really 
in the larger picture of urban informal settlements? And how does that kind of rhetoric 
affect or influence how youth operated within its borders? 
On the Margins 
In the context of Kibera, marginalization explains the physical separateness of the 
informal settlement from the larger city. Exclusion refers to the social processes of 
stigmatization and lack of access to basic human rights. The two are interrelated in that the 
physical separation of Kibera prevents delivery of resources that are generally available to 
formal areas in the city—resources like emergency services, water delivery, or electricity 
supply. The terms marginalized and excluded also suggest that there is an action deliberately 
being taken against residents by some macro-economic or political force. But 
marginalization and exclusion remain tied only to the language used by the development 
field—and are not a part of the public consciousness. The terms matter in the sense that 
they serve to justify an intense focus on development and the saturation of NGOs. 
There was a clear dissonance between the approach of development institutions to 
marginality and the view of the general public, media, and government in Kenya. An 
example of this can be seen in the public reaction to a tragedy in one of Nairobi’s informal 
settlements. In 2011, Sinai, an informal settlement east of Nairobi’s city center, burned to the 
ground after a lit cigarette set leaking gas on fire. A gas pipeline ran near and under the 
settlement on land privately owned by the Kenya Pipeline Company—a government 
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parastatal that processes and distributes petroleum products. For this reason, it was an area 
that should never have been settled by human population. Because of the physical layout of 
the settlement, ambulances and fire trucks struggled to reach the scene to rescue victims and 
over 100 people died in the blaze. It should not have been surprising that an event like this 
occurred, given that Sinai had been precariously located on the gas pipeline for 20 years, but 
the magnitude and scale of the fire were shocking enough that the city took notice. It was 
reported as breaking news on television and victims were transported to dozens of hospitals 
across the city to be treated for life-threatening burns.  
Government officials in charge of the area, as well as the company’s executives, had not 
put preventive measures in place to avoid a catastrophe like this; this meant that Sinai’s 
residents were victims of official neglect. The government not only neglected to put 
protective measures into place, they neglected to do proper urban planning to produce 
adequate and appropriate shelter for the city’s lowest class and to make Sinai accessible to 
emergency vehicles and law enforcement. While there was initial public outrage against the 
officials who were responsible, eventually comments shifted to victim blaming. Members of 
the public asked questions like, “why had these people accepted to live atop a gas pipeline in 
the first place?” and made statements to the effect that they should have known that it was a 
high-risk area when they moved there.47 Instead of holding the people with the power to 
make change responsible, eventually the public response evolved to point fingers at residents 
who lacked insight and intelligence to exercise personal responsibility on the matter.  
                                                
47 See “KENYA: Preventable Disasters – Why They Keep Occurring” Irin News (10/19/2011) in which it is 
written that “in 2008, three years before the Sinai slum fire tragedy, a local television station highlighted the 




The truth was that people lived in Sinai for one reason—it had been built. Structures 
there had been built by entrepreneurs and businessmen and not by the tenants who were 
burned in the fire. The word ‘squatter’ was sometimes erroneously used to describe Nairobi’s 
informal settlement residents, but by 2011 very few locations in Nairobi were actually self-
built.48 The informal housing market was a lucrative commercial system involving a small 
percentage of landlords and a massive number of tenants. The process to become a landlord 
necessarily involved getting permission from the local government administration, like a 
District Officer or a local area chief, and no structure could be built without such 
permission. And because rent in Sinai was cheaper than in the adjacent middle-class housing 
estates of Pipeline or Donholm, residents opted to live there. The location also offered 
economic opportunities by being adjacent to the nearby industrial area—another fact that 
made it a desirable place to live.  
Another of the biggest and most fallacious claims about Nairobi’s poor neighborhoods is 
that people lack social capital.49 Actual assets and available resources measure poverty, but 
few studies of poverty paid for by development agencies pay attention to individuals’ 
investments in social linkages, because these are difficult to quantify.50 Several justifications 
have been made about this claim of weaker social capital. First, there is an assumption that 
coordination and cooperation in urban spaces, where ethnic linkages and family ties are 
                                                
48 Journalist Robert Neuwirth (2005) wrote of his experience living in informal settlements in Rio, Mumbai, 
Nairobi and Istanbul and calls them all squatter communities, regardless of legality, tenure, or rents. In reality, 
there were very few communities of self-built housing in Nairobi into the second decade of Kenya’s 
independence (also see Amis 1984). 
49 From Robert Putnam (2003), “‘social capital’ refers to features of social organization, such as networks, 
norms, and trust, that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit. Social capital enhances the 
benefits of investment in physical and human capital.” 
50 The focus on quantitative measurement is a result of needing to make comparisons across time and space 
and dealing with large statistical datasets. See Willis 2011, 12. 
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fewer, create a condition of competitiveness and individualism. Second, slum residents move 
frequently and their lack of tenure reduces loyalty and identification to single locations. 
Finally, governance structures in slum areas tend to be weak, a fact that is mirrored in the 
functions of other institutional structures as well.  
Among the youth I met in Kibera, none of the above issues affected their ability to 
amass social capital. In fact, the slum environment, more than any other space that they 
might inhabit, was the location where they could freely work to build networks, play with 
hierarchies, and build social capital by cultivating their reputations. As we will see it was the 
marginal nature of Kibera that was partially responsible for this freedom. 
The Logic of Informality 
Globally, poor people have long been assumed to operate within an illogical system, 
even when the underlying causes like economic inequality and bad governance are known to 
be responsible for their marginality and social exclusion. In 1958, anthropologist A.L. 
Epstein remarked of the emerging informal economy in Zambia: “the developing urban 
social system appears to be marked by internal inconsistency” (Epstein 1958, xvii). In 
Nairobi, informality is considered unsuccessful urbanization, where the masses have been 
left behind to suffer while a few in the middle and upper classes enjoy the modern amenities 
of the city. This line of thinking tends to diminish the actions of the marginal majority as 
they participate in urban life. As Simone notes, “for the most part… studies have not 
examined the ways in which some economies and activities themselves might act as a 
platform for the creation of a very different kind of sustainable urban configuration than we 
have yet to generally know” (Simone 2004, 9). Indeed, informal economies that emerge 
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organically from the margins do make sense to those who participate. “Cities have their own 
logic and if we fail to understand this, we cannot make much sense of how economic and 
social factors place their imprint on them” (Hillier 2006, 16).  
African cities tend to be defined by dichotomies. There is formal and informal, legal and 
illegal, and official and unauthorized. The negatives in these dualities are the labels given to 
people living in slum settlements; this kind of labeling is what James Ferguson (2006) has 
highlighted as the “shadows.” It is the people involved in the informal economy who live 
behind and in the gaps between formal urban spaces. They are involved in unauthorized 
businesses and illegal trade. The informal is criminalized even when its benefits outweigh the 
costs—informality provides job training, expands human and physical capital, and satisfies 
growing demand for low cost goods (Becker et al. 1994, 36). Informal settlements provide 
labor, employment, income, markets, and cheap goods in African cities (Otiso 2002, 254). 
And “Nairobi’s slums offer low quality, but high cost housing, and even worse, they seem to 
be stuck in this sub-optimal equilibrium” (Guylani and Talukdar 2008, 1917). As Janice 
Perlman noted in her study of the favela of Rio de Janeiro, “my conclusion was that the 
favela residents are not marginal at all but inextricably bound into society, albeit in a manner 
detrimental to their own interests” (Perlman 2010, 150). Likewise in Kibera, the residents 
labored to participate in the Nairobi economy only to find themselves maligned and 
excluded from urban processes. 
Richard Hosier categorizes the critiques of informality as being involutionist or evolutionist 
(Hosier 1987). In his definition, involutionists see the relationship between formal and 
informal as an exploitative product of history. Nairobi’s slums emerged as a result of colonial 
segregation policies and capitalist expansion, which left behind a class and status of people 
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who were exploited for cheap labor. Involutionists clamber to design interventions to solve 
this one-sided exploitation. In particular in Kenya, the involutionists have informed 
movements, like Muungano wa Wanavijiji, a group fighting for slum dwellers’ rights through 
community mobilization and protest (Weru 2004).51  
Evolutionists describe the relationship between the formal and informal as benign. 
Instead of seeing the formal sector as harmful, evolutionists claim that informal settlements 
are filled with small-scale and efficient entrepreneurs. This ensures that their innovations will 
generate opportunity. Evolutionists believe that market forces ensure that wealth is trickled 
down to the poor and actors in the formal sector need not worry about the informal 
economy because the best workers will eventually emerge. This representation of laissez faire 
capitalism mirrors the ‘anti-poor’ approaches of Kenya’s urban policies.52  
In Nairobi, everyone knew someone who had had relative success in the informal 
economy and with this success the definition between formality and informality was made 
more ambiguous. I personally found it difficult to decide between seeing the exploitation of 
residents and celebrating their ability to seize opportunities. For example, my car mechanic 
Chris started his work life as a casual apprentice with another mechanic who owned a 
roadside jua kali shop.53 Jua kali (literally, “hot sun”) is a category of the informal economy in 
Kenya referring to artisans and handymen. For many years, Chris worked as a jua kali 
mechanic in various garages across the city and garnered a reputation for being honest and 
hardworking. Eventually, a connection in his low-income Nairobi neighborhood landed him 
                                                
51 Muungano wa Wanavijiji means “Union of Villagers”. A slum in Kiswahili is vijiji ovyoovyo, literally “disorderly 
villages.” 
52 Hart (1973) first coined the term informality, but more recent scholarship has redefined and re-evaluated 
informality approaches. The best of these is the edited volume from Hansen and Vaa (2004). 
53 Throughout this text, names have been changed to maintain anonymity. 
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a job as a driver at a local NGO, but he was let go after funding was cut. As a driver, his 
social status was still low, but with regular wage employment in a formal organization he was 
able to send his children to boarding schools and build a house upcountry. He straddled the 
informal and formal for years by continuing to repair cars on the weekends and helping 
expatriates source second-hand cars. When he was eventually laid off, Chris turned his 
informal brokering into a regular business. He dressed sharply and spoke perfect English to 
transcend the stereotypes of jua kali mechanics, known for wearing dirty overalls and having 
reputations as scam artists. His experience at the NGO had given him the skills to meet his 
clients’ expectations of honesty, punctuality, and fairness. He maintained an appearance of 
formality while engaging in what were, for all intents and purposes, informal activities.  
The involutionist reads Chris’s story and find fault in the systems that he should have to 
dress in a certain way or speak in a certain way—in this case fitting into more “western” 
styles—in order to get his clients and educate his children. The evolutionist finds that Chris 
exhibits the positive qualities of informality, like entrepreneurship and adaptability, which led 
to his success. The involutionist believes that everyone should have equal opportunities; the 
evolutionist believes that competition in the informal market will drive those most likely to 
succeed forward. 
In Kibera, the NGOs operated mainly from an involutionist perspective, but the Nairobi 
public subscribed, for the most part, to a belief in free-market competition to sort the weak 
from the strong. The informal sector was tied to an achievement ideology that youth had 
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internalized since their days in school.54 In this economy, success would be measured by 
overcoming economic and social constraints. Many of the youth I met were frustrated by 
this reality but took pride in finding ways to move through informality—an action they refer 
to colloquially as “hustling,” a concept that will be explored in more depth in Chapter 3.  
Traversing Kibera 
South African Edgar Pieterse has pointed out that “the real challenge is not merely to 
describe the failure of cities in Africa to emulate models of urbanization, but to seek a 
deeper comprehension of why these urban agglomerations have developed the way they 
have” (Pieterse 2009, 10). NGOs failed at this challenge when they treated Kibera as a failure 
of urbanization and a stereotype of human rights abuses without interrogating the structures 
that emerged from failure. Instead of understanding the positive outcomes of how the 
physical layout of slums and organic emergence of informal settlements complement the 
economy, most have unquestionably assumed that informal settlements breed poverty, 
criminality, and human suffering. Looking beyond this as Stuart Brand has done, shows that 
slum settlements need to be considered for more than their misery. Brand showcases how 
they are instead models of sustainability—he says, “Squatter cities are unexpectedly green. 
They have maximum density—one million people per square mile in some areas of 
Mumbai—and have minimum energy and material use” (Brand 2010). Many people end up 
living where they work and are therefore able to focus on economic activities and building 
personal networks. Despite good evidence of these internal logics, it was continually 
                                                
54 Quite similar to the achievement ideology subscribed to by the young American men in Jay MacLeod Ain't 
No Makin It (1995). 
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puzzling to see development interventions focus on eradication as a solution to urban 
poverty instead of searching for sources of reform. 
The best example of the eradication approach was the joint operation begun by the 
United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat) and the Kenyan government 
in 2000. A guiding principle of the Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme (KENSUP) was that 
the lived environment of Kibera was the cause of wider social issues. The underlying 
justification was that overcrowding led to high rates of crime and unsanitary conditions 
reduced residents’ sense of dignity. These causes resulted in a program that sought to 
eradicate slums by “upgrading” the housing. In phase one, KENSUP built a “decanting” 
site, which consisted of multi-story three-bedroom apartment buildings that would 
temporarily house residents who were removed from their shanties. Phase two involved the 
actual moving of more than five hundred households from the Soweto East village of 
Kibera to the decanting site. After residents were moved, the previous homes were razed. 
Phase three saw the construction of new homes where the original residents would return. 
At this stage, these residents would be given the option to own through subsidized 
mortgages.55 The new constructions of one, two, and three-bedroom houses were to be 
based on designs used in the growing areas of middle class Nairobi and meant to stimulate a 
new kind of culture and forever remove residents from the negative environmental 
conditions of the slum56.  
                                                
55 The information that was often relayed by locals was this rent-to-own model would be equal to current rent 
rates. Many Kiberans were suspicious of these claims. 
56 More in depth analyses and descriptions of the upgrading include Huchzermeyer (2008); Fernandez and 
Calas (2011); and Muraguri (2011) 
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Beyond the negative assumption surrounding how the built environment in Kibera 
caused social problems and human rights abuses, this model actually threatened the active 
strategies that residents put in place to ensure survival in a place of uncertainty. The organic 
construction of Kibera with its winding pathways and clustered housing units had not 
emerged only at the hands of dispassionate landlords eager to exploit the urban poor. It 
represented a vernacular architecture built with a logic benefitting residents and related to 
how they go about their daily lives.57 One of the biggest complaints I heard from residents 
about the decanting site was that their informal and ambiguous economic activities were 
now out in the open. Without back alleys and hidden spaces, residents could no longer hide 
economic activities that could be nefarious, like the brewing of illicit alcohol. At the 
decanting site, there were also restrictions on who could own businesses; regulations were 
set on what were appropriate livelihoods. These restrictions lowered the economic potential 
of residents and made it difficult for them to continue to be creative and adaptable 
entrepreneurs.  
The physical and mental walls between Kibera and its nearby neighborhoods were 
essentially built from both sides. Barbed wire fences and guarded shopping malls were some 
of the visible ways that slum residents were pushed from formal Nairobi into spending their 
work and leisure time in informal settlements, but Kiberans built up their own barriers to 
entry as well. It was important for Kibera’s residents to maintain internal security and 
networks; outsiders were treated with suspicion. Acceptance into the community was not 
                                                
57 Rudolfsky (1964) calls the kind of non-pedigreed architecture that could be seen in slum settlements 
“vernacular, anonymous, spontaneous, indigenous, rural.” In Kibera the jua kali builders of the structures could 
certainly be found, but their craft remains more folk that formal. 
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something to be achieved overnight. And yet, whether they were ghettoized or ghettoized 
themselves, Kibera was never separate from the city. It represented a threshold and a place 
where people could find entry into the urban space after learning the local rules.  
Once I started exploring grassroots community groups beyond the areas of Kibera 
served by Carolina for Kibera, I gave a blank sheet of paper to nearly 200 youth survey 
participants and asked them to draw maps of the city of Nairobi. I was interested in 
understanding how people visualized and navigated their physical space. I then followed up 
by enlisting young people for a focus group discussion. With the GIS-based mapping 
programs that were emerging in Kibera, like Map Kibera, which aimed to map the 
unmapped, the exercise would allow me to juxtapose individual perceptions of space with 
the detailed maps that being developed.58  
Kibera had always appeared on static paper maps that could be purchased at Nairobi 
bookshops as a blank space (see Figure 4). The only roads that appeared were those that 
were part of the civil servant housing that had been built around Kibera in the now 
privatized areas like Olympic Estate and Karanja Road. The main pathways that transported 
people and goods between different villages and connected Kibera to neighboring estates 
were always omitted. The reality that Kibera is illustrated as a blank space is reiterated in a 
line from Robert Neurwirth’s case study where he quotes a resident: 
“The problem here is the land. The government claims the land is forest. When they 
come to ask for votes from the forest, we are suddenly changed from trees to people. 
But, legally, we are just trees” (Neuwirth 2005, 98). 
 
                                                
58 Map Kibera is a trust founded in 2009 to “empower youth residents” and “transform a marginalized 










Newer online maps compiled by Map Kibera through citizens armed with GPS recorders 
have filled in this blank area more realistically (See Figure 5). In its initial stages Map Kibera 
thought the exercise would help NGOs make better decisions in their project design and 
delivery. The ever-changing online map featured water points where people accessed clean 
water and toilets and showed where residents found the services of mosques and churches, 
informal and formal schools, and chemists and clinics. Depending on the area of Kibera, the 
offices of non-governmental organizations and self-help groups as well as areas where the 
community gathered in open spaces were captured. In the illustration of Darajani (at the 
bridge), an area where Kambi Muru and Makina villages meet, the Kambi Muru Ushirika 
Youth Self-help Group has been labeled (see Figure 6). The group’s community garden, built 
along the railway, is also highlighted. Nearby are the offices for the international non-profit 
called Water and Sanitation for the Urban Poor (WSUP), several pubs, two informal high 
schools, a church, and medical clinics. The offices of some organizations, like Carolina for 
Kibera, are noticeably absent, but overall the open source version gives a much more 
nuanced graphic representation of Kibera than any previous map. It meets Map Kibera’s 










Figure 6. Detail of Darajani (Open Street Map) 
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When I asked participants in the survey and my focus group discussions to map the 
whole of Nairobi, I suspected that some would only be able to depict Kibera or its adjacent 
suburbs. I also expected the participants would only mark large landmarks in the city center, 
like the iconic image of the Kenyatta International Conference Center or Times Tower, the 
tallest building in East Africa at the time. The two assistants I had hired to distribute the 
survey reported back that many of the participants opted out of drawing a map, for various 
reasons. Some told my assistants they did not know Nairobi well enough, so were unwilling 
to try. Others just returned blank surveys. A few participants wrote notes in the space that 
had been left for the drawings. One young woman wrote, “I did not go to school so am 
unable to even sketch a map” and another “though I have stayed here for five years. I don’t 
yet go to town. And since I have not reached far in education, I cannot be able to draw the 
map of Nairobi.”  
Of those who did draw maps, four patterns emerged. There were generic maps that did 
not particularly represent Nairobi at all. For example Figure 7 begins with the international 
conference center as the base of the map, but then divides the town between estates, parks, 




Figure 7. Map with Kenyatta International Conference Center (anonymous Kibera resident) 
 
Some participants contributed to a category of maps that did not seem to be spatially 
oriented. They put place names down, but not in any particular order. Figure 8 below marks 
the Kibera village, Silanga, that the respondent lived in and includes the neighborhoods and 
areas adjacent to it, like the Langata suburb to the south, Mbagathi Road in the east, and 
Rowlands Boy Scout camp located in the Ngong Road Forest west of Kibera. Other 
locations included on the map were “Lovington” or Lavington, an upper class estate located 
5 miles to the northwest of Kibera, and Umoja, a lower-middle class estate in Nairobi’s 
Eastlands at least 14 miles away. Landmarks in town, like the parliament building and KICC, 




Figure 8. Map including Silanga Village in Kibera and surrounds (anonymous Kibera 
resident) 
 
Many of the participants produced maps showing movement, specifically showcasing 
how respondents navigated the city. Some of these started in the city center at locations 
where Kiberans picked up public transportation vehicles heading either to the D.C. 
(referring to the District Commissioner’s compound) or Ngummo matatu stages.59 These 
were the two most likely entrances for residents returning to Kibera. Locations along the 
transportation routes, like the Kenyatta National Hospital or the city mortuary, showed up 
on these maps. The participant who drew Figure 9 below also indicated movement, but only 
                                                
59 A matatu is a 14 or 21-seater public service vehicle that serves as Nairobi’s main form of public 
transportation. See Mutongi (2006) for more on the public perceptions of this industry in the city. 
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within Kibera. This map starts at the village of Makina, where residents alight from matatus 
from Nairobi’s city center. Passing through Makina, the respondent’s map shows how he 
traverses Kibera towards Darajani, then Kambi Muru, Lindi and Silanga all on his way to 
Soweto. This map is interesting because it shows a connection between the villages, but 
recognizes their distinctions. Learning to identify Kibera neighborhoods, even as they lack 
visible boundaries, was important for youth who were just learning the city to develop 
loyalties and networks. 
 
Figure 9. Map showing walking directions (anonymous Kibera resident) 
 
The final category of maps showed more detailed knowledge of the city center. Figure 10 
shows Machakos Bus Station where Nairobi residents find cheap buses to their upcountry 
villages. The bus station is located on the east side of the Central Business District, but the 
map shows detail all the way to Kenyatta Market in the west, a location not far from the 
Ngummo entrance to Kibera. Landmarks, including three institutions of higher learning, the 
Parliament building, two soccer stadiums, three hospitals, and markets, give an indication 
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that the respondent has an geographic knowledge beyond Kibera—this was the rarest type 
of map I received. 
 
Figure 10. Detailed Map of Downtown Nairobi (anonymous Kibera resident) 
 
Why does it matter how youth map their city and what do maps have to do at all with 
this overall study of how youth come of age in Kibera? My original intention with the 
exercise was to use it as a way of elucidating individual perceptions of marginality, since the 
prevailing development discourse specified that youth felt excluded from the city. However 
throughout the exercise I began to notice that there was no single way that youth 
experienced or were integrated.  
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The discourse about Kibera peddled by non-profit funders, journalists, and government 
officials was so convincing that it took me a long time to recognize the reality that the maps 
were indicating that for some of its residents Kibera was just a low-cost housing solution—
people who worked and paid taxes but also needed the community, cheap cost of living, and 
connections they had in Kibera to get by. In a city where rents in the upmarket areas rose 
17.9% in 2012, affordable housing was a real concern.60 Abdoumaliq Simone (2004) laments 
the term “slum” to describe informal settlements in African cities. In spite of the widespread 
use of the word by planners, visitors, and residents themselves, Simone sees that “slum” in 
and of itself denotes the apartness of a walled, excluded space. Instead, Simone labels them 
“quarters,” elevating their status to that of a city neighborhood, no different than the rest of 
a city’s diverse districts. These quarters just happen to be the most densely populated by the 
city’s lowest class. This distinction as a quarter suggests inclusion and connection to the 
larger city.  
In retrospect, I learned early on that Kibera was integrated into the larger city and not as 
apart as it seemed. The first summer I spent at Carolina for Kibera, I chased the sun each 
evening in order to be home before the sun set. I was adamant about leaving the office early 
enough in the day because I felt a form of extreme anxiety at dusk—a period of time when 
real and imagined criminals could potentially be lurking in the shadows. I knew too many 
people in Nairobi who had been victims of muggings at this time of day and I had a personal 
policy to minimize risk to others and myself. Because of the warnings I had been given 
                                                
60 Statistics on rental increases in lower income areas and informal settlements are not available, but the figures 
for the formal rental market show how difficult it was to enter into the formal housing sectors. See John 





about Kibera, this seemed like a sound policy. One evening, I was waiting for one of my 
Kenyan colleagues to close up the office so she and I could go to town together. She had 
promised we would be out of Kibera before the sun set, but she delayed while talking to 
some program beneficiaries. I kept urging her to let us leave and she responded by laughing 
at my paranoia. I had never been in Kibera past five in the evening and it was now nearing 
seven o’clock. The sun had set and I knew we would be walking in the dark.  
By the time she had locked up and we began to walk out through Olympic Estate I 
suddenly realized what I had been missing by strictly adhering to my risk policies. Olympic 
was an area where many NGOs working in Kibera were headquartered because there was 
easy access to the main road and a mostly steady electricity and water supply. Walking out 
that day, I experienced what happened when Kibera turned from day to night. The dimly lit 
informal storefronts stayed open to accommodate masses of people returning home from a 
day’s work. Children in uniform who attended schools in better neighborhoods were 
commuting home. Men and women, some who walked miles to work at factories in the 
industrial area or to do domestic work in nearby neighborhoods, wearily tread their way back 
into the kijiji. It was a time of day when the poor infrastructure, the piles of rotten trash, and 
the shoddily built, substandard housing were masked by the buzz of the industrious masses. 
These were not criminals and the lazy poor. This was as economically integrated as any area 
of any city in any part of the world. When the slum was buzzing like this, I finally saw it as a 
neighborhood.   
Before I went there, expatriate and local Nairobi residents warned me of the dangers of 
Kibera. I had read articles in the Kenyan newspapers and heard feature stories about the 
hardships of the slums on news programs. International journalists covered Kibera as if they 
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had discovered hell on earth. Non-governmental organizations produced reports and images 
of poor, deprived, pitiful slum residents to induce emotional responses and raise money. In 
Global Shadows, James Ferguson writes of how in the discourse of crisis Africa has come to 
be recognized as a single place—a place of absence, in comparison to the fully formed West. 
Africa has become a category, arbitrary or fixed, through which a whole world has been 
constructed. The negative perceptions do not just “misunderstand social reality; they also 
shape it” (Ferguson 2006, 7).  
The same is true of the perceptions of Kibera. Despite a social reality of an integrated 
and productive urban neighborhood with occasional instances of social discord, the visitors, 
practitioners, and residents themselves have constructed a place of darkness. But my 
experience with civil society, non-governmental organizations, and grassroots groups began 
to show a very different story. Janice Perlman, writing of the favelas in Rio forty years ago, 
described a “myth of marginalization” that had been constructed not just by outsiders, but 
also by those within (Perlman 2010). Despite a dominant discourse indicating that people 
who lived in favelas were disconnected from the rest of mainstream society, she found a 
district of the city that was completely integrated into urban life, but often to its inhabitants’ 
own detriment. Kiberans, too, provided cheap labor, services, and goods, without reaping 
many rewards. The legacy of a colonial segregation policy, based on racial rather than 
economic distinctions, paved the way for the invisible walls that separated slum and shanty 
areas from formal Nairobi (see Figure 11). The youth in the development field depended on 
an ability to translate the actions of a poor, chaotic seeming, and impermeable community 
for outsiders seeking to deliver services. They not only were complicit in watching their 
neighbors and friends perpetrate the cycle of poverty, but also reinforced the idea that the 
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slum was walled from the rest of the city. This wall, as we will see, provided an opportunity 




Figure 11. Colonial Residential Segregation61 
 
Putting the Slum On  
The slum-upgrading program that sought to physically change the built environment of 
Kibera was grounded in an idea that the chaos of the settlement was responsible for its 
poverty. Youth “put the slum on” in order to be able to make sense of that chaos and as a 
                                                
61 From Nairobi: Master Plan for a Colonial Capital (Thornton et. al 1948) 
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way to build toward economic growth and eventually adulthood. The chaos itself was an 
important part of the reinforcement of the informal sector and the bias toward evolutionist 
ideology. Many Kiberan youth failed to move up the Kenyan social strata via the school 
system and had already learned that their opportunities for success were limited. Therefore it 
became necessary for them to construct gateways within their social networks and limit the 
success of others. What I learned from many youth during my time in Kibera was that there 
were important signifiers to inclusion in poor spaces that had to be adopted upon becoming 
a resident in the slum in order to access the networks of survival. By acknowledging the 
thresholds, youth bought into a Kiberan sensibility and “put the slum on” in order to 
develop the right style and language as a way to help get there.  
Youth survived mainly by developing social networks of support, whether they grew up 
in Kibera or were a recent arrival. These networks could be cross-ethnic friendships, but the 
idea that primordial ethnic group connections were important was also widespread. For 
example, one of the earliest forms of associational life in Nairobi took the form of ethnic 
mutual self-help groups like the Luo Union. The Union was formed in the early 1920s for 
dockworkers in Mombasa and Dar es Salaam, railway workers in Nairobi, and agricultural 
laborers on cash crop plantations across East Africa for members of the Luo ethnic group. 
Despite these blue-collar roots, from 1945 on, it was the mission-educated elites in the 
association who pushed an agenda to unite the community (Carotenuto 2006, 57). The 
association billed itself as non-political and provided social services for members who lived 
far from their rural homelands. The colonial government encouraged associations like the 
Luo Union because they took pressure off public funds—like the formation of committees 
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to pay for funeral expenses.62 The added benefit was that such associations solidified ethnic 
identities and helped regulate “social and cultural practices” just when the urban officials 
were most concerned that natives were becoming “detribalized.” (Ibid., 61). 
The Luo Union and all other ethnic welfare associations were banned in 1980, but the 
legacy of ethnic associations continues in modern day Nairobi. Most of my contacts in 
Kibera and elsewhere were involved in formal ethnic associations that took forms like 
marriage or funeral committees, political action committees, or groups-savings or investment 
clubs. These were sometimes made up of people who were actually extended kin or 
connected based on place of origin. These groups might form around particular churches 
that practiced a regionally specific form of indigenous Christianity or drinking places owned 
by members of a certain clan or sub-ethnic grouping. Increasingly, class demarcated these 
kinds of spaces, so that in Nairobi it was possible to go to a club for Luo lawyers or a bar 
frequented by young professionals who all hailed from a certain ethnic subset of the Luhya.  
Social meeting places for members of different ethnicities also existed in Kibera. These 
took the form of pubs and football clubs or happened in public spaces where members met 
to discuss politics. In the village of Gatwekira, for instance, Luos knew they could meet on 
Sundays at the Kamukunji grounds, an open space near the railway line. Here, politically 
involved Luos could deliver speeches in their native tongue in a sort of open Speaker’s 
                                                
62 David Parkin (1978) examined the social importance of Luo welfare groups and associational in his study of 
social organization in the Nairobi neighborhood of Kaloleni. John Lonsdale (2002) also writes of the ethnic 
burial societies that were the first voluntary associations in Nairobi. 
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Corner-type forum. While some locations within Kibera were more likely to house members 
of specific ethnic groups, real ethnic boundaries between Kibera areas remained fuzzy63. 
Entrance into this formal associational life in Kibera required the accumulation of 
capital, a challenge for youth. They could not drink in ethnic pubs without money to buy 
beer and they could not gain the respect and confidence to stand before an intergenerational 
crowd at a public meeting without proving themselves first. Luckily, youth had other 
associational options in which they readily took part. Some of the churches had youth 
programs where young people could participate in sports teams and leadership development. 
Many of the youth in this dissertation got their first taste of democracy and citizenship from 
the Christ the King Catholic Church in Laini Saba where a dynamic youth pastor encouraged 
their participation in the church’s leadership.64 Others still found opportunities in youth 
programming set up by NGOs. These projects were avenues for artistic development, 
performance, or sports. The churches and NGOs pushed for interethnic solidarity, often 
placing quotas on programs to ensure a wide representation of ethnic affiliations.  
The most organic, informal, and easily accessed of the associations in Kibera were 
neighborhood joints where young people began to learn how to hustle. These joints were 
frequently transformed into more official groups like savings clubs, self-help groups, 
                                                
63 The only exception to this was during times of conflict when neighborhood level joints (see Chapter 1) 
would mobilize to defend certain areas. The bridge between Mashimoni and Laini Saba, for instance, served as 
a boundary line during the post-election violence. People from certain ethnic groups were not allowed to pass 
over the bridge. 
64 Christine Bodewes (2010) details the human rights programming that took place in that particular parish in 
the early 2000s. 
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community-based organization, or even churches.65 Estimates of the number of these 
organizations in Kibera ranged from 6,000 to 15,000.66 This wide statistical variation has as 
much to do with the continued rise, dormancy, and decline of such organizations as it did 
with the ambiguity of their purpose.  For young Kiberans, recreation and socializing were 
primarily experienced through these organic non-institutionalized groupings. The word joint 
refers not only to the actual geographical location where a group of young people might 
gather, but also to the group itself. A lay observer might label such a grouping “a gang.” In 
each village within Kibera there would be several joints but the raisons d’être for each would 
vary depending on shared interests. Joints had no fixed membership and lacked official 
documentation—most were not even named. Youth that liked a certain football team or 
young people who belonged to the same church would form a joint. These were 
spontaneous groupings, not constrained or organized formally.67 The youth in such joints 
might appear idle since they spent much of the day hanging out, but they were integral to 
Kibera’s social ecosystem.  
Joints could also be mobilized to deal with extra-legal and security issues where they 
were located. For example, during a period when muggings were frequent in the Silanga 
village of Kibera, I was told that a local joint had been asked by the community to organize a 
vigilante group to police the village. Ultimately, the “policing” took a violent turn and the 
                                                
65 Religious institutions in Kibera were wide-ranging. There are the physical markers of large Christian 
churches, like the Lutheran Church, Presbyterian Church of East Africa, Christ the King Catholic Church, and 
African Inland Church. The large Nubian presence in Kibera increases the Muslim population disproportionate 
to the country’s population—there are numerous mosques dotting its landscape. 
66 The figures for these, like the population of Kibera, are suspect as Rasna Warah reports in her column in the 
Daily Nation “How Numbers Game Turned Kibera Into ‘The Biggest Slum in Africa,’” (9/12/2013) 
http://www.nation.co.ke/oped/Opinion/-/440808/1009446/-/nyf5o7z/-/index.html 
67 It has been observed in other Nairobi neighborhoods that joints also develop specific forms of Sheng, which 
serve as an ‘in-language’ (Githinji 2006). 
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accused thieves were accosted and then publicly flogged in an area nicknamed Golgotha.68 
The young man who shared the story with me took no issue with the action and applauded 
the joint for eradicating a community problem. Joints were the most basic level of 
associational life in Kibera, representing an egalitarian and natural form of the grassroots, 
but they were also the most vulnerable. The joint was a starting point and a place to learn the 
rules of informality. 
After forming a joint, a group of young people might legally register as a youth self-help 
group.69 The requirement to form youth self-help groups with the Kenyan government was an 
application and 1000 Kenyan shillings (~$12). These groups were conceived mainly as arenas 
for young people to develop income-generating projects. The ideal mission was to build a 
collectively owned business with the profits split equally. There were male and female self-
help groups, but rarely were they mixed gender. The male groups typically did male-oriented 
work, such as garbage collection, recycling, car washing, or water delivery. The female 
groups joined each other for economic support but struggled to turn more female-oriented 
occupations like clothes washing, nannying, cleaning, hair braiding, or tailoring into 
collective work. Females tended, instead, to use the groups for rotational savings schemes 
and as general support networks.70 A reason for this might be, as Parker Shipton has noted, 
that “having a duty to contribute to the group sounds better than saving for oneself—even 
though these may ultimately be the same” (Shipton 2010, 174). Ultimately, the relationships 
formed were as valuable as the economic output. At their location in Kianda village, Kibera 
                                                
68 This was a biblical reference to the location where Jesus was crucified. 
69 There are also women’s groups, and groups for the disabled in this category, but for our purposes, we’ll 
focus on youth. 
70 A rotational savings scheme is a collective pooling of money that typically happens every month. Each 
member brings money to contribute and on a rotational basis, one member at a time gets to take it home. 
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Youth was the most visibly successful youth self-help group I had met. They ran a car wash 
and recycling center, exhausted toilets, collected garbage, and ran a nursery school at a local 
church. 71 Their success was evident in the way they performed their roles and how they 
branded their organization—marked by their ownership of a garbage truck, the wearing of 
uniforms, and their prime location on Kibera Drive. 
Community-based organizations (CBOs) were a level above self-help groups. Registration of 
these kinds of organizations cost five times as much. By law and as part of their legal 
registration, CBOs were required to draw up a constitution and assign members to 
leadership positions. CBOs did not have to be strictly youth-centered, but in Kibera many of 
them were. The organizations were formed with a mind toward community improvement. 
Members of these organizations belonged to local advisory committees that sought to 
improve the environment or reform schools. After the government introduced the 
Constituency Development Fund in 2003 to support constituency-level, grassroots 
development projects, CBOs were recruited to guide the focus of the fund. By joining 
community-based organizations, an individual was deliberately seeking a higher profile and 
more political civic role.  
Above the CBOs were the non-governmental organizations. From 1996 to 2003, Kenyan 
NGOs experienced a fivefold increase in growth—from 511 to 2,511 (Hearn 2007, 1096). A 
decade later, in 2013, the NGO Coordination Board (a government-run oversight board) 
had a database of over 7000 registered entities. In Nairobi district alone, there were over 
                                                
71 In other parts of town, exhausters (euphemistically termed “honey hunters”) extract human waste from long 
drop toilets and septic tanks with the help of a pump powered by a truck with a tank. In Kibera, and other 
slums, the exhaustion of a toilet is done by hand, with a bucket and rope. 
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2000 NGOs; 314 of these were registered under the youth sector. Some NGOs marketed 
themselves as grassroots and kept offices in Kibera but were strongly connected to 
supporters abroad. Small CBOs struggled to emulate these institutions. There were also 
NGOs that did not keep offices in Kibera but used the settlement as a field site. These 
NGOs relied on the services of gatekeepers to implement projects. This kind of NGO actor 
in Kibera was sustainable in its own right but not structured to provide sustainable 
employment to Kibera residents. In the development hustle, these NGOs were key because 
their short-term and infrequent programs relied heavily on grassroots associations to 
facilitate. 
No matter which category of Kiberan associational life a young person found his or her 
way into, it was very important for all of them, in the end, to learn how to “put the slum 
on.” This was revealed to me in the example given by John, who served as my research 
assistant and will be featured prominently in the pages to follow. He was part of a small 
organization called the Initiative for Sports and Social Arts (ISSA) and told me how much he 
worried about a member of his group, Thomas. Thomas was timid and at the age of 21 still 
very small physically. He had joined his father in Kibera when he was 18 after he finished 
school in his rural upcountry home, but in the three years he had been in Kibera, Thomas 
had not learned how to walk like he belonged. He was picked on and regularly mugged, 
including once at gunpoint while walking with one of the students from the study abroad 
program I directed. No matter what kind of work a young man wanted to do or which 
organization he was involved with, alone on the pathways and streets of Nairobi and outside 
of his immediate neighborhood he was vulnerable. Some of the young women I knew from 
a girls’ empowerment program dealt with the harassment they experienced in public in 
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Kibera by dressing like boys and developing ways of moving through the slum that were off-
putting. The longer I spent in Kibera, the more easily I could tell if a youth had become local 
through his embodiment of the slum identity. There was a confidence and a swagger 
necessary to be able to move through Kibera without trouble. 
Language was another important aspect of “putting the slum on.” Most children in 
Kenya were raised in the language of their ethnic group.72 Primary school was taught in the 
two national languages, Swahili and English. Those who went to high school learned 
exclusively in English. On the streets of Nairobi, the language of choice was Sheng. Each area 
of the city had its own version of the language and youth with a keen ear could pick up the 
intra-city dialects that had emerged. Kibera, or Kibich in Sheng, was no different and youth 
constantly had to keep up with the slang in order to solidify group membership. Different 
bazes, or joints, developed vocabulary unique to what they were interested in. Githinji shows 
that a group of youth in a neighborhood in Nairobi’s Eastlands used words connected to the 
computer classes they were taking. “Members of the Ngara baze…called caressing a girl 
‘browsing’—a shared term reflecting their heavy internet use.” (Githinji 2006, 457). Similarly, 
in Kibera, the phrase “sending out my CV (or resume)” was code for courting a member of 
the opposite sex.73 
Putting the slum on also meant allowing oneself to be known. It was an important 
survival mechanism to develop friendships and networks of neighbors and people with 
shared interests. Being anonymous was not acceptable in Kibera—another example of the 
                                                
72 This is not as true of second or third generation Nairobians or young people raised by parents of mixed-
ethnicities. These Nairobi born (or “born tau”) grew up speaking Kiswahili or English as their home language. 
73 Other studies of the Sheng phenomenon in Nairobi include Iraki (2004); Abdulaziz and Osinde (1997); 
Githiora (2002); Bosire (2006); and Samper (2002). 
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internal walls set up in Kibera to protect it. During the 2008 post-election violence, young 
men living in the Mashimoni village close to the boundary with the Laini Saba village told 
me that in order to appear to be on the side of protesters they had to stand outside in 
solidarity for several days with their neighbors to “protect” their village. They did not have 
to throw stones or participate in violence, but had to give the appearance that they might.  
The same was true in instances of mob justice. It was not necessary to participate in a 
crowd’s vigilante justice, but it was necessary to appear as though you were with the group.  
Kibera’s associational life and the opportunities it afforded were only possible if a young 
person was able to master the immediate environment. Whether or not they knew the roads 
in the city center did not matter as much as finding a group and network within Kibera. 
Even kibarua work, the least desirable kind of work involving insecure day labor, was 
advertised through word-of-mouth. Without a way of connecting with others, youth could 
not find opportunities. Putting the slum on included style, language, and behavior that 
indicated group membership. Ultimately, being initiated into a neighborhood joint was the 
most important step for a youth to succeed in the informal sector. The next chapter will 
discuss the evolution of a protracted liminality for young people across Kenya and how this 
played a role in the actions and adaptation of young people in Kibera. Their need to navigate 
a world of uncertainty, through the formation of groups, is directly connected to the 















CHAPTER TWO: PROTRACTED LIMINALITY 
On my first extended stay in Kenya in 2002, I landed into a national debate about 
whether or not to include young people more actively in the lively conversations already 
taking place about democracy and political reform. The idea was that youth, or vijana, had 
been systematically excluded from participating in democracy because of negative cultural 
attitudes and the historical manipulation of generational politics. Despite a numerical 
advantage, these young Kenyans were disproportionately represented in Parliament and had 
fewer appointed positions in national and local administrative offices. 74 Development 
planners, too, overlooked their specific needs. The implications of these demographics were 
troubling. There was clear evidence from the multiparty elections held in 1992 and 1997 that 
young people were being coerced to participate in state-sponsored violence by politicians 
aligned with the ruling party, the Kenya Nationalist African Union (KANU), in a bid to 
maintain autocratic rule while appearing to herald in a new political dispensation. There were 
also overwhelming levels of youth underemployment countrywide and the informal activities 
that young people did engage in were frequently denounced as illegal (Linehan 2007). 
Economic disparities and age discrimination were the cause of rapid urbanization and slum 
proliferation. Without meaningful inclusion in political and economic processes, it looked 
certain that poverty in Kenya would only get worse. It was publicly acknowledged in various 
fora that young people were the leaders of tomorrow but it was unclear how long they would 
                                                
74 According to the “World Population Prospects” in 2010 the number of Kenyans under 30 was 72% (UN 




have to wait before they could engage meaningfully. In the representational democracy of 
Kenya, its largest population was conspicuously missing. 
Gerontocracy was more than a national political issue. In August of 2009, I travelled 
with my colleague Peter to western Kenya on two missions. The first was to conduct 
perception interviews with grassroots women for a consulting job we were working on 
together. The second was to oversee the logistical coordination of a rural homestay 
experience I was planning for my American students who were arriving the following 
month. I had asked three young men I knew from Kibera—Otoyo, Shadrack, and John (the 
research assistant we met in the previous chapter)—to travel to the area ahead of me to 
scout cultural sites, look for appropriate lodging, and identify homestay families in the area. 
Shadrack was a native of the area, John was from eastern Kenya, and Otoyo’s family was in 
southern Nyanza Province. They were close friends who worked well together as a team and 
I had come to rely on them as coordinators of program activities in Nairobi. In return I paid 
their expenses and gave them small stipends.  
After a day of sitting in meetings with various women’s groups, Peter and I arrived in a 
small town where we expected to find Shadrack and the others. It was a dusty, provincial 
town that was both in between and relatively equidistant from Peter and Shadrack’s rural 
villages. I had communicated with the three earlier in the day, while they were involved in 
rural week coordination, and we decided that it would be the best place to debrief over beer 
and a shared meal. When we arrived at one of the local drinking holes, I found them sitting 
at the bar waiting for a turn at the pool table. I went to shake their hands and see how their 
day had gone. Both Peter and I entered the bar at the same time but he went into the 
adjoining room with some of his local relatives and friends who we had picked up on our 
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way and simply ignored the three young men. Peter had never met my “boys” from Kibera, 
as he called them then, and I was confused that he was not being the usually jovial and 
welcoming friend I had not known him to be. He even refused to honor them with a 
handshake, which I had internalized as the most ordinary of actions. There was something 
here I did not understand. Something was wrong. 
I flitted between Peter’s table and the bar and repeatedly proclaimed to Peter that he 
needed to meet my “colleagues”. He told me to tell them to come to him. Since I was the 
one who had arranged the meeting it felt very awkward and I found myself apologizing for 
Peter’s rudeness. I started to rack my brain for a reason for his strange behavior: Was it 
because they were from Kibera? Was it because they were subordinate colleagues, appearing 
here in western Kenya at my request as a director? Was this behavior class-based? It did not 
occur to me until later in the night that the situation was ultimately about their ujana—or 
youth.  
Peter had been one of the drafters of the National Youth Policy and had fought for 
youth affirmative action as a civil society activist and was now unexpectedly obeying 
unspoken rules of generational status. Peter’s behavior indicated that these young men, 
because of the economics of their class and the categorization of their biological age, should 
approach him. If the opposite were to happen, it would indicate a mutuality of respect and 
rank that they had not yet “earned.” After some initial, youthful indignation, Shadrack, 
Otoyo, and John seemed to understand this and told me they would come over in a few 
minutes. I returned to Peter’s table, ordered a beer, and engaged one of the members of the 
entourage, while continuing to fume inside. Eventually, after they had played a round of 
pool, the three younger men came with big smiles and shook the hands of everyone sitting at 
  
83 
Peter’s table, but were never invited to sit with our group. They sat nearby, drank a beer, and 
eventually excused themselves.  
At the time, Peter was not even 40, but he was the co-owner of a consulting firm and 
had a wife and children. The house he built in his upcountry village was even connected to 
the electricity grid, an important symbol that set him apart from kin who had adjacent 
homes. He provided political commentary on TV and campaigned unsuccessfully in the 
previous election for the parliamentary seat of the area. After Peter passed through his 
village on the way to his rural home in his large four-wheel-drive vehicle, numerous villagers 
would come seeking advice in sorting out local issues. All this indicated he had achieved 
elder status, a state of being he liked to joke about while showing off the dust of white hair 
at his temples. Despite his proclamation of elderhood, and the rights and responsibilities 
imbued with that, he still had a reputation among his family, friends, and colleagues for 
being outspoken, contrary, and impulsive—traits more often linked to youth.  
I had known Peter a long time and six years prior had been privy to a conversation 
between him and his uncle in a downtown Nairobi coffee shop. For thirty minutes, I sat 
with him at my side, while his uncle spoke directly to me about Peter’s rebelliousness and 
disrespect of the culture and traditions of his people. Peter silently listened and later 
complained to me that people did not understand him. That was the Peter I knew—the one 
who wrote concept notes to foreign donors using capital letters and shouted and walked out 
of meetings when he sensed unfairness. He called people out for their hypocrisy, found signs 
of dishonesty reprehensible, and turned his political campaign into a civic education exercise, 
lecturing potential voters about democracy and citizenship when they asked for handouts. 
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He was passion personified and the actions of the evening with the youth from Kibera, 
especially in regards to issues of generational inequalities, confused me. 
The morning after Peter had spurned my friends in the pub, I laid into him over 
breakfast at the hotel where we were staying. How could he treat those young men like that? 
Did he not remember when he himself was unemployed and struggling to achieve 
adulthood? Did he not remember the insulting sting of the title kijana? How did he so 
quickly forget the youth he had been fighting for when he and I first met? As we talked it 
out Peter acknowledged that it was true—that in the location of his rural home he had fallen 
into the local habit of discrimination against youth. It was different in Nairobi, where there 
were some varying attitudes toward age structure, but in rural Kenya elders held the power. 
He almost seemed as puzzled as I did about how easily he fell into seeing these young men 
as unequal. He vowed to readjust his attitude toward them, which he had based solely on the 
perceived notion of their failed adulthood. And as they were all my friends and colleagues, 
over the next few years he continued to meet John, Shadrack, and Otoyo at various social 
gatherings and remained true to his word to be inclusive and mutually respectful towards 
them. I could see that it was a struggle for him to do so with other young men. It was clearly 
difficult to reconcile the ideals of modern democracy in the face of such persistent 
gerontocracy. 
Peter was capable of idealizing a nation that appreciated the interests of young people 
and advocated for their equal representation in political space, but in his own practice in 
everyday life, he found it convenient if not principally correct, to assert his generational 
authority. There were very clear rules of engagement between youth and elders and he was 
constantly correcting young men around him. I observed him take a corrective tone with the 
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fresh university graduates he hired as assistants in his office, with his twenty-something 
relatives upcountry, and even with waitresses at the downtown Nairobi restaurant where we 
sometimes ate lunch. When the young men in his village asked him for monetary assistance 
or to buy them alcohol, he would lecture them about their choices in life. When I watched 
him with his children, he took on a tone of harsh condescension in correcting their behavior. 
I was also ten years his junior and endured many lectures on the proper and appropriate way 
to do things. When I asked him why he felt the need to consistently regulate the behavior of 
those younger than him, he effortlessly responded that it was the only way that he, as an 
African, could guarantee the maintenance of African culture. The constant oral 
reinforcement of right and wrong was, to him, the only way to pass down social mores. In 
spite of the introduction of new modes of production and class, the growth of an education 
system that produces better informed and capable citizens, and the spread of pluralist 
ideologies connected to religious dispensations and modern liberalism, gerontocracy in 
Kenya remained the most persistent form of social control across grassroots and national 
arenas.  
Young men in Kenya were caught in the middle, receiving mixed messages to engage in 
social change only as long as it adhered to the gerontocratic traditions of their local 
communities. It was especially paradoxical for the youth in the NGO-saturated location of 
Kibera where they were assailed with promises of equality and inclusion in development 
forums, while experiencing very real age discrimination within their families and stigma from 
the wider society.  
Shadrack, Otoyo, and John were already in their late 20s when I met them and all three 
had been slowly gaining reputation and rank within the community-based organizations of 
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Kibera. They commanded respect within the Kibera community for being honest, 
diplomatic, and refreshingly audacious. I recall a conversation with John shortly after we met 
wherein he expressed his surprise at recently being asked by a local youth group to help 
mediate a dispute between them and their landlord—a task that required delicate political 
discussions with the local, government appointment chief. A Kenyan director of one of the 
local NGOs once told me that he considered all three of them to be the elites of Kibera—
able to navigate power structures and lead others despite their lack of economic 
achievements or generational advancements. When they stood up to address a group of 
youth in Kibera, they carried a charismatic quality that allowed them to command the room. 
Yet the respect they enjoyed in Kibera was only locational; it did not translate to how they 
were treated by their kin or fellow Nairobians. Outside of Kibera, employment opportunities 
for these young men, who had not been able to go to university or achieve financial stability, 
were few. Their soft skills of grassroots mobilization and community facilitation were not 
translatable to the larger development community. They felt discrimination within their 
extended kin networks because of a failure to achieve adulthood and still suffered the insults 
of kijana wherever they went. 
The Kibera Life Course  
The way that societies define and describe age categories is contextual and situational 
and the question of youth has more to do with questions of power and authority than of 
biological delineations. What I saw of the transitional stage of youth for the disadvantaged 
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poor of Kibera was relatively standard.75 No single ethnic affiliation or religious dispensation 
contradicted what had become, in the modern urban life, a standard way of progression. The 
life cycle as it exists presently for young men like Shadrack, Otoyo, and John in Kibera is 
defined by four categories: childhood (utoto), youth (ujana), adulthood (utu uzima), and 
elderhood (uzee). The final category, uzee, was once reserved only for a specific group of 
elders who had attained enough experience and wisdom to be accorded this ultimate 
honorific. But as we saw with Peter, this categorization could be accelerated if the person 
deserving of the respect found ways around biological maturation in order to gain a new 
kind of authority. The youth of Kibera were statistically unlikely to achieve what Peter had 
and were more representative of the status quo. 
Childhood is marked by a dependence on parents and extended family for basic needs 
like shelter, clothing, and food. In modern Kenya, a large percentage of children—over 
80%—spend most of this time enrolled in formal schooling, though the economic situation 
of their caregivers often affects the stability of a child’s attendance.76 All of the young people 
I knew during my time in Kibera had attended some school and had a basic level of 
literacy.77 
Within the school structure there emerged two fundamental rites of passage for children. 
The first came during the final year of primary school, Class 8, when they became candidates 
                                                
75 Others who have noted the contextual and situational classifications of youth include Durham (2000); 
Frederiksen and Munive (2000); Cruise O’Brien (1996); and Abbink and Van Kessel (2005). 
76 School enrollment rates drawn from statistics published by UNICEF for the 2008-2012 period 
http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/kenya_statistics.html 
77 Like many of the statistics about Kibera, there is no clear picture of overall literacy specific to the settlement. 
However the latest Kenya Demographic and Health Survey (2008-2009) shows literacy levels for urban 
residents countrywide is higher overall than in rural areas. 92.6% of urban females between 15-19 were literate; 
in the same age range urban males were literate at a percentage of 94.8%  (KNBS 2010, 32-34) 
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for the Kenya Certificate of Primary Education. This exam, taken in December, would be 
the determining factor for the kind of high school a student would be accepted into. The 
best performing students would be invited to attend a national school, with supplemented 
school fees paid through the state. The next best performing students would find a 
placement in one of the various provincial schools. Students who scored lowest were invited 
to attend local district schools. High school, by the end of the twentieth century, had 
become out of reach for many. In 1998, per capita income was approximately $280 USD a 
year, but enrollment in a typical non-residential secondary school cost between $400 and 
$500 a year.78 Those who did attend high school would find that their next rite of passage 
came in the form of yet another standardized test, the Kenya Certificate of Secondary 
Education, an exam that determines eligibility to enter university. At each stage, the process 
bottlenecked so that students who did attend public university felt like members of an 
exclusive, elite class. 
These educational milestones, from the primary leaver exam up to the end of high 
school, were the main determining factor for how far a person might reach in life, and were 
taken very seriously. Education was the rite-of-passage that was most often seen as the step 
toward adulthood. “In part it is through education that children now become adults, boys 
are transformed into men and girls into women” (Ogola 2006, 584). Students preparing to 
take exams were often relieved from household duties during the months preceding them. 
They were given a multitude of greeting cards, called success cards, urging them on to 
                                                
78 Human rights and constitutional reform advocate Maina Kiai provided this statistic in 1998, in a commentary 
on the elections in that year. Worsening living standards in the 1990s were reflected in the inability of the 




excellence. When they failed to achieve well during the exams they knew they were failing 
not just themselves but the larger family that had supported them to this point. In recent 
years, the pressure to academically achieve has led to widespread allegations of cheating and 
incidences of suicide.79 More often than not, a young person who grew up in Kibera, or 
landed there after completing school, had not been among the highest performers in the 
national exams.  
After a young person exited school, he or she then advanced into ujana or youth. Youth 
is a period of institutionalized liminality in Kenya, an official in-betweenness during which a 
young person transitions to adulthood.80 In urban spaces like Nairobi, “the passing of age is 
not dictated by a centralized and unified ritual” like those that would have been used in more 
localized systems (Aguilar 1998, 9). It was once common, regardless of ethnic group, for the 
transition to youth to be marked by an initiation ritual. This was mainly in the form of 
circumcision for most Kenyan ethnic groups or its equivalent in groups like the Luo, who 
marked the initiation with the removal of teeth. The practice of circumcision most often 
takes place between the ages of 9 and 13 and most of the young men I met in Kibera had the 
procedure done in a hospital or clinic rather than in a ritualized ceremony.81 In some ethnic 
groups there were comparable initiation rites for young women, though their period of 
youth followed a much shorter trajectory.  
                                                
79 Job Weru “KCSE Candidate Commits Suicide After Failing,” Standard Digital , 3/4/2012, 
http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/business/article/2000053343/kcse-candidate-commits-suicide-after-failing.  
80 The word “teenager” has no analog in Kiswahili and is infrequently used in English in Nairobi. A more 
clinical term, adolescent is used for a young person between 12 and 18 and youth overlaps this category starting 
around age 15.  
81 In recent years, there have been controversial campaigns to encourage Luo men to undergo voluntary 
circumcision in order to lower their risk of contracting HIV.  
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The differences between youth for women and men were clear. While it was expected 
that a young man would leave his father’s home during the period of youth, it was much 
more common for young women to stay at home and continue to help with responsibilities 
within the household. When I first went to Kenya at the age of 22, people felt it was quite 
strange that I would want to live on my own in an apartment in the city. This was not 
appropriate for a young woman my age. Indeed, many young women I knew stayed with a 
parental figure, if their family was in the city, until they moved in with a partner or got 
married.  
The official age bracket of youth did not constrain women in the same ways either. 
Unlike their male counterparts they could claim adulthood and a status change upon giving 
birth, regardless of whether or not they had officially gotten married. This seems to 
correspond to the situation in other African countries, where “men remain ‘young’ much 
longer than women” (Hansen 2005, 5). Jean Davison found that after the banning of female 
circumcision among the Kikuyu in the early 1980s, with or without marriage, motherhood 
had replaced the event, becoming the only way to validate a woman’s adulthood (Davison 
1989, 201). I had female friends in Kenya who upon reaching their late 20s began to talk 
about just needing to have a baby in order to appease their families. My close friend 
Christine, who married after the late age of 30, told me that she and her husband quarreled 
constantly, but she need to maintain the marriage long enough to give birth. Though such 
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practices were frowned upon in Kibera, early pregnancy, outside formal marriage bonds, was 
also quite common.82  
For a young man to enter utu uzima or adulthood, the literal translation in Kiswahili 
being “the state of being a whole human,” he had to achieve economically as well as prove 
his ability to an extended kin network, to take on the rights and responsibilities conferred 
through adulthood before he could be regarded as whole.83 Most of the young men who had 
migrated to Kibera from upcountry areas landed in the home of a relative before they 
figured out how to rent a house, which they likely shared with friends. This was always seen 
as a temporary solution—moving out was the first step toward respect and a status change. 
If they had remained upcountry the building of a house on a piece of family land would be 
the correlate of this action. Without steady income, it was difficult for young men to amass 
the kind of wealth needed to secure a wife, though love relationships within Kibera were 
common. Quite a lot of young couples found themselves in a liminal union, referred to 
colloquially as a “come-we-stay” marriage. Without going through the requisite rituals that 
would indicate marriage, they would move in together and become “husbands” and “wives.” 
Bernard, a handsome and charming young man who worked for a local NGO, once told me 
how a “come-we-stay” marriage happened: 
“It might be a Sunday and I might be outside my house washing a few clothes. My 
[female] friend might come by and see me washing my clothes and tell me that she’ll 
do it. So, I let her. And then she tells me that if I buy tea and milk, she’ll make me 
breakfast. And, that seems like a good idea, so that’s what I do. The next thing I 
know she moves in.”  
                                                
82 It is important to note that early pregnancy is common in Kibera for many reasons beyond the acceleration 
of adulthood—including high incidences of sexual assault, inadequate reproductive health education, and the 
prevalence of transactional sex due to economic constraints. For more analyses see Dodoo (2002); Whittle 
(2011); Austrian et. al. (2009). 




Because the union is not recognized by the church, the state, or by custom (the three forms 
of legal marriage in Kenya), it is often kept secret from the larger extended family. These 
arrangements also arise, as Bernard bluntly pointed out, more out of convenience rather than 
long-term investment. When the Kenyan legislature was debating to legalize “come-we-stay” 
marriages after six-months of co-habitation, I asked Bernard how that would affect his own 
relationships. Half-jokingly, he said that he would kick out this hypothetical wife, who he 
was not serious about, after five and a half months in order to avoid any legal obligations.84 
The “come-we-stay” arrangement is a popular alternative to marriage in Kibera for 
several reasons. First, it gets around the moral ambiguities involved in pre-marital sex. 
Delayed adulthood, for economic, cultural, and legal purposes, does not correspond to 
sexual maturation. Therefore, engaging in a relatively monogamous union, even if it is an 
informal marriage, allows for a young man to subvert social mores. Second, “divorce” or 
dissolution of these informal unions is much less stigmatized than a union that had been 
sealed by either a customary or religious ritual. Young men can try on different kinds of 
women, even across ethnic lines, before ultimately fundraising to pay bridewealth for a wife. 
Third, for young women within a “come-we-stay” marriage, the production of children is 
less shameful—even if her parents never meet her “husband.” There is always a possibility 
that the marriage will be formalized in the future and if it is not, she can claim to have been 
married. Finally, it allows for young people, of either gender, to at least play as adults within 
the intimate environment of their own homes. As much as the wider public lamented the 
                                                
84 This particular law never passed, though the Marriage Act of 2013 resurrected the debate, recognizing 
informal marriages after 2 years of co-habitation. 
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phenomenon of informal marriages, in Nairobi most acquaintances and neighbors in the city 
would not know the official status of a couple’s marriage. (Frederiksen 2000, 218) To them, 
they were husband and wife, no matter the arrangement. There was an urban face of 
marriage and a rural one and “come-we-stay” arrangements allowed young men to advance 
their social adulthood in the city. This was a personal triumph of fictive adulthood rather 
than one that would be formally acknowledged by wider kin networks. 
Beyond formal and recognized marriage, becoming an adult in Kibera most frequently 
involved the relationship the young man had with his upcountry kin. It was to them that he 
needed to prove his economic stability and viability as an adult. Since the majority of 
Nairobians live in settlements where they have no access to property or land, much of the 
money earned in the informal economy was remitted home. Even before they were married, 
many young men tried to find the means to build a house upcountry that they could use 
during visits. Save for the youth from the Kikuyu areas of central Kenya, where property had 
long been segmented and privatized even within families, young men from various ethnic 
groups shared this concern of feeling that they had to perform their adulthood in their rural 
villages. All official, formal, and customary rituals, whether they were bridewealth 
negotiations or funeral ceremonies, happened outside of Nairobi. A young man would raise 
money with his friends and paternal kin and form a committee that would join him at the 
rural home of his betrothed to make formal arrangements for marriage. Large caravans of 
friends and well-wishers, part of funeral committees, were also expected to trek to upcountry 
locations for funeral procedures. As much as a young person might achieve autonomy and 
economic success in the city, it was not until he or she could show this to their upcountry 
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kinfolk that adulthood was really achieved. Coincidentally, these events and rites required 
significant economic capital. 
Proving themselves to the clan and kin upcountry was where most youth in Kibera got 
stuck—building a proper house could be expensive, a potential bride’s family’s expectation 
of bridewealth might be exorbitant, and fulfilling the cash demands of kin in poor, rural 
places exhausted their abilities to save. They would rather remain youth in Kibera, with all 
the ambiguity and liminality that conferred on them, than try to manage the expectations of 
custom or tradition in their upcountry homes. Young men like Shadrack, Otoyo, and John 
could rise in status within the slum, despite their youth, through their connections to non-
governmental organizations. Their adulthood at “home” might be delayed, but in Kibera 
they could make up new categories of status where “adulthood” no longer mattered. The 
formal age structuring of social institutions, like those of cohorts, roles, and age strata, is 
circumvented by the informal—where an individual goes about dividing his own life course 
into meaningful segments (Kertzer 1989, 6).  
The roots of intergenerational tension in Africa precede even the schism caused by the 
introduction of colonialism. Justin Willis’s (2002) text on the social history of alcohol in East 
Africa tells a story of how senior men have always constructed authority by creating the 
circumstance through which they can control the actions of young men and women. The 
observations of Africanist anthropologists show that these tensions were once mediated by 
the very same systems of authority that suspended youth’s access to it. In some East African 
groups especially, these intergenerational issues, between old men pursuing social order and 
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young men seeking to seize power, were mediated by the presence of age sets.85 Children 
born into a certain period of time would be initiated together and pass through life’s 
transitions as a group. In some communities, like the Giriama, the initiates would wait, 
sometimes up to 40 years, for their chance to “rule” (Brantley 1978, 250). A similar system 
was in place among the Kikuyu, where initiates entered a riika, or age set, which defined their 
behavior toward members of other age sets, both younger and older. “The older members of 
a particular riika became, the more respect the riika accorded” (Davison 1989, 33).  
As Jon Abbink has stated in the introduction to his edited volume on youth in Africa, 
these examples of functional gerontocracy are no longer relevant in the current era: 
Even the last bastion of African society—the (extended) family—seems to have 
succumbed to the pressure as parents and relatives find it increasingly difficult to 
foster the young and provide them with a relatively carefree period in which to grow 
and develop. This transformation has led to a large proportion of youth having no 
well-defined place in society and being vulnerable and dependent, especially in urban 
conditions (Abbink 2005, 2). 
 
Young men now go through initiation, but this no longer leads to the kind of ideal liminality 
that will prepare them for reintegration back into a society. Instead, they are liminal in the 
sense that they have no status, power, or authority in the wider society, but that liminality 
does not extend to responsibilities. Many of them are forced to take on unprecedented 
economic burdens. John, who is the first-born son of his large nuclear Kamba family, came 
to Kibera after completing high school upcountry at the age of 18. He was given some 
support by a paternal uncle who had a low-wage, but steady, job as a security guard in a 
Nairobi office building, but he quickly experienced extraordinary pressure, at that young age, 
                                                
85 Fueled by the observations of Evans-Pritchard (1940) on the uniqueness of segmentary lineage in East 
Africa, the inquiry into the social organization of age sets continues to fascinate anthropologists. For more 
discussions of East African age sets, see Baxter (1978); Bernardi and Kertzer (1985); Kertzer (1984); Levine and 
Sangree (1962); Sangree (1989); and Settersten and Mayer (1997). 
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to remit extra income made from his forays as an informal laborer. He took on the burden 
of paying school fees for his siblings and sending food home to an area of the country that 
experienced chronic food shortages due to drought and government underdevelopment. 
During a period of time when he was societally defined as irresponsible and powerless, he 
instead found himself saddled with becoming the chief provider for his immediate family. 
Across Kenya, children are seen as old-age security for aging parents (Hoddinott 1992), but 
John’s familial pressures resulted in a total suspension of his personal advancement in order 
to address issues back home. In return, like others of his age, educational background, and 
economic status, he was treated only to the pains of age discrimination. 
In Kibera, however, the categories of age are culturally defined and individually 
constructed and there is room for negotiation. The young men and women find opportunity 
in ambiguity and create new categories, like informal marriages, to advance their statuses 
within the slum. The institutional response to this liminality has been less flexible. Instead, 
the national and legal processes associated with youth reform end up reinforcing a longer 
period of youth. Young men who were once able to feel like they were achieving a new level 
of independence in the city are informed by youth policies that they are youth until they are 
35. The intended benefit of this would be that they could potentially access youth services 
for a longer period of time, but the outcome has proven to be more restrictive than 
empowering.  
Generational Politics 
Immediately following Kenya’s independence, the authority of age was reasserted and 
confirmed through the rhetoric and practice of national level leaders and politicians. Under 
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Kenyatta and Moi, it had become expected and normal that national political structures 
should mirror African “traditional” gerontocracies. “The post-colonial leadership in much of 
Africa, especially at independence, (re)invented the myth of gerontocratic leadership as 
legitimate leadership” (Ogola 2006). What was really happening was a continuation of 
colonial interventions seeking to solve the problem of “detribalized” youth who ended up as 
vagrants in Nairobi due to rural disenfranchisement and chronic underemployment for 
young people in the city. The imposition of colonial era vagrancy laws labeled youth as 
problems to remove and did not deal with the very urban issues of poor housing conditions 
and unemployment (Ocobock 2006). The colonial policies also reflected an idealized history 
of what youth had been like under the previous authority of age sets. This was not 
necessarily true. “Images of youth were as potent in dreams of a stable past as they were in 
nightmares of a disordered present. Officials and elders tended to agree that discipline had 
been stronger—if harsher—before, and young people under better control when they were 
free of modern temptations” (Waller 2006, 90).  
What looked like state rebellion was recognition by young people that elders “controlled 
marriage, access to land and livestock, education, employment, and also the social knowledge 
that the young would need to survive and prosper. “They ‘made custom’ in the courts, 
instilled discipline in the schools, shaped ‘respectability’ and controlled the debate about 
youth” (Waller 2006, 87). Kenya’s first president, Jomo Kenyatta, continued to control youth 
through legal means, but Daniel arap Moi manipulated generational politics to not only 
control rebellious youth but to advance his own political power in an increasingly 
authoritarian state. During his 24 years as Kenya’s president, Moi revitalized a youth wing of 
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KANU to monitor public dissent and underwrote tribal militias, made up of disadvantaged 
youth, in the process (Kagwanja 2006).  
While Moi drew young disadvantaged, unemployed, and frustrated young men into 
disreputable activities to solidify his power, the young men and women graduating from 
Kenyan universities joined civil society movements to rally for multi-partyism and a new 
democratic space. Beyond being exploited and used by older politicians in their quest for 
authority, youth were conspicuously absent in all levels of the government. When youth 
entered the civil service, they would wait years to rise through the ranks to get into positions 
of reform or leadership.  
Government policy makers, lobbyists, and development practitioners have approached 
the perceived youth crisis with the assumption that the stage of liminal transition 
experienced by the marginal masses in Kenya is static. This is reflected not just in the official 
documents they produce, but also in the attitudes toward young people that place them on a 
long march toward adulthood. Young people in Kenya growing up in an era of 
unprecedented growth and rapid urbanization are members of a youth bulge, indicated in 
locations where the percentage of young people aged between 15 and 24 is large relative to 
the total population. Some scholars have correlated the existence of youth bulges to the 
predominance of youth violence and “[y]outh bulges may be a better predictor of low 
intensity political violence than large scale wars” (Urdal 2006, 608).86  There are indications 
that youth bulges are often responsible for large-scale underemployment, which can also 
                                                
86 See also Hart and Gullan (2010); Kaplan (1994); and Huntington (1996) 
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explain the likelihood for young people to get involved in political movements or extremist 
measures.  
Evidence also suggests that “members of youth bulges have less civic knowledge than 
youth raised with more adults” (Hart and Gullan 2010, 72) and “communities affect civic 
knowledge and civic participation through social influence, knowledge, attitudes…behaviors 
are shaped in daily interactions with other people” (Hart et al. 2004, 592). In child-saturated 
communities young people interact most often with their peers and miss the opportunity to 
acquire “fundamental civic qualities” (ibid., 591). The emerging civil society organizations of 
1990s Kenya agreed. Their interventions were designed to fill a knowledge gap in the 
country, specifically related to democracy and citizenship. The programs were founded on 
the idea that if the gap were filled more young people would be capable of articulating their 
specific needs. Citizenship training, combined with a rise in youth representation, was 
conceived in order solve the crisis of youth. 
During my earliest days in Kenya coinciding with the general election of 2002, I was 
witness to several civil society initiatives attempting to address the problem of 
representation. I engaged with the young people of a national youth lobby organization 
funded by several foreign donors interested in promoting democracy in an age of multi-
partyism. There were two major agenda items connected to the election—which was to be 
the third multiparty election held since 1992. The first priority of civil society organizations 
and donors was engaging young people in civic education programs. Years of political 
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repression under the presidency of Daniel arap Moi had created a tinderbox in Kenya.87 In 
order to address the threat of election violence and increase civic knowledge, between late 
2001 and the election in December of 2002, over 80 non-governmental organizations 
organized 50,000 civic education activities, including workshops, lectures, plays, puppet 
shows, and community forums to promote democratic citizenship and dialogue (Finkel and 
Smith 2011).  
The second agendum for civil society organizations working on youth representation was 
to increase the number of young people elected to local and national positions. In 2002, 
“youthfulness” previously “equated with political naivety and thus glossed over… now 
became equated with the push for a new moral order” (Mwangola 2007, 150). During the 
2002 election youth became a competitive advantage and among the older power brokers 
emerged a group of “Young Turks.” This was a group of second-generation politicians aged 
between 40 and 50 years who were promoted by the veterans of Kenya’s political arena as 
the face of change. In both the government and opposition parties, many of these “youth” 
representatives were the sons of prominent politicians. An opposition leader, Raila Odinga 
was the son of Kenya’s first vice-president and the government front-runner Uhuru 
Kenyatta was son of Kenya’s first president. Other prominent young men, like William Ruto, 
were engaged in politics at the behest of Moi who had drafted them into the KANU’s youth 
wing during the first multiparty elections and had since been honing their political skills. 
Even though these politicians were not exactly young, the idea of youth was emphasized in 
                                                





the press. The campaigns of members of the youth reform were prominently highlighted 
(ibid.).88 
There was great euphoria after the election of opposition leader Mwai Kibaki who, at the 
age of 72 in 2002, represented the promise of radical governmental change and reform. 
Kenyans I met truly believed that a dark veil of silence, repression, autocracy, and corruption 
had been lifted when the political party that had ruled the country since independence lost 
control of the government. Youth reformers were buoyed by the changes in government and 
continued full throttle to change its gerontocratic makeup. Affirmative action, a concept that 
had become popular in Kenya’s women’s movement (Tripp 2001), was promoted as the 
solution to increase young people’s presence in governance with the ultimate aim that 
proportional representation improved the types of government programs, legislation, and 
services focused on alleviating youth problems. The forms of affirmative action they 
proposed included setting aside specific seats for nominated members of Parliament, 
establishing a cabinet ministry specifically focused on youth affairs, and creating an elected 
youth council that would advise government agencies about special youth needs.  
Kibaki’s government came through on several of its promises to be more inclusive of 
segments of Kenyan society that had been systematically marginalized. In 2005, the 
government established the Ministry of State for Youth Affairs and in the following year the 
National Assembly passed a National Youth Policy. A national youth council was eventually 
established and youth officers were appointed to serve at local administrative offices 
                                                
88 I was initially introduced to the youth reform movement when I went to meet Cecily Mbarire. In 2002, 
Mbarire was one of the few young people in office after the election—she lost in her constituency but was 
nominated by Kibaki’s party, NARC. 
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countrywide. Finally, several different funds were allocated to tackle youth issues, from the 
Youth Enterprise Development Fund (YEDF) to the eventual introduction of Kazi kwa 
Vijana (Work for Youth), a state-funded work program for young people. By 2009, when 
Kazi kwa Vijana was introduced, just six years after Kibaki came to power, official 
interventions to address the youth crisis had finally started to gain ground.  
Affirmative Action in the Age of Reform 
I met Kamau when he was the director of a youth serving organizations promoting 
affirmative action. At the time, the youth in Kenya’s civil society had isolated the major 
culprits of youth exclusion to poor leadership training and under-representation of youth, so 
his organization was especially interested in ensuring that young people understood a new 
type of democratic leadership. They endorsed ambitious youth, supported them to contest in 
the election, and encouraged them to take on elder politicians in local and national contests. 
Kamau grew up in a poor estate in Nairobi’s Eastlands, the first born of five to a single 
mother. He was a bright student and after the primary school exit exam was admitted to 
Kenya High School, a national secondary school where he grew a network of middle and 
upper class friends. He told me once that if he had ended up in a less prestigious, non-
boarding high school, he is certain he would have ended up a thug. After high school he 
landed at the University of Nairobi, where he was able to get a regular program placement in 
Political Science after scoring high on the secondary school exam.  
While at university in 1992, he connected with a group of activist students who were 
canvassing and campaigning in the multi-party electioneering happening across the country. 
Major opposition politicians like Mwai Kibaki, Oginga Odinga, and Kenneth Matiba joined 
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academic activists from the universities who then pushed their students to rally for political 
change (Amutabi 2002; Klopp and Orina 2002). Kamau and his network of friends, who 
were powerful student leaders, participated in the pro-democracy rallies fervently. In 1996, 
lifted by funding opportunities from foreign donors keen to utilize youth for democratic 
change (Muthee 2010), the student leaders held the National Youth Conference in Limuru, 
which led to the creation of several national NGOs focused on youth. At the age of 28, 
Kamau had landed an executive position in a fairly influential, civil society organization. His 
colleagues were also able to network their way into management positions in other small 
democracy-promoting or youth-serving organizations in Nairobi. I attended several civic 
education workshops, leadership trainings, and meetings about youth’s role in the 
constitution-making process with Kamau and his team in 2002 and 2003. They had the lofty 
and noble goals to represent the masses of youth across the nation. It was clear that 
“representation” would not necessarily include the rural or urban poor.  
While the big issue of persistent gerontocracy was important to the young men and 
women I met in Kenya’s civil society, I understood later that the quest for democracy was 
not necessarily a revolt against generational inequality. The crowd around Kamau wanted 
young people to be involved in order to potentially address youth issues—like 
unemployment and political exploitation—but there was never any indication that the 
current life course, wherein a young person must pass through ujana, needed systematic 
restructuring. Kamau stayed on as the head of his organization until he was nearing his 35th 
birthday, at which point he moved on to a job with an international organization doing non-
youth related policy work. Most of the other former youth activists also retired from youth 
development and rights work when they were no longer youth. Kamau told me that it was 
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time for him to pass the reins on to the next generation to fight their fights. By putting this 
age boundary between youth and adulthood he and the others permitted themselves, at a 
certain age, to stop advocating for youth. The idea was that eventually, all youth would 
become adults and the phase was just “transitional”.89 If the process of getting there was 
difficult, it was kind of the point.  
The draft National Youth Policy was written in 2002 through a process sponsored by the 
Ministry of Home Affairs, Heritage and Sports and developed with a coalition of both 
international organizations (UNICEF, UNFPA, Commonwealth Youth Programme, and 
ActionAid) and members, like Kamau, of Kenya’s organizations serving youth. The main 
goals sought the increase of affirmative action for young people in Kenya, ensuring their 
representation as both participants in national political processes and in the National Youth 
Council. The Council would, in theory, steer government policy towards resolving issues 
resulting from the historical exclusion of youth in development agendas across the country. 
It was emphasized in the bill that young Kenyans, under 30 years old (later revised to 35), 
constituted 75% of the country’s population but “their status has been placed on the 
periphery” and “they have been excluded from designing, planning and implementing 
programmes.” It further stated that youth were in a position where they could not help 
themselves: 
Everyone in the community both young and old should play their respective roles to 
see that the aspirations and hopes of the youth are met. Many of the youth who are 
productive and energetic remain unemployed, continue to suffer from poor health, 
and lack sufficient support. In addition there are those youth that have special needs 
                                                
89 This was the exact wording used by PLO Lumumba, who was serving as the Secretary of the Constitution of 
Kenya Review Commission in 2003, and who told me and other members of a youth lobby group that youth 
should not be seen as a separate special interest group. 
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that require attention. These include those living on the streets, those living with 
HIV/AIDS, the girl youth and those with disabilities.90 
 
The Youth Policy was designed to be all-inclusive to ensure that youth were no longer 
accorded a minority status, especially considering they were the demographic majority.  
For the drafters of the National Youth Policy, the emphasis was not on the cultural or 
historical roots of youth’s exclusion and delays in reaching utu uzima, but rather in their 
specific denial from being part of the post-independence development agenda. The policy 
cites a few governmental programs and publications that addressed youth issues in Kenya; a 
conference on education and employment in 1966, a report called “After School - What?” 
written by the National Council of Churches of Kenya from the same year, an 
acknowledgement in the 1976 National Development Plan about youth unemployment, and 
the 1992 Sessional Paper on Small Scale and Jua Kali Enterprises.91 Youth organizations, 
working on “innovative programmes to address the youth’s economic needs, health 
interventions especially those aimed at reproductive health and alleviating the spread of 
HIV/AIDS among the youth, environmental programmes, character building, literacy, 
vocational training, sports and recreational as well as socio-cultural programmes” were 
constrained due to high population pressures, lack of appropriate skills, unclear and 
uncoordinated youth policies and programs, resource constraints, and “low status given to the 
youth”.  
When the Kenyan National Assembly finally debated the National Youth Policy Bill in 
2006, they emphasized the symptoms. Samuel Poghisio (who became Minister for 
                                                
90 Ministry of Gender, Sports, Culture and Social Services. Kenya National Youth Policy, 2006. 
91 Jua kali, literally meaning “fierce sun”, used to refer to the artisanal, small scale, informal economy. 
  
106 
Information in 2007) spoke in favor of the policy, especially as it related to addressing the 
need for a National Youth Council: 
I am happy we have a Ministry of Youth Affairs. However, we want it to be given 
adequate resources so that they can give credit to young people to participate in 
income generating activities. We want to see more young people being involved in 
decision making at all levels of governance. I also want to see young people being 
seen for who they are. There is goodness and energy in young people. If we want to 
develop this country, we cannot afford to leave 70 percent behind… We should not 
wait until elections time and we start to mobilise young people to be our foot 
soldiers. We should wake up and help those young people. They are not a cursed lot 
that they must continue taking kumi kumi and dying or taking miraa and getting into 
drug addiction because no one cares about them. They are bound to get into drug 
addiction. How does it feel be a young person, 30 years old, with a degree at home 
still depending on your parents for the next meal?92  
 
The bill was debated during a period of time when the government police was beginning its 
operation against vigilante groups of youth, mainly members of the Mungiki sect, who were 
said to be responsible for a series of gruesome murders in the country. Amina Abdalla 
worried the bill was just rhetoric and called for innovative interventions and not just old 
solutions:  
I am glad that the Government is taking serious action on one problem that the 
youth is facing. There are vigilante groups which come in different forms. They 
include Baghdad Brothers, Mungiki, and the rest. Dealing with the criminal aspects of 
those vigilante groups is dealing with a small portion of the problem. The problem is 
multi-sectoral. It has mental health and employment dimensions. So, as the 
Government rounds up those youths for illegal activities, we need a long-term 
solution to their problems. We do not just need to take them to court.93 
 
In 2007, the Kenya Police hunted down Mungiki, a religious sect, a youth movement, a gang, 
and a criminal mafia (Anderson 2002; Kagwanja 2003; Rasmussen 2010; Wamue 2001). In 
                                                
92 Kumi kumi (ten ten) is a potent illicit brew, made of sorghum, maize or millet, drunk by low-income Kenyans. 
Miraa, or khat, is a flowering plant known for its stimulant-like properties. It is especially popular with Muslims, 




some reports, more than 500 members of the group disappeared and were killed by a “Death 
Squad.”94  
When Kibaki ran for president again in 2007, one of his campaign promises was to 
provide 500,000 new informal sector jobs for youth. That number and emphasis on 
informality were suspect, since everyone knew that for every successful informal sector 
entrepreneur there were twenty people copying a business and merely subsisting. The trend 
in development programs, however, had shifted by this point to include exciting new words 
like entrepreneurship. Youth organizations shifted from awareness trainings to 
entrepreneurship campaigns. The National Youth Policy was deemed a big win for young 
people in Kenya and Kibaki’s youth minister unveiled two key income generating projects, 
the Youth Enterprise Development Fund and Kazi kwa Vijana, to deal with youth 
unemployment.  
The premise behind Youth Enterprise Development Fund, which began in 2006, was 
simple. Youth up to age 35 who were part of a registered youth group were invited to submit 
proposals to the district youth officer to be eligible for a 50,000 Kenyan Shilling loan. The 
loan had a low interest rate and was set up to allow youth groups to use seed capital to build 
strong businesses together. Designed like a micro-finance program, the youth were expected 
to then pay the government back within a certain amount of time. A report put out by a 
team of Kenyan researchers states: 
Poor working young people are creative, persistent and resourceful and they have 
learned to think like adults on how to sell, ration, budget and manage risk either 
                                                
94 In 2009, Oscar Kamau Kingara, founder of the Oscar Foundation that had been documenting the extra-
judicial killings of the Mungiki, was murdered alongside his colleague John Paul Oulu as they sat in traffic on 
State House Road near the University of Nairobi. 
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completely on their own or with families and/or community networks. Despite the 
fact that these younger entrepreneurs are self-learned, they are sales savvy, quick with 
complex math transactions and hardworking, they cannot access financial services 
(Amenya et al. 2006). 
 
They added, “it should be said that not all children and youth will be entrepreneurial nor 
may microfinance be appropriate for their needs” (ibid.). Subsequently, the YEDF was 
designed to increase access to credit that would, in turn, build an informal industry where no 
formal opportunities exist. Based on the Grameen Bank’s micro-finance model, the 
emphasis on working through groups existed because social pressure was thought to ensure 
loan repayment. However, since the Kenyan government was the source of the loan, few 
youth took the repayment seriously. Shadrack, Otoyo, and John were approached by the 
youth development officer in Kibera and offered the loan, with no interest rate and only a 
5% administrative fee up front. They were not really interested in starting a business, but 
took the money anyway and split it between them for personal use.95  
The other program, Kazi kwa Vijana, was launched in 2009 and was marketed as Kenya’s 
version of the Civilian Conservation Corps. Its mission was to employ urban and rural youth 
in labor-intensive public works projects like road maintenance, water harvesting, 
afforestation and waste collection. According to young people I met during focus group 
discussions in 2010 in Ugunja and Ahero, both located in Western Kenya, the Kazi kwa 
Vijana program promised youth 40 full days of work with a remuneration of 300 Kenya 
Shillings per day. At the completion of 40 days, they would then receive 12,000 Kenya 
Shillings, or around $150. Youth, many of whom had completed their education through 
high school, told me that they were willing to do degrading work like digging ditches and 
                                                
95 Up to now, I do not know if they have ever repaid it. 
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cutting grass, if it meant having access to this bulk sum of money which they would invest in 
small businesses and tertiary education. The experience of youth in Ugunja was that they 
were given a week of work at the 300 shilling a day rate, but in order to collect their pay of 
1200 shillings it required traveling to the District headquarters in Siaya, a half a day’s bicycle 
ride away. The experience for youth in Ahero included a tale of corruption. The National 
Irrigation Board was tasked with coordinating the Kazi Kwa Vijana Initiative in that area and 
they blamed the institution because it was sporadic and menial work. When they did get 
paid, they found it was at a reduced rate since the board took out an “administration fee.”  
Affirmative action ended up looking like a victory for young people but it was really just 
a confirmation of state power over young people’s lives, leaving them little choice but to 
look upon gerontocratic order as the ruling social structure. Instead, affirmative action 
served as a way for youth activists like Peter and Kamau, who had the advantage of higher 
education and the status that imbued, to find space within the political realm. The policy 
served to help educated young men (and women) find political space, but was unsuccessful 
for youth in locations like Kibera who needed to overcome their liminal states, not at the 
national level, but within their larger extended kin networks or within their communities. It 
is these cultural and political realities that lay the foundation for the actions and decision 
made by Kibera’s youth hustlers. In the face of such disappointments, learning to hustle 
NGOs (and anything else for that matter) becomes a legitimate and significant skill they 
need in their personal journeys to success. 
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Steve ’s  Story ,  Part  I :  The Lost  Years (or Putt ing the Slum On)96 
 
In November 1999, a young man named Steve completed the examinations of the Kenya 
Certificate of Secondary Education. He felt good about his performance in the subjects of 
English, Kiswahili, history and governance, but was certain that his marks in physics, 
chemistry, and math would bring down his overall score and ruin his chances to attend a 
public university. As it was, Steve was almost certain he would not even be able to see the 
results of his exams, because there was an outstanding balance at the school of unpaid 
tuition, fees, and lost-book fines. In the months prior to the exam, the school’s headmaster 
had repeatedly reminded him of these debts and continually threatened to send him home. 
He was only allowed to take the exams because he had scraped together enough money to 
pay the examination fees directly to the Kenya National Examinations Council. 
Steve’s school was a district-level boys’ boarding school 20 kilometers from the rural 
village where he grew up. All throughout his childhood he had been told that he was bright 
and he competed hard every quarter to be in the top position at his small village primary 
school. Men of his father’s generation often told him, on the basis of this early performance, 
that he would go far in life. That encouragement fueled a desire in him to do well in school 
and no one was surprised that he received high scores on the primary exit exam and was 
invited to attend a second-tier provincial school, eight-hours away by bus. Under pressure 
from his father, who worried that the family would not be able to afford the transportation 
fees, Steve found himself seeking admission in the smaller, less prestigious school closer to 
home.  
Even at this lesser school, Steve thrived. Misfortune struck during his third year, 
however, when his father became ill and could no longer continue to work in his low-level 
civil servants position. Lacking funds for fees, Steve was sent home from school indefinitely. 
Right after the expulsion, his mother encouraged him to head to Nairobi or another city to 
get some cash to send home to the family. But, he was just 15 years old and did not want to 
give up hope of continuing his education. Instead of heading to the city, he sought out 
counsel from a local primary teacher who was far enough away from his natal village so as 
not to embarrass and shame his extended family and who would be able to advise him on 
how to continue his schooling. The man, seeing his determination, enlisted Steve to teach 
primary level English at his school in order to make enough money to pay the debts at the 
high school and return to his studies. The primary teacher even allowed Steve to stay in his 
house while he worked. 
After two terms of teaching, Steve scraped together enough money to return to school 
and pay for his national examinations, but it was not enough to pay off all the debts. He 
studied hard during his final year in high school but had missed too many science and 
mathematics lessons—subjects he struggled with—to be able to catch up. He left school at 
the age of 17, satisfied to have finished but with few economic options.  
By this time, his father had recovered from his illness and was trying to run a small 
                                                
96 This is the first in a series of vignettes about Steve written as a fusion of many of the young men I knew in 
Kibera and offered as an illustration of a typical coming of age story for youth in the development field. 
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butchery in the local shopping center near their homestead, which he bought after selling a 
portion of the family’s land. Steve could have joined his father in the butchery business but 
things were tense between them and Steve felt his father’s business prowess was suspect 
since the shop was opened infrequently and profits were often drank away.  
Steve’s father’s alcohol problem had been evident since childhood. When he was 10, his 
mother sent Steve to the local shopping center to find his father and ask what he was 
bringing home for dinner. None of the children had eaten all day. His father had gone to 
town to sell a goat but had never returned. Steve and his younger brother walked two 
kilometers to town and asked at one of the small general shops that sold items like soap and 
tea where their father was. They were pointed in the direction of the local bar. The brothers 
tentatively approached the tall wooden fence that had been built up around the drinking hole 
and peered between the slats to see their father buying rounds of Tusker beer and eating 
barbecued goat meat with village elders. They knew they would get in trouble if they 
interrupted, so instead walked home and lied to their mother that they could not find him. 
Everyone went to bed hungry that night—a situation that was too common for the family. 
During the six months after completing high school, Steve lingered around the village. 
He spent much of his time pining for an old girlfriend who had attended a sister school of 
his own. He had met her during a regional drama festival where she performed with her 
classmates in a choral verse about the importance of education and Steve recited a poem in 
Kiswahili by the Tanzanian poet laureate, Shabaan Robert. In the two years they courted 
they rarely saw each other, but wrote long and emotional love letters. She had tested well 
during the KCSE and had been invited to attend Kenyatta University in Nairobi. When 
Steve told her that he was not going to go to university, the letters from her stopped. 
Around the village and nearby shopping center, Steve tentatively began to learn to hustle. 
On market days he would ask people if they needed help herding recently purchased cows or 
goats from the market in exchange for a few coins. His maternal uncle had a small general 
shop that he sometimes helped stock for a small wage. He occasionally helped tutor 
candidates for the primary school exam. Mostly though, he worried. There was a lot of 
pressure from his parents to get cash to help send his siblings to school. They needed money 
to be able to afford the right fertilizer and watering resources necessary to make their small 
pieces of land productive. His mother belonged to a small women’s cooperative and savings 
club that produced handicrafts sold at the Maasai Market in Nairobi, but the proceeds were 
small. There was never enough to sustain the larger extended family. Steve’s father, possibly 
as a result of his increased drinking and shame of his poverty, had become misanthropic 
which lowered the chances of the whole family to lean on extended kin and neighbors for 
help. No one talked about it but Steve’s mom was finding it harder and harder to send her 
children to nearby relatives to be fed because the family could not participate in the mutual 
part of mutual help—they only received. Steve’s sense of responsibility to his family, 
stemming from the cultural instruction he received from his warm and loving grandmother, 
was strong and he was motivated to help lessen their suffering.  
When he had enough money saved up to pay for bus fare, Steve left for Nairobi. His 
Baba Mkubwa—his father’s older brother—lived in a small one-room shack in the Laini 
Saba area of Kibera. Steve moved to Kibera in order to relieve his family of another mouth 
to feed and he hoped to maximize his economic potential. But life in Nairobi was hard. His 
uncle, who was employed as a deliveryman at an office building in Nairobi, treated him like a 
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child. He was commanded around and constantly reminded that he was just a youth. One of 
the local neighborhood joints consisted of young men who gambled on checkers and dice, 
games that Steve discovered he could sometimes win. He got caught more than once 
gambling away the few small coins his uncle gave him to purchase food for the household.  
More than anything, though, Steve looked for work. Young men his age, in those early 
lost years, had the hardest time finding ways to make money. They were not experienced 
enough and did not have the social networks necessary to find the salaried employment they 
desired. They were passed over by construction foremen and factory managers looking for 
stronger and bigger men to do casual manual labor. Steve would occasionally hear of an 
opportunity to do construction work from a friend to make 100 shillings after a day of 
grueling work digging trenches. On days he did not have work and other youth in the 
neighborhood did, he would stay inside the house with the curtains drawn, sleeping and 
listening to the sounds of the slum: babies crying, women washing clothes, radio reports of 
the lunchtime news, or the video hall next door playing Nollywood movies from Nigeria.  
After about a year and a half of sleeping on the small sofa in Baba Mkubwa’s house in 
Kibera and having been unable to amass money to send home, Steve contacted another 
maternal uncle in Kisumu who owned a fleet of matatus. The uncle agreed to let Steve come 
and stay with him and learn the matatu business. This uncle had a larger house in Kisumu 
and Steve hoped to feel like less of a burden and be able to establish more independence. He 
had learned from other young people that he needed connections to get work. This uncle 
was more financially successful than the others, so he was hopeful that this could be his 
chance to make significant advancement toward adulthood, or at least financial 
independence. The uncle immediately put him to work by stationing him at a matatu stage 
about halfway along a route, where he collected money from the drivers and touts as they 
passed. Steve was responsible for safeguarding the day’s earnings and bringing home the 
money at the end of each day. This job required handling large bundles of notes and 
counting and recounting to ensure that the matatu workers were not stealing. He delivered 
the day’s income to his waiting uncle each night but was never paid for his effort. The uncle 
told him his labor was an equal exchange for room, board, and valuable business skills. Steve 
was frustrated by how stingy his uncle was being, especially because he had grown up in a 
house where his mother had shared whatever they had with whoever was nearby. He was 
surprised that the generosity had not been passed on to his uncle. 
After six months of sweating on the roadside with no pay, he grew increasingly 
frustrated with his uncle and borrowed some money from a cousin for the fare to travel back 
to his village. Steve was now 20 years old and returned home with little to show for his 
adventures. Except for the small amounts of cash he occasionally sent home with cousins or 
other Kiberans from his home area—money he would tell his mom was for the sugar in her 
tea—he had not paid any school fees for his brothers or significantly reduced the family’s 
financial insecurity. For several more months he lived at home, in the small bachelor hut that 
had been built to house the boys after they had gone through circumcision and could no 
longer sleep in their mother’s house. He helped with the meager harvest they had that year 
but grew restless and bored. He also increasingly disapproved of his father’s drinking, which 
he felt was the cause of the family’s money problems. The tension between them rose and as 
soon as he could gather fare, he returned to his uncle’s house in Kibera where at least he felt 
he had a chance to find work.   
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CHAPTER THREE: THE DEFINITION OF WORK 
In the 2014 World Bank Report on the State of Youth Employment in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, the authors state “Youth not only need jobs, but also create them” (Filmer and Fox 
2014, 2). This may seem like an obvious statement to make about such a demographically 
important segment of modern sub-Saharan Africa, but it reads as almost revolutionary in the 
context of youth liminality and persistent gerontocracy.  
Youth create jobs. They are agents. They actively participate to alleviate youth 
unemployment. 
A fundamental tenet of this dissertation asks that we not just recognize the untapped 
potential of young people but also pay attention to the ways in which they participate and 
engage in shaping their world. Even when they had it, young people in Kibera barely 
recognized their power and would never have guessed that they were ones creating new 
industries or developing career pathways. This was mainly because youth, and the people 
creating intervention programs, labeled their economic activities as “informal” and 
perpetuated the idea that young people were victims of systemic political and cultural 
barriers. Katindi Sivi of the Kenyan civil society organization, The Institute for Economic 
Affairs agrees:  
“The trends and dynamics of employment in Kenya discussed … shows that 
majority of the jobs are created in the informal sector more than in the formal sector. 
However, the informal sector jobs are precarious in nature as characterized by job 
insecurity, poor wages and terms and conditions of employment, lack of social 
protection, weak safety and health standards, and low job tenure. Even though 
informal sector employment has been a key driver to reducing unemployment in 
Kenya, informality remains a major productivity trap. Thus, without strategic 
interventions to formalize and improve the informal sector jobs, the sector cannot 
be relied on to effectively address the country’s youth employment problem and 
poverty reduction goals” (Sivi 2010, 132). 
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To understand why informality created a “productivity trap,” it is important to 
understand that the statistics on population in Kibera and the ambiguity in the meaning of 
“youth,” were sister problems to issues surrounding a. what constitutes employment, b. how 
many people are actually unemployed and why, and c. how youth compete for work. This 
chapter will dive into the controversy of work and discuss the use of “informality” as a 
catch-all category for economic opportunities. Then, I will detail the facts and figures used 
by NGOs in their design of interventions with examples of how these connect to the 
unemployment situation in Kibera. Finally, I’ll discuss how hustling, an activity that has been 
alluded to but not fully described above, contributes to producing an environment for 
youthful job creation.  
What is work? 
Like “youth,” Kiberans ascribed ambiguous meaning to the words “work” and 
“employment.” This ambiguity contributed yet another systemic burden preventing young 
people from becoming whole. For example, in the life course of Kibera youth, “work” and 
“employment” referred mainly to the jobs in the formal sector that would help alleviate their 
liminality. Work was a steady income or a regular salaried wage. It was working in an office, 
at a school, or a government institution. It meant having a title and a boss and a uniform. To 
become an adult, a young man needed to “work.” But there were ways around these strict 
definitions and this is where the ambiguities in definition complicated things. Informal 
economic activities were sometimes work and hustling was sometimes a job. 
To illustrate these variations, a good example lies in the informal carpentry industry of 
Ngong Road, a long stretch of shacks and small storefronts in walking distance to Kibera. 
The industry utilized a range of laborers–carpenters who made the furniture, tailors who 
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added cushions and other finishes, sellers who hawked the pieces, and people who stood by 
with pickup trucks and handcarts to make deliveries. By definition, some of these people had 
jobs and others were just hustlers—the differences of which were very slight. The handcart 
pullers and the furniture hawkers could be considered hustlers because they remained 
uncommitted to participating actively in the sector, while the carpenters and truck drivers 
invested resources and time in creating a profession. Confusingly, all of the activities were 
thought of as informal. Fees were paid to the city council for storefronts and business 
licenses, but the industry was basically unregulated with little oversight and insurance against 
tragedy. For example, when a former colleague’s husband lost all his tools during a robbery, 
he could not work for months because he had no way to reenter the workforce. Examples of 
these slight variations in the definition of work in the informal economy abounded. I’d ask 
colleagues and friends—“is that considered work?”—when stuck in Nairobi’s notorious 
traffic watching young men and women weave between cars selling everything from apples 
and plums to car air fresheners and children’s toys. And, what of the woman with her 
cardboard roadside stand who sold gum, mobile phone credit and cigarettes or the man who 
cut grass by hand for the Nairobi City Council? 
The answers were confusing. The woman on the side of the road who sold gum and 
candy atop a cardboard box was hustling, but if she was able to eventually build a more solid 
shed or kiosk to sell her goods, she might be able to transform her hustling into a job. The 
grass cutter was hustling, but had been hired by an official government institution.  The 
street hawkers in traffic were definitely hustlers, but it was clear from the similarity of the 
goods that were offered that there was a formal system to distribute products. Most of the 
carpenters on Ngong Road were working, but those without their own tools or who just sold 
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the goods, instead of constructing them, were probably hustlers. And yet, all of these 
laborers contributed productively to the economy and provided basic, and necessary, 
services that kept the city tidy, fed, sanitary, furnished, and clothed. 
More examples added to the milieu. A bodaboda driver, carrying people on the back of his 
motorcycle for a fee was working, but a young man delivering produce for a fee with an 
mkokoteni, or pushcart, was not. The former had a job; the latter was a hustler. The drivers of 
matatus, the chaotic 14-seater public vehicle vans ferrying passengers across the city, had 
jobs, but the wild conductors who hung off the side of the vehicles shouting for passengers 
were hustling. It was made very clear to me that while hustling helped with economic 
subsistence and served the purpose of building networks, it was absolutely and unequivocally 
not work.   
From where did these definition and expectations of work originate? In 1947, Elspeth 
Huxley, author of the Flame Trees of Thika based on a childhood growing up on a Kenyan 
coffee farm, wrote her impressions of East Africa and illuminated the thinking at the time 
on how Africans worked. Concerned about overcrowding on the native reserve land and the 
potential threat posed to European settlers, Huxley proposed the creation of industries to 
absorb the growing populations, but worried about African labor outputs and the work ethic 
of the African population. She wrote, “a great many farm or estate labourers… will not take 
on a task unless they can finish it by eleven or half-past eleven in the morning” (Huxley 
1947, 205). Huxley offers an environmental explanation for why this seems to be the case. “ 
The African, of course, has had to do some work to survive, but infinitely less, because there 
is no winter and plant growth is so much quicker and what work there was he managed, for 
the most part, to delegate to his wife” (206). And she blames the social services and colonial 
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policies for not encouraging people to work. “When people are short of food—that is when 
economic compulsion begins to come in—we soften the blow by famine relief, without any 
obligation to work for it. Our social policy is to provide more and more things for the 
African, either free, like education and medical services, or at subsidized rates, like housing” 
(ibid.). 
Huxley’s answer to the employment problem in Kenya was to create new industries and 
give fewer handouts, an evolutionist response to the rising informality. This would compel 
Africans to participate more meaningfully in the economy and develop stronger work ethics. 
Her observation of dependency culture rings eerily similar to the narrative of Kibera’s 
ruination. An added problem was that the opportunities for work in the colonial 
environment were already beginning to draw class lines among Africans—some were 
favored for civil servant positions in the colonial government while others were co-opted for 
manual labor in the railway and construction industries. The issues she details—especially in 
terms of a lack of jobs to absorb the workforce—carried forth to the post-independence era 
since the job categories and options for work were already narrow.  
In “Nairobi in the Time of Uhuru” Herbert Werlin (1963) describes unemployment at 
the time of Kenya’s independence: 
In 1960, 71,000 African men were employed in Nairobi; this year (1963) the figure is 
below 60,000. Last year employment dropped in the private sector in Nairobi by five 
percent, part of which stemmed from a 30 percent drop in employment in building 
and construction and from a nine percent drop in domestic work between June 1961 
and June 1962… It may be well that 25 percent of Nairobi’s African working 
population is unemployed and underemployed. 
 
A rise in unemployment naturally brings with it certain unfortunate consequences. 
An increase in the number of beggars, neglected children, prostitutes, and illegal 
hawkers is causing much concern. Crime rose in Nairobi by 36 percent between 1959 
and 1961, and its incidence now averages over 200 a week, mostly burglaries. Tax 
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collection has become more difficult, with only one-eighth of the adult population 
paying. Those Africans earning enough to invest savings are prevented from doing 
so by the increase in the demands made upon them by dependent relatives (Werlin 
1963, 9). 
 
Like Huxley, a declining formal sector was worrisome to Werlin. The illegal hawkers, who 
did not pay taxes, represented the seeding of discriminatory policies against the informal 
sector that would not change in Nairobi for the next 50 years. Despite that, the hidden, 
shadow economy Werlin saw in 1963 and described as underemployment, would become a 
vibrant economic sector in which the majority of Nairobians engaged in one way or another.  
What does the structured informal economy look like? The adjectives “formal” and 
“informal” are used in academic and development discourse, but the most often used 
colloquial word for the informal sector in Kenya is jua kali. Jua means “sun” and kali means 
“hot/fierce.” It initially referred to items produced by artisans and craftsmen (also called jua 
kali workers) made in open-air markets.97 Jua kali once referred to small-scale business 
activities, many of which were illegal and operated in improperly zoned physical space, but is 
now a pejorative term that carries a connotation of “low quality” (Macharia 1992). When a 
fundi, or handyman, is called to fix a leaky faucet and improvises a faulty solution, his work 
would be called jua kali. If a car is taken to an informal garage set up on the side of the road 
for panel beating and a fresh coat of paint, any resultant imperfections left on the car is jua 
kali. Ironically, few in Nairobi could avoid jua kali workers especially since during my time in 
Nairobi the few master craftsmen, from automobile mechanics to furniture carpenters, 
operating in formal storefronts charged exorbitant rates for services and goods. So most city 
                                                
97 Jua kali means “fierce sun,” a reference to the harsh conditions under which items are made. Kenneth King 
wrote the definitive history of jua kali in 1996. Other sources on the development of micro-enterprise and 




residents, even wealthier ones, had relationships with skilled informal sector workers. Even 
formal industries, like factories in industrial areas and construction companies, profited from 
paying workers daily instead of creating long-term contracts. These sectors that might have 
created the most formal employment options were also responsible for the flourishing of 
informality.  
These first informal opportunities young people found were kibarua, which was mainly 
characterized as temporary day labor contracted by formal industries.98 Kibarua work came in 
many forms. The lowest forms of kibarua in Kibera were the most difficult, dangerous, or 
degrading manual labor jobs. Young men seeking kibarua work would set out before the sun 
rose to seek out low-paying jobs like construction or roadwork. It was much cheaper for 
formal construction companies and factories to pay workers per day without additional 
benefits, as opposed to employing workers per month or under contract for the period of 
the job. Each day when a shift ended, workers would receive payment and decide if they 
wanted to return the following day. There was a freedom to this process but also insecurity. 
A person had no obligation to show up for work each day so could look for better, higher 
status employment options. The informal nature of things also meant that work every day 
was not guaranteed. Kenneth King’s study of jua kali noted that there was a “coexistence of 
survival/subsistence as well as entrepreneurial activities at different stages” (King 1996, 196). 
A young man or woman used kibarua work as a subsistence strategy and not as the 
                                                
98 The kibarua work dates to the coastal era of slavery when enslaved people were contracted out to work for 
someone else. At the end of the work, the slave would be given a card or barua that had the hours they worked 
marked to ensure half the wage would be shared with his owner. Under colonialism, kibarua became the 




advancement of a career. This resulted in a situation that further denigrated the jobs that 
were available, making them undesirable and low status.  
In 2010, my research assistant John ran a survey with 84 young Kiberans, seeking to 
understand whether they had grown up in Kibera or had originated from somewhere else in 
Kenya. I wanted to travel to the towns from which young people were migrating so that I 
could better understand the motives for migration. Were young people aware that upon 
arrival in Nairobi, they would likely live in the sprawling informal settlements? If they had 
that knowledge, why would they come? I also added two simple open-ended statements to 
the end of the survey. The first said “My favorite thing about Kibera is…;” the second 
indicated the respondents’ least favorite aspect of Kiberan life. The responses were 
illuminating for several reasons. In many instances, people’s favorite and least favorite things 
about Kibera were contradictory. For example, a 20-year-old male claimed that his favorite 
thing about Kibera was “unity among people and coordination with the youth,” but his least 
favorite thing was “[it is] prone to chaos, theft… and other small small issues.” The 
contradictions mirrored what I was hearing from young people about NGOs and outsiders. 
Not surprisingly, many of the respondents followed the themes of Kibera’s potential for 
providing survival activities and showed the importance of kibarua work in daily subsistence. 
Living in Kibera “vibarua ni rahisi kuget,” or “[kibarua work] is easy to ‘get’.”99 Having 
opportunities or chances “to enhance one’s survival,” as another put it, was a preoccupation. 
As for the youth in Kibera who had migrated to the city, I eventually started to see that they 
were predominantly evolutionists. There was no demand for labor rights or better working 
                                                
99 This is an example of Sheng. The grammatical structure is Kiswahili, but the English word “get” is in place 
of a Swahili word that would mean the same thing (in this instance). Vibarua is plural for kibarua. 
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conditions. Instead they saw subsistence strategies like working short-term jobs and living in 
the lowest cost housing as inevitable steps to achievement. The added consequence of the 
widespread abuses in Nairobi’s labor market was that when youth failed, they blamed 
themselves.  
The Kibera youth I knew were frustrated with the sociopolitical implications of their 
liminal positions in society, but their inability to find work far outweighed their frustrations 
with poor public policy or gerontocracy. When the government proposed the Kazi kwa 
Vijana program as a way of increasing wages for young people, they were replicating the 
kibarua economy. Originally designed as a national work program that would build large-
scale infrastructure projects, what the government ended up offering was work like digging 
ditches, clearing bush, and picking up roadside trash. Youth described this work as 
depressing and felt that by engaging in it they were reduced to a low station in life.100 The 
youth, who had been promised that the program would improve employment options, were 
disappointed to see a program that produced more of the same low wage, low class 
opportunities already available in the informal sector.  
The jua kali sector usually offered better and more formal opportunities for work. 
Historically associated with artisan handicrafts, jua kali industries have expanded. In recent 
years, development programs have seized on these displays of entrepreneurship and pushed 
projects for youth empowerment to tackle problems of waste and unemployment. For 
example, the Tako ni Pato (Trash is Cash) project at Carolina for Kibera, encouraged youth 
self-help groups to create sellable products from waste. One of the groups, PAT Zero 
                                                
100 From a focus group discussion with youth held in the town of Ahero, near the city of Kisumu, in July 2010. 
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Waste, collected the ubiquitous plastic bags seen everywhere across Kibera, washed them, 
and then fashioned them into a plastic string that could be crocheted into bags to take to 
market. Jua kali work like this was seen as desirable by the youth because it provided a steady 
income and higher status than kibarua—but there were barriers to entry. 
Poor Numbers 
I already knew that young people believed that unemployment was rampant in Kibera, 
and felt powerless to address it. And like the statistics on population, it was nearly 
impossible to really understand how large the problem was since the employment data in 
Kibera was unreliable. The most widely quoted figure on unemployment came from the 
“Facts and Figures” page of Kibera UK, an organization that helped match foreigners with 
gap year projects in Kibera. The fact they supply was that “Kibera is near the industrial area 
of Nairobi where up to 50% of the available workforce are employed (usually in fairly 
unskilled jobs). However, there is still an unemployment rate of 50%.”101 The figure is 
problematic in that it basically states that if a person did not work in the industrial area, that 
they are unemployed—an illogical conclusion given that some residents with low wage, but 
formal jobs used Kibera as a low-cost housing solution. It is also contestable because the 
figure includes no reference to a survey or census dataset. Despite this, 50% unemployment 
was widely used by NGOs in Kibera as a barometer against which improvements in 
employment would be measured with no clear plan for tracking change in the employment 
field over time. 
                                                
101 As reported on the Kibera UK “Facts and Figures” page (undated) http://www.kibera.org.uk/Facts.html 
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Contradictory statistics about the state of employment were common countrywide. A 
website called “Trading Economics” which “provides its users with accurate information for 
196 countries … [uses] official sources, not third party data providers” (in this case the 
Kenya National Bureau of Statistics) and shows that between 1999 and 2011 unemployment 
in Kenya averaged 22.43 % between 1999 – 2011 (with a record low in 2006). This rate 
measures “the number of people actively looking for a job.102 The CIA Factbook shows an 
estimate unemployment rate of 40% for both 2001 and 2008.103 The Institute of Economic 
Affairs’ Youth Fact Book stated that “unemployment increased from 6.7 percent in 1978 to 
25.1 percent in 1998/1999 before easing to 12.7 percent in 2005/2006”  (Sivi 2010, 128).  
These statistics are presented with little clarity or explanation of the huge swings in 
employment figures. The Youth Fact Book does make suggestions that these swings are related 
to the variation in employment levels for different demographic groups. Youth aged 20-24 
years old, for instance, experienced an unemployment rate of 47.3 percent in 1998/1999 
compared to 30-34 year olds who had an unemployment rate of 14.3 percent. In 2005/2006, 
during what appears to be a period of employment boom, the rate for 20-24 year olds was 
24.2 percent compared to a 7.5 percent rate for 30-34 year olds. The Brookings Institute 
aggregates the data for urban populations also by age range, stating that “in urban areas in 
2009…the overall unemployment rate was about 11.0 percent relative to a youth (20-24 
years) unemployment rate of 19.1 percent” (Munga and Onsomu 2014),104 
                                                
102 See “Kenya Unemployment Rate” http://www.tradingeconomics.com/kenya/unemployment-rate 
103 See “Kenya Unemployment Rate” http://www.indexmundi.com/kenya/unemployment_rate.html 





As Morten Jerven has pointed out, “poor numbers fundamentally shape what we know 
about development in sub-Saharan Africa, which in turn shapes how decisions are made” 
(Jerven 2013, 4). What specifically were the political implications of misstating or 
misinterpreting the statistics about employment in Kenya? Cynical Kiberans often said that 
statistics were skewed in order to keep them poor because there was money to be made, by 
foreign NGO practitioners and government officials, in their poverty. This was not a bad 
hypothesis considering how badly youth and other policies seemed to extend their problems 
rather than alleviate them. But why skew the results of the employment issue?  
Two reasons for the statistical confusion seem clear. First, statistics provided an alarmist 
call to action (and a justification) for NGOs, the government, and other international 
organizations to address the employment crisis. Without needing to say it outright, for many 
youth unemployment equaled violence. The root cause of extremist groups, ethnic violence, 
the uprisings in North Africa and the Middle East has very often been connected to 
inadequate economic opportunities for young people, especially young men. Echoing the 
common sentiment, “disaffected young people who lack the economic opportunities to raise 
themselves out of poverty are more vulnerable than adults to participation in armed 
violence, crime, gangs, drug trafficking, and other illicit activities.”105 More youth equaled 
more panic about the potential consequences of the youth bulge. A second, and more 
shadowy reason, was that the NGOs and government officials rarely saw economic activities 
of the informal economy as real “work,” even when the activities were productive and 
contributed to Kenya’s growing economy. Some of this had to do with the assumption that 
                                                




informal sector participants did not pay taxes because nothing was withdrawn from their 
uneven incomes even when it was clear that they did—through value added tax (18% in 
Kenya), land rates, or city council fees. So even if a young person was making money 
regularly, but through kibarua or jua kali work, it would not count in the narrow lens used to 
describe employment. 
Employment problems were often examined from the macro-level. From a demand 
perspective, economists point to the fact that all African countries depend on primary 
commodities for their exports. In Kenya, the export market’s main commodities were 
horticultural products (fresh cut flowers and greenhouse vegetables), coffee, and tea. Not 
only did large commercial farmers control these markets but many young Kenyans would 
not consider careers in agriculture because the sector was heavily stigmatized as low class 
and old-fashioned. If they had completed secondary school or university, they did not see 
why they should be farmers—the vocation of their rural and illiterate kin. But the increase of 
industry was also a poor solution. “Manufacturing’s share in GDP is lower in sub-Saharan 
Africa today than it was in 1980; over the same period in Asia, it rose in both lower- and 
middle- income countries” (Filmer and Fox 2015, 3). This means that African economies do 
not create the kind of labor-intensive growth that would absorb the high numbers of young 
people who completed their secondary studies each year.  
Despite perpetuating narrow definitions of work, it was clear that most practitioners saw 
opportunity in informality. In July 2014, I attended a summit for NGO practitioners and 
social innovators in Nairobi and a question was asked about where the jobs of Kenya’s 
future would originate. The majority of people voted for “self-employment.” In general, 
traditional ideas about what work is and how young people will get work have had to shift in 
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the face of these realities. It is clear that the private sector cannot effectively create the high 
numbers of jobs needed to satisfy the amount of laborers flooding the market. But even 
private sector companies complain that even these trained workers do not possess the skills 
and resources to meet their needs:  
“In countries with high youth unemployment young people do not see opportunities 
for the future. Many of these countries have large youth bulges, which can put 
downward pressure on employment and earnings. Many also have education and 
training systems that are not developing the kinds of skills needed by the private 
sector. On closer inspection, the problem is often more on the demand side than the 
supply side, with limited competition reducing employment opportunities, especially 
in more skill-intensive sectors. In these settings, removing privilege in business entry 
and access to jobs is likely to have large development payoffs.” (Hartnett and Dawdy 
2013, 18) 
There is also an issue of quality. More students are completing higher education, but the 
expenditure per student has decreased across Africa. In Kenya, only a few elite high schools 
produce Kenya’s future professional class and it is no wonder that these high schools, both 
public and private, have greater resources. Outdated pedagogical models hinder young 
people’s ability to develop critical and creative thinking skills and graduates enter an 
inefficient labor market with diplomas of limited quality and little relevance to needs of 
economy.106 In the last decade, the number of profit-driven tertiary institutions in Kenya has 
risen. Instead of improving the quality of workers they issue certificates and diplomas that 
mean little.107  
                                                
106 In the McKinsey Global Institute report, “Africa at Work,” the suggestion is made the educational reforms 
need to better target the tertiary level in Africa and improve access to vocational training and focus on math, 
engineering, and other “marketable skills.” (8/2012) 
http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/africa/africa_at_work  
107 This is related to a growing concern over the shallowness of private universities in Kenya. See Stephen 




In this kind of environment, where job availability does not match the number of job-
seekers, young people have to create their own opportunities. The systemic issues relating to 
youth powerlessness means that these actions go unrecognized and young people remain 
unable to acknowledge their role in the creation of work. The pull to Nairobi for young 
migrants was not because they thought there were formal work options that would suddenly 
be available in the city, but rather that the city was seen as a place where opportunities could 
be maximized. Within Nairobi an infrastructure for informality had emerged to absorb 
young people and hustling was a component of that structure. Not quite work, but also not 
quite idleness, becoming a good hustler was a necessary part of finding one’s way 
economically. 
The Concept of Hustling 
The word hustling has been used throughout the text to describe the liminal actions of 
opportunity creation in which young people engaged. There was no other colloquial term 
that resonated so well with young people to try to explain their informal economic activities. 
But “hustle” could also carry negative connotations as well, especially when used by people 
in the formal sector. Like “ghetto” which was appropriated and worn with a badge of pride 
by young Kibera residents, the local of use of “hustling” did not indicate an act that they 
were embarrassed to participate in, even if it was generally useful to hide the fact that they 
were doing it. Despite a pride in hustling, the action was still connected to the shadows—to 
hustle was to find a way around the conventional ways of doing things. It was sometimes 
extra-legal and a means to an end.  
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There was good hustling—a show of energy, enthusiasm, and creativity. This kind of 
hustling involved personal motivation and skill in networking. And there was bad hustling—
the kind where people were taken advantage of and cheated. Like most binaries in Kibera, 
the line between the two kinds of hustling was thin and permeable. Charles Piot spoke of his 
experience with the “hustle economy” in Lome, Togo where everybody is “out to get theirs” 
indicating that what is arising in African cities is a fierce competitiveness for resources 
needed for survival.108 This is an idea sometimes euphemized as a rise in entrepreneurial 
spirit—lauded especially in East Africa where the informal economy has yielded real 
innovations, competition, and economic outputs.109 The truth was that the only universal in 
hustling was that someone was getting money for a kind of work that was ambiguously 
defined, sporadically obtained, and occasionally morally suspect. In an article on the politics 
of the African hustle economy, the South African historian Petrus de Kock summarizes the 
daily hustle as a “a day-to-day grind. What you end up with is a hustle economy from street 
level up to the highest political offices. That kind of economy shapes behavior and leads to 
corrupt practices. Either you eat today or you’re going to be hungry. That’s the kind of 
socioeconomic understanding that people face on a day-to-day basis” (Pampalone 2012, 49).  
To follow this logic, hustling transcends class and geography and in the city and almost 
everyone hustles for something. Tatiana Thieme conceptualizes “hustling” as a survival 
mechanism and contestation to the structures of authority for youth engaged in garbage 
collection and toilet cleaning in Mathare slum, east of Nairobi’s downtown. She describes: 
                                                
108 Discussed during a session on “After Colonialism” at the Harvard Africa Workshop (April 8, 2013). 
109 East Africa has seen an especially high increase in tech startups see Quinton Wall “What can western 





“Whether youth hustled at the bottom of the waste economy as ‘scavengers’ or were 
key sonkos strategizing about the portfolios of waste management practices, 
“hustling” involved operating within the underground economy resistant to multiple 
nodes of authority, balancing the risks of sheer survivalism with the possibilities to 
thrive, and a taste for taking on and managing risks that might yield potential higher 
earnings than yesterday, but also involve regular setbacks and loss tomorrow” 
(Thieme 2013, 18). 
Hustling could also indicate positive values like wiliness, innovation, and improvisation and 
youth liked to remind me that they had energy and good hustling was proof that they were 
not the troublemakers their elders said they were.110 They felt they were counteracting their 
perceived idleness; hustling showed agency and self-motivation.  
The best hustling did not look like hustling at all. It was not an individualist strategy, but 
rather defined by groups of individuals working together in a kind of egalitarian 
communalism. When John was mugged coming out of a matatu in the neighborhood of 
South B in 2008, he went to his networks in Kibera. The next day he returned to the scene 
of the crime with five friends. Without actually getting into a physical altercation, he and his 
friends were able to get some of the money back that had been taken. By getting help from 
others, John incurred a debt.111 John would now be expected to pass on hustling jobs, lend 
cash, or help his friends fundraise for future bridewealth negotiations. The future was 
unknown but youth operated under the assumption that community and connections would 
build security.  
Hustling did not translate well to development practitioners and the moral ambiguity of 
hustling contributed to the misrecognition of its potential. Many of the tried and tested ideas 
                                                
110 For more interpretations of hustling across Africa see Chernoff (2003); Munive (2010); Peake (1989); and 
Peterson (2003). 
111 This is similar to the notion of entrustment described by Shipton (2007) described as “entrustment implies 
an obligation, but not necessarily an obligation to repay like with like, as a loan might imply” (11).  
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about poverty included seeing un- and underemployment as big barriers to potential growth 
in poor areas. By 2005, when I had just begun to participate in development programming in 
Kibera, the conversation for alleviating unemployment had shifted to entrepreneurship. 
While never explicitly stated, hustling was a form of entrepreneurship specifically because it 
involved risk-taking, but it was easy for development practitioners to misunderstand this 
since the youth would not describe the short-term jobs they engaged in as work. If a young 
person who hustled was asked “do you work?” they would most likely say no, because in fact 
they did not think of themselves in the regular form of employment. Questions like “how do 
you pay your rent?”, “how do you buy food?”, or “how much money did you send 
upcountry last month?” might have elicited better answers, possibly leading to an 
understanding about hustling as a viable form of income generation. 
The day-to-day grind 
As part of my research, I asked several young people to describe their work histories 
after the completion of secondary school. The following is John’s, who helped in collecting 
these timelines and in the process gave the best details of his own work history. Between 
1997 when he arrived in Kibera and 2006, the year before I met him, John followed many 
leads in his attempt to find meaningful work and economic stability. He, and the others we 
surveyed, struggled to remember how they had survived over the period of time, especially 
during lean months when they depended on friends and family to keep them fed, clothed, 
and sheltered. John’s timeline of his first ten years suffered from the failure of memory and 
when I pushed him to fill in gaps he would usually respond that he had been doing 





Residence Economic Activity Reason for leaving 
1997 – 
1999 
Kibera Idle N/A 
1999 Kibera Worked as a shamba boy (gardener) 
for an Indian women in Kilimani for 5 
months  
the employer no longer needed 
him 
2000 Kibera Casual labor, informal sector work  N/A 
 Kibera Worked for factory (Feb-Sep) as 
dispatch clerk at the plant  
Left because the company didn’t 
employ anyone full-time 
 Mombasa Was given chance to work for uncle Left because his uncle forced him 
to take a mid-wife course  
 Rural 
home 




Dandora Returned to the factory Same reason as before 
Jan - May 
2003 
Kibera Casual labor, informal sector work N/A 
May – Jul 
2003 
Kibera Casual work at Kenyatta hospital 











Kibera Did baseline survey for Archdiocese 
of Nairobi 
Only 1 month of research 
2005 Kibera Sold household items purchased at 
Kamukunji and hawked in Kaloleni, 
Makongeni, and Bahati (estates in 
Nairobi’s Eastlands) 
N/A 
2006  Kibera Attended residential vocational 
training through church scholarship 
Graduated 
 
Figure 14. Work timeline for John (1997-2007) 
 
John’s timeline points to the systemic root of his own misrecognition of work and one 
that was not unique to him. His first two years in Nairobi were spent “idling”—a common 
condition for young men and women in their “lost years.”112  He would have been around 18 
or 19 years old and at a period in his life when he should have been furthering his studies or 
                                                
112 Kenya’s youth from across economic classes seemed to suffer from the lost year syndrome. High 
unemployment rates meant that the jobs that were there went to older youth.  
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apprenticing, but he felt like he had done nothing to further his economic prospects. This is 
the time when young men join neighborhood “joints” and learned to “put the slum on.” 
This would have also been the time where young people were most likely to be led into 
negative hustling. His first “job” only lasted 5 months and he was engaged in the degrading 
work of domestic work—tending the garden of a woman in Kilimani, walking distance to 
Kibera. He told me that he left because he was not needed anymore, but I always suspected 
that there was more to the story. John’s next job was at a factory where he worked in a 
department responsible for preparing goods for delivery. This work was menial and there 
was no indication that he would advance so he left the job, returning once to try again. His 
first meaningful job was at the Kenyatta National Hospital where he worked with a research 
project on malaria control; the job ended when the project ended. Curiously, he considered 
his role as the youth secretary at the church as a job, but he did not get paid.   What is most 
noticeable about this decade of John’s life is how inconsistent his economic opportunities 
were. The idea that young people get “stuck” and unable to move forward to get the house, 
the wife, and the children that would propel them toward adulthood is clear in John’s 
example.  
John’s timeline from 2007-2009—just two years—noticeably improved. He actually 
referred to the year 2007 as the time he “started living.” He had just completed a vocational 
training course and had returned to Kibera with fresh eyes. His first foray into the NGO 
hustle was with the World Social Forum, which held its 2007 meeting in Nairobi. He was 
invited by young people from the church to participate and was given a position of 
responsibility to supervise mobilization. That opportunity led to his entrance at ISSA, a 
youth organization that had been established four years earlier and had as members the 
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young people John wanted to spend time with. Annually, they held the Mr. and Miss Kibera 
pageant each year—an event that recruited young Kiberans (below age 23) for a month of 
mentorship and training and culminated in a big public event where two of the participants 
were crowned Mr. and Miss Kibera. John stumbled into the organization at the time when 
they were organizing the 2007 pageant and was able to establish himself in the community 
by helping to fundraise for the event.  
Time Period Residence Economic Activity Reason for leaving 
2007 Kibera “Started living”; worked as fundi, or 
handyman on casual jobs 
 
Feb 2007 Kibera Supervisor for World Social Forum One month contract 
Mar – Aug 2007 Kibera Radio controller for cab company Felt disrespected 
July 2007 Kibera Enters ISSA as a member N/A 
Jul – Sep 2007 Kibera ISSA: Coordinated fundraising for Mr. and 
Miss Kibera (no pay) 
N/A 





Kibera Early warning signs monitoring for 
PeaceNet (facilitation fees) 
Contract ended 
Oct – Jan 
2007/2008 
Kibera Community Policing project (facilitation 
fees) 
Contract ended 
Dec 2007 Kibera Peace Week  (stipends) Contract ended 
Jan 2008 Kibera Pamoja Trust meetings about post-election 
violence (stipends received) 
Violence ended 
Jan – Mar 2008 Kibera Wasanii wa Amani guerilla theater (actor – 
received payment per performance) 
Contract ended 
Mar 2008 Kibera Electoral Violence Response Initiative 
(coordinated tournaments, PET, Peace 
Rally, Peace trainings) 
Contract ended 
July 2008  Kibera ISSA: Oversaw sanitation project (no pay) N/A 
Sep 2008 Kibera  ISSA: Mr/Miss Kibera (no pay) N/A 
Oct –Dec 2008 Kibera ISSA/ Peacenet: Waki Mtaani – held 
forums  
Contract ended 





Kibera Research assistant for PhD Researcher 
(paid)  
Researcher left 
Mar – Jun 2009 Kibera Contracted to do research on Kenya Slum 
Upgrading Project (paid) 
Contract ended 
 
Figure 15. Work Timeline for John (2007-2009) 
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2007 was also a year of opportunity in the Kibera NGO hustle because young people 
were being organized by NGOs and development agencies to promote peace before the 
general election. The initiatives that emerged developed peace campaigns and community 
plays to reduce the likelihood of election-related violence. In exchange for these activities, 
there were small stipends and transport reimbursements. John engaged enthusiastically. 
When the election was over and Kibera ended up erupting into violence, John and his 
colleagues at ISSA then participated in post-election peace activities as well. Throughout 
2007 and 2008, a hodgepodge of development activities related to the post-election violence 
emerged, each of which he considered “work.” Filmer and Fox wrote that youth create jobs 
and the NGO hustle was the best example I saw for how.  
Conversely when he began hustling the shadow aid economy, his “job” prospects grew. 
The differences between the descriptions John made about his economic opportunities 
before 2007 and how they changed after he joined the community-based Initiative for Sports 
and Social Arts (ISSA) were night and day. The picture of John’s economic opportunities 
before his membership in ISSA can only be described as fleeting—the experience lacked 
cohesion and one did not build on the next. He went from casual labor, hawking household 
items, to learning a vocational trade. At one point, a family member enrolled him in a 
midwifery course—an opportunity he did not ask for. He had a few semi-formal sector jobs, 
but at each he felt insulted, disrespected, and unwelcome. The factory he worked for did not 
give its employees contracts so it was easy to be let go for a day if there was no work. What 
the timeline also shows is that money mattered less than finding something meaningful that 
would help to build his profile and earn him respect.  
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John’s work timeline after he began to hustle NGOs changed dramatically. Whereas in 
his earlier years he struggled to remember what he was doing and how he was getting by 
from 2007 onwards, things were much clearer. It should be noted that John did not give up 
“hustling” after he joined ISSA. There were still clear gaps in the timeline that he could not 
fill in, which were likely occupied with small kibarua jobs. And many of the opportunities 
that he detailed did not bring anything like steady pay. The difference was that these were 
projects and programs that brought a different kind of capital. He had titles and positions 
that mattered in the development hustle, even if he was no better off economically.  
There was a reason young NGO hustlers did not know they were job creators, even 
though they called it work. One time I asked my friend Caleb, the community leader/activist 
who I worked with on the Jamii ya Kibera project, what his mother thought of his working 
with the community. Was she proud of his successes? Did people back home, in Homa Bay 
near Lake Victoria, think highly of him for choosing such a selfless and noble career like 
community development?   
Caleb laughed at me for suggesting that there was anything noble about his work in 
Kibera and in other low-income neighborhoods in Nairobi. If he were a lawyer, a teacher or 
a doctor—careers that people understood—he could have earned more respect. His other 
hustling activities—the market stall he ran and other “business” he participated in—were 
better examples of jobs to tell the people back home about than the community work he 
engaged in. The city, I would come to find out, was not a place where someone was 
supposed to go to become a hero or a compassionate leader. The expectation of rural 
parents was that children and young adults should go to cities to find money, not to find a 
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new sense of belonging or a purpose in life. If a young adult succeeds, he remits that money 
back to the village, family, and community he left. If he fails, he is considered lost.  
After 2007, John found himself and started living, but he continued to disappoint his 
family. The ambiguity in work and what constitutes a respectable and stable job signaled a 
reality that even when he personally felt good about himself, he was still left behind. The 
next chapter will explore exactly how John and his colleagues participated in the NGO 




Figure 16. A path in the Gatwekira village of Kibera 
  
137 
Steve ’s  Story ,  Part  II :  Discover ing the NGO Hust le  
 
Steve’s return to Kibera in 2001 coincided with President Moi’s announcement that 
Kibera residents were paying too much in rent and being exploited by landlords. Steve had 
just rejoined members of the local gambling joint—his closest friends in Kibera—when 
spontaneous violence erupted across Kibera. The violence was concentrated at the area near 
the bridge between Makina and Kambi Muru. Most of the members of his joint joined the 
gangs of young men that gathered there to battle the Nubians who faced off on the other 
side of the bridge. It was not uncommon for Steve to get into fist fights with other young 
men over disagreements—once, he had even punched a security guard who he thought 
insulted him for being a slum youth—but he stopped short of engaging in politically-charged 
ethnic violence. In 2001, he avoided the violence by avoiding his friends. The mini-war 
between landlords and renters raged on for almost two months and Steve watched as some 
nearby neighbors were forced from their homes on the basis of their ethnic affiliation. Since 
he had abandoned his joint, he did not have many friends in that violent time.  
Shortly after the violence ceased, a neighbor and fellow Catholic asked him if he wanted 
to come to a youth peace program being organized by the brothers of the Guadalupe 
Missionaries at the Christ the King Catholic Church on the hill in Laini Saba. That year the 
church, along with other community groups across Kibera, had begun to institute human 
rights and civic education programs in the run up to the 2002 general election. The programs 
were revelatory for Steve. For the first time in his life, he did not get into trouble for 
expressing his opinions. In fact, the facilitators of the civic education programs encouraged 
him to find his voice. He was taught about leadership, democracy, and human rights and was 
inspired to find avenues to do something to change his community. There was one really 
dynamic youth pastor in particular—a monk from Mexico—who had the uncanny ability to 
make young people feel like they were important.  
The youth program at the church also introduced him to a group of socially active youth 
with whom he could build new networks of reciprocity. These youth were like him—many 
should have gone on to university, but for various economic or familial reasons missed their 
chance. Some were being sponsored through religious and non-profit organizations to attend 
short courses at private tertiary institutions where they studied subjects like community 
development. Others were enrolled in vocational training programs in a never-ending 
attempt to tackle youth unemployment in Kibera. In 2002, Steve was invited along with a 
dozen other Kiberan youth to participate in a two-month training program in participatory 
educational theater, with a professor from a university in the United Kingdom who came to 
Kenya with a team of his students. Each day the Kiberans and the UK students worked 
together to invent plot lines for plays, which would be performed at public gatherings to 
convey positive messages. The training in social theater was much different than the 
preparation for the drama festivals he had done in high school. Instead of being told to 
memorize and recite something written for them by their teachers, the students from the UK 
encouraged improvisation and creativity. He even had a brief flirtation with one of the 
wazungu who was part of the visiting group, but she left and never wrote. 
After the theater training, Steve continued to be involved in youth programming at the 
church but rejoined the neighborhood joint to maximize his economic hustling strategy. By 
2003, he finally had enough casual work, gleaned through connections from his joint, to feel 
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like he could make the move and share a room with some other young men who came from 
his same home area. The social development programs of non-governmental organizations 
were increasing in number in Kibera but there was little evidence that these were sustainable 
strategies to make money and earn a steady wage. Instead, Steve’s experience taught him that 
he would achieve this by exploiting his kin or ethnic networks.  
Steve briefly had a connection with a neighbor from his home area that landed him a job 
as a gardener at the national hospital, but he was there only for a few months because the 
meager salary did not make up for the sting of stigmatization he felt while there. His 
residence in Kibera, maligned by the stereotypes that were being spread around Nairobi, 
meant that he was mistreated and verbally abused by other members of the gardening team. 
Shortly after, another connection through a friend of his uncle landed him in newspaper 
distribution at Nation Media, but it was always non-contracted work and they sent home 
junior staff when there were dips in newspaper sales. After each failed attempt at finding 
work, Steve would return to animate his networks with his joint and the youth group at the 
church and hope for something better to come along. 
The boys he shared a room with had various strategies for getting through each day. 
While rent was always a concern in the back of their minds, they were more worried about 
finding enough food to eat in a day. Steve and his friends needed about 50 shillings each 
($.60) to be able to get through the day. If they pooled their money together, they could 
make it on even less. They befriended local restaurant owners in Kibera, and after paying for 
a small bit of sukuma wiki, or collard greens, with the Kenyan maize meal staple of ugali, they 
would call for an extra slice at no cost to help fill their stomachs.113  They could buy small 
amounts of oil, rice, vegetables, and soup made from bones to make a beef flavored meal, 
even if it did not have real chunks of meat in it. They learned to roll sausages or hard-boiled 
eggs, sold at 5 shillings each, into 10 shilling chapatis, or flat bread, in an attempt to make 
balanced and filling meals. On really hungry days, they would time their visits to friends’ 
homes in Kibera in order to be included in the evening meal.114 During Christmas and during 
the Muslim holy month of Ramadhan, there was always enough food for sharing as people 
made a point to include the young men in their celebrations.115 It was a game for Steve and 
his friends to work together to get fed. 
For several years, this was how Steve operated. He lived with friends, made a little 
money, sent money home to his parents to pay for the school fees of his siblings when he 
had the means, attended programs put on by the church and other NGOs in Kibera, and 
started to court a young woman who had a job at a marketing company that set up road 
shows to sell products across the country. They met at a church retreat in Central Province. 
                                                
113 Sukuma wiki, a variety of kale, translates as “push the week” to indicate its affordability. Ugali is a stiff 
porridge, cooked from maize meal and water and can be cut with a knife. 
114 It is custom in most Kenyan ethnic groups to feed visitors, especially if it is near a mealtime. Youth in 
Kibera are savvy to who can afford to include others and seldom burden friends or relatives by showing up this 
way. I had to be careful to time my visits to people’s homes to avoid their including me in their meal planning. 
115 Ramadhan was the month of fasting observed by Muslims worldwide. Between sunrise and sunset, Muslims 
abstain from eating, but at sunrise are able to break their fast and share a meal. Even though the official Eid 




She suggested they move in together as a way to save some money, so he secretly left his 
friends behind. She lived with her young daughter in Komarock, in Nairobi’s Eastlands. For 
several months, Steve did not tell anyone in Kibera where he had moved while he tried to 
look for more steady work in order to help contribute to the household. He was 
embarrassed that he was living off a woman and did not want word to reach his parents that 
he was cohabiting outside of marriage. He was in no position to start a bridewealth 
negotiation, nor was he sure he wanted to marry his girlfriend. They fought a lot, mostly 
over money, since she was providing the household income. They also fought over his 
girlfriend’s daughter, who had been fathered by another man. Without his established Kibera 
networks to help him find opportunities, he struggled in the new environment, and the 
situation exacerbated his liminal state. 
Eight months later, Steve left the relationship and returned to Kibera, where he moved 
in with friends from the church. It was these friends, of the community development, civic 
participation, and human rights sectors, who quickly forgave his disappearance. They did not 
ask questions and immediately included him in their hustling activities. By this time, most of 
them had decided that they would mainly hustle NGOs. Some of the young men he knew 
had already started to find positions in national NGOs outside of Kibera—and one had 
even, with only a diploma in community development, landed a job with the United States 





CHAPTER FOUR: HUSTLING NGOS 
In March 2008 I was still working in an advisory capacity with Carolina for Kibera as an 
organizer for the Jamii ya Kibera peace initiative. At the end of the month, after the violence 
had ended, we invited women’s groups, youth groups and other prominent residents to 
participate in the first public, open-air gathering—a community “fun day.” Invited 
participants from all these local organizations gathered in the morning near CFK’s offices in 
Olympic and were given free T-shirts to wear and rakes, shovels, and brooms to use to 
sweep the streets and clear the pathways and open sewers of debris.  
When the cleanup was over, the participants joined together and paraded down the main 
road of Kibera Drive to the District Commissioner’s office in Makina. The crowd shouted 
slogans of peace and handed out postcards and stickers printed with peace messaging. At 
one point, about midway, a young man put his hand up in front of a bus and compelled it to 
stop. He peeled the back off of a sticker that read Kibera ni Moja (Kibera is One) and stuck it 
to the bumper. A palpable flash of tension washed over the crowd while they waited to see 
how the driver would react. Luckily, he only smiled and waved. Soon stickers were 
everywhere—on people’s faces, on electricity poles and even on the shovels, rakes and 
brooms that had been used in the cleanup. After such a drawn out and stressful period of 
violence, these “fun day” festivities were a welcome relief and a chance for the community 
to release a big collective sigh. At the procession’s end giant puppets, music, skits and a 
bouncing castle for the children greeted the nearly 200 participants.116 For several hours, 
                                                
116 As part of the Jamii ya Kibera initiative, we held focus group discussion with youth in various sectors of 
Kibera and they decided on what messaging they wanted to incorporate into the media campaigns. “Why are 
we destroying ourselves?” and “Kibera is one” were widely agreed upon. 
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local theater groups, prominent local leaders, and community mediators took turns 
entertaining the crowd and informing them about peaceful coexistence and community 
cohesion. 
Interspersed throughout the event, a young DJ played the latest popular music and 
people spontaneously stood and danced. Everyone seemed happy, joyful, and relieved. 
Nearing the end of the program, each attendee was given a single soda—a gesture of 
hospitality across Kenya and common symbol of celebration. After bidding the crowd 
farewell, we collected the bottles, the DJ packed up his equipment, and the day’s participants 
headed for home. An older woman from one of the women’s groups approached to ask me 
a question. With her hand literally outstretched toward me, she asked, “how can I go home 
like that?” 
“Pardon?” I said. I thought I understood, but hoped she would prove me wrong. 
She repeated, “I sat here with you the whole day and now I am going home with 
nothing. How can I go home like that?”  
Ah, I had understood and my response was curt. “You volunteered to be here, Mama. 
No one forced you. The only thing we promised was t-shirts and sodas for all of the 
participants.” With a look of disgust, she turned and walked down the pathway into the 
village. 
When NGOs and development practitioners talked about the ruination of Kibera and 
how the culture of dependency has turned every civic engagement into a monetary 
transaction, this was the kind of incident they meant. This chapter will explore how this 
supposed ruination, as it manifest in the form of hustling NGOs, enabled young people to 
seize opportunities in informal and unlikely fields to gain economically. But we will see the 
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most significant piece of hustling was not just the monetary gain. Hustling was an important 
part of building networks that taught young people the kinds of skills they needed to survive 
in the informal environment. These were skills in reciprocity and adaptability that were not 
taught in vocational training courses or entrepreneurship trainings. Youth also learned that 
in the process of reframing the NGO hustle as “work,” they were able to build up their 
respectability and create alternative means of advancement in their area. Hustling was a 
reliable and constant activity where the ambiguity of these definitions thrived. 
Best Practices in Youth Development 
The incident at the fun day felt especially insulting and raw to me because throughout 
the months of stress and insecurity that followed the 2007 election, Carolina for Kibera 
scrambled to participate meaningfully in a community-driven effort to promote peace and 
start the hard conversations about root causes of violence in their push toward peace. My 
colleagues and I had gone into overdrive putting together media materials, hosting focus 
group discussions, and planning forums and community events. This event was our finale—
a reward for us and for the community for making it this far. None of the staff members had 
been given pay to help manage their additional responsibilities and all extra funds had been 
carefully managed and funneled into the program’s activities to guarantee and maximize 
impact. I was personally operating at a loss, as I would not will myself to ask for a 
reimbursement for the phone calls I made, the fuel I put into my car, or the lunches I 
bought while activating a network of supporters. In that historic moment, when Kibera had 
descended into such chaos and violence, peace had seemed far more important than money. 
The incident with the mama was not, however, my first glimpse at this so-called 
dependency culture. During the three months that we engaged in the project, Caleb, who 
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was a talented mobilizer and who had spearheaded the initiative in the community, 
continually informed me that there were murmurings of disgruntlement among the 
mediators we had trained for the program. On a regular and almost daily basis, he asked me 
to find a way to ensure their commitment and satisfaction. His suggestion was always that 
we needed to give the mobilizers a stipend or pay for their transportation. At this point in 
my experience, I understood that it was a common practice for NGOs in Kibera to offer 
monetary tokens to participants, but I still held a strong belief that such actions were morally 
suspect. Possibly even worse, they were unsustainable. But the fun day marked a beginning 
in the evolution of my thinking. I eventually came to reflect that I was upset not just because 
the mama had asked for remuneration, but more so because I responded so acerbically. I 
was not a stranger to requests for money in Kenya, but her actions had contrasted virulently 
with the festivities that in the moment I could only see them as a manifestation of 
dependency. It was a critical incident that gave me pause to press more deeply to unveil the 
structural causes to explain it.117   
Carolina for Kibera’s operating mantra, like most grassroots or community-level NGOs, 
was sustainability and the organization encouraged staff to work on ensuring that the 
community did not become dependent on programs. This was based on an understanding 
that every project had the potential to be short-lived. Funding timeframes were short and an 
organization might only receive enough money to cover the costs of a pilot project or a 
                                                
117 My instinct to see dependency was based on a long tradition in development studies in Kenya to come up 
with solutions to ensure that local communities are able sustain projects, introduced by external aid programs 
and development organizations, beyond the project period. Even though dependency as a political-economic 
approach in theory has been challenged, it is a persistent paradigm in development practice. For further reading 
on the economic debates concerning Kenya and dependency theory, see Bienefeld (1988); Bradshaw (1988); 
Kaplinsky (1980); Leys (1980, 1996).  
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short-term deliverable. Therefore it was important to try to make it so that participants did 
not see long-term economic livelihoods in any one project.118 For this reason, the ideal was 
to design projects that incorporated income generation components and did not promise 
monetary outputs.119 Short-term solutions, like giving money to a street child or a handout to 
anyone who asked, were widely considered to be bad practices and amateur mistakes. 
Additionally, it was important for practitioners to not play favorites with participants in a 
specific project as it hurt the integrity and transparency of the whole organization. Nepotism 
and corruption were considered plagues in Kenya and NGOs fought to find cures to such 
ills. So in theory, I exhibited a “best-practice” in not giving money to the mama that day, 
because if I had, I would have contributed to this larger problem of unsustainable 
programming.  
We have already learned about the systems that created a Kibera where young people felt 
excluded and apart from the wider society; where youth felt permanence in their liminality; 
and where ambiguities in what did and did not constitute work contributed to high rates of 
unemployment and economic stagnation. A theme across all of these systemic constraints 
was that they led to something that looked like powerlessness on the part of young people. 
Eventually I would come to understand that the mama’s actions and the actions of countless 
local members of the development field were deliberate actions that, in fact, contributed to 
resident’s power and agency. I was right to dislike my response, not only because I was rude 
and it signaled an awkward power dynamic, but also because I had not understood the 
                                                
118 The exceptions would have been health clinics, like those run by the Centers for Disease Control, the 
African Medical Research Foundation, or Médicins Sans Frontières and mission or church-funded educational 
facilities.  
119 That said, there was a big difference between many projects designed for income generation and those 
actually able to be implemented. 
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unstated rules of hustling NGOs and the role I as a mzungu, a volunteer, and a researcher 
played in such a system. 
There were two main problems with anti-dependency ideals. The first was a matter of 
inconsistency. Many programs operating in Kibera had already succumbed to local pressure 
to provide remuneration for participants, therefore creating an expectation among the 
community for financial compensation. Using the example of the mama, providing 
remuneration to her would have been an acknowledgement that she could have hustled in 
another industry that day if she had not been mobilized to participate in our fun day. “Lost 
wages” was a collective bargaining chip used by community groups to convince organizers to 
provide allowances, transport, or sitting fees. Ironically, our gifts of t-shirts and sodas 
probably cost the project close to 400 Kenyan Shillings per person ($5), which was more 
than the daily income for many Kiberans. But the overall goal of the event—to share 
messages of peace and reduce community tensions—was considered more beneficial to the 
community than an individual handout. In terms of measuring impact, it was the number of 
people served or trained, or whose awareness was raised, that was a prevailing way NGOs 
measured success.  
As part of our desire to activate a wide network to receive the Jamii ya Kibera messages 
and interventions, we wrestled with not being able to offer remuneration. This was especially 
salient since we knew other peace projects had already done so. For example, a few weeks 
prior to our fun day, a branch of the United Nations had hired women’s groups, many of 
whom overlapped with those we were working with as well, to help clean up in the hardest 
hit villages after the violence. In exchange for a week of their labor, the women received 
supermarket vouchers. CFK had also used supermarket vouchers as a form of aid for its 
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program beneficiaries when the violence had started in January because the main market had 
burned down and people’s access to food had been severely restricted. By the time of our 
event in March, the market was rebuilt with donations from various NGOs and Kibera 
businesses were up and running again. We questioned whether remuneration at this point, 
three months into the year and a month after the violence had ended, would look like 
dependency. These were the contradictions in the development field that appeared 
throughout my time in Kibera.120  
The second problem was that NGOs did not try to understand the action of hustling or 
how youth’s economic livelihoods were supplemented by the ways they operated in Kibera. 
NGOs assumed that even the most grassroots and participatory work was formal and 
official, without recognizing that the boundaries between formality and informality were 
kept strategically ambiguous by the population. NGOs and youth groups used the 
development jargon in their interpersonal communication with each other but the words 
meant different things. For instance, mobilization for projects was translated by youth as 
“job recruitment” and remuneration for transportation was a “wage”. Recognizing this was 
my first real step in understanding the mama’s motivations. Like most Kiberans, she weighed 
her hustling options each day and decided where to invest time and energy. She chose our 
event, which experience had told her might help her get money to could get her through the 
day. When it was not overtly apparent that she was going to get cash, she tried another 
tactic—asking the mzungu outright. Her action was not a depressing sign of dependency— 
instead or as well, it was a tactical move in the hustling game. 
                                                
120 For more on the process of political compromise and publicly forgetting after Kenya’ post-election violence, 
see Brown and Sriram (2012); Kagwanja and Southall (2009); and Muhoma and Nyairo (2011). 
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Another example of NGO hustling was revealed during the summer of 2010. I was 
sitting with some young ladies in a home in the Ayany section of Kibera, trying to 
understand the nature of work and youth patterns of “survival.” I talked with one of the 
young single women, Jane, about her daily walk through the neighboring middle class area of 
Kilimani. She shared that some days she was offered money to wash clothes or do light 
housework, but that it was hard to find jobs and some days she would come home empty 
handed. She was lucky when, on occasion, she got called in to do office cleaning for an 
NGO on Riverside Drive.121 I tried to be as delicate as I could when I asked, “What do you 
do if there is no domestic work?” Jane nursed a small baby as we talked and I knew there 
was likely a constant urgency for cash. She returned her answer with a shrug and the usual 
“we get by” that I had heard from a lot of respondents. Then she offered the oft-repeated 
explanation of her troubles, an exasperated “Maisha!” (a shortened version of the phrase 
“Maisha ni magumu,” or life is hard)  
Jane’s response to my questioning her sources of cash income was a standard one and 
not particularly illuminating. Having spent several years in Kibera, I already knew what work 
was available and was aware that there were frequent gaps in work timelines. Work was 
limited and varied, depending on one’s skill set and risk aversion. The least ambiguous 
option for unskilled and undereducated young women was domestic work like washing 
clothes, cooking, and serving as house or office cleaners. Women who had strong networks 
and the ability to get the startup investment could turn those jobs into small businesses. 
Rather than just walking around in the middle class neighborhoods knocking on gates, the 
                                                
121 Riverside was a wealthy neighborhood on Nairobi’s west side that served as a headquarters for several 
international non-profits and consulates. 
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best female hustlers would set up illegal roadside stands and sell tea and mandazi (donuts) in 
the morning, and ugali, vegetables and stew to askaris, gardeners and domestic workers at 
lunchtime. Or perhaps they would negotiate the politics of the market to get a stall in order 
to sell vegetables. Others would brave the chaos of the large Gikomba Market downtown 
and sort through the mountains of second hand clothes that came up in bales from the 
Mombasa port every day. After picking a selection of clothing, they would wash, press and 
resell these garments in Toi Market or at other informal roadside stands for a tidy profit.  
John had also scheduled me to speak with Asha, who had been talking with him outside 
for much of the time I spoke with Jane. She came inside at just about the time I was asking 
Jane what she did when there was no domestic work. After Jane’s shrug and lamentation that 
life was hard, Asha interrupted. “You should give us money,” she said. This outburst clearly 
embarrassed Jane, the reluctant and clearly less successful hustler. John and I shared a 
sideways glance. 
Asha, who had been mobilized to the interview by John, obviously had strong feelings 
about remuneration. She had called Jane, a friend who was not involved in Kibera’s 
development field, because she assumed they would both be paid and then Jane would be 
indebted to her. She did this despite John’s insistence that it was not work and that I was 
only coming to gather information to give an accurate portrayal of life in Kibera. However, 
Asha’s previous experience with wazungu in the development field had left her with the 
impression that her story was up for sale and she expected that the one or two hours we had 
together would lead to a financial outcome.  
Asha’s approach to hustling was clumsy: she lacked the nuance and the euphemistic 
approach of smooth hustlers I knew. She did not even mask her request as the mama at the 
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fun day had. The mama was asking me for a gift, Asha was asking outright for a payment. 
Both were strategies of hustling, but I did not yet understand the differences between the 
two. 
At the beginning of the meeting with Asha and Jane, we talked about the nature of 
research and the reasons I was asking certain questions. I repeated what John had told them 
during the initial mobilization—that there would be no monetary compensation. We brought 
biscuits and soda with us and I imagined this gesture of goodwill would be meaningful 
enough to divert demands. As was my usual practice, I discussed the nature of the research 
and asked Asha at the beginning of our meeting if she agreed to participate, and she simply 
said, “Tuendelee” (Let’s continue).  So why was she asking for money now? Surely our casual 
conversation about work and money was not burdensome. Both women might have found 
another work opportunity for the day, but neither seemed put out by sitting for an hour with 
me on a warm afternoon. I sensed that Jane, who was not involved in NGO work, had no 
problem with this arrangement, yet Asha did. Why was there a difference in expectations? 
After I awkwardly avoided the demand for money she and John went outside again. 
When she returned, her mood had changed considerably, and she told me that her own 
sporadic income came mainly from being mobilized to attend NGO meetings and 
workshops. She did not have an affiliation to a specific community-based organization but 
was a part of the network and was often mobilized to participate. When I was packing up my 
notebook and preparing to leave Asha’s house, I casually asked her “What is the biggest 
need in Kibera?”  
“More community work.”  
“Like what?” I asked. 
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“No, just more community work,” she said impatiently. 
Not better roads or schools, cheaper access to water or electricity, improved sanitation, 
or better leaders, which were the usual themes of development workshops. She did not even 
use the word “development” to explain the economic or social needs as I would have 
expected from someone with her NGO hustling background. Asha’s response reflected that 
she was not motivated as an activist but as a hustler. After all of her participation in 
community work, she still saw the primary outcome of the development machinery as cash. 
This might have been exaggerated by her displeasure with my unwillingness to provide her 
remuneration, but she also may have decided to be candid after learning I was not in a 
position to provide her with future work, and therefore had no need to “play the game”.  
As we left Ayany, John clued me into the side meetings he had with her outside while I 
spoke with Jane. He admitted that he ended up negotiating a fee for our time there mainly 
because he wanted to avoid a scene. He knew I would not pay, so gave her money out of his 
own pocket in to protect his own reputation. This was motivated by rumors John had 
started to hear about his association with me as a research assistant. People were saying that 
he was getting paid but he had not found a way to spread the wealth to his network. The 
potential risk to his own hustle was so great that he thought the 200 Shillings (~$3) he gave 
her was a small investment to ensure he was not blacklisted from future opportunities.  
Hustling and Reciprocity 
I mulled over the incident with Asha for several weeks. The situation was uncomfortable 
and embarrassing and I could not decide if I did the right thing in holding firm to my 
position of neutral outsider instead of giving a small gift to a person who needed it. I also 
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felt bad that I had involved John in the process. The interaction called into question my 
cultural competence and my line of inquiry and made Asha question John’s loyalty and 
connection to his fellow Kiberans. Once I got over the emotions of the interaction, I 
ultimately realized how grateful I was to Asha for illuminating several aspects of the hustling 
system that the youth had been hiding from me. 
Hustling involved the practical action of economic survival but the meeting with Asha 
gave me the opportunity to finally recognize how integral participating in the hustle was to 
all symbolic aspects of social life in Kibera. Hustling was a mechanism for continual 
reaffirmation of what could be relatively tenuous inter-ethnic and cross-class relationships. 
While this could hold true for the young people I met in Kibera, I also noticed somewhat 
unlikely inter-ethnic friendships that challenged the pervasive assumptions of negative 
ethnicity. Once I started asking the right questions, I began to recognize the correlation 
between being a successful hustler and having a diversity of friendships. It was a key 
component of the hustle economy to cultivate wide networks for giving and receiving goods 
and services. 
Hustling was, in essence, an elaborate system of reciprocity. This latter concept was 
emphasized in anthropology by Marcel Mauss as a foundation of social form in The Gift 
(1990 [1950]). The form hinges on the idea that an item or services is given by one party, 
acknowledged as received by another, and returned by the receiver through an in-kind good 
or service. Unlike a pure barter or capitalist system, where transactions take place 
immediately, reciprocal exchange can take place over a long period of time and is marked by 
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actors’ voluntarily incurring debt.122 The system of reciprocity became clear in the two 
examples of NGO hustling that we have seen thus far in this chapter because I, the 
foreigner, did not know to complete the cycle. During the interaction with Asha, she 
approached me knowing she was offering information that could be sold, thought I would 
recognize its value, and would give her money in exchange. The mama during the Jamii ya 
Kibera event had offered to me her time, hoping I would recognize its value, and she would 
also receive something in return. In both instances my assumption about their participation 
did not match their expectation of what it was worth and the covert hustling system was 
revealed. 
There were at least two forms of reciprocity evident. Clear interactions looked like 
market-based exchange, or what David Graeber (2012) has called “closed reciprocity.” With 
closed reciprocity, there was no long-term indebtedness. Neither Asha nor the mama 
expected to engage in a relationship with me beyond those moments. No obligation would 
be expected after the transaction. The hustle economy was rarely navigated with such simple 
acts and many of the relationships people cultivated were best defined as “open reciprocity.” 
Open reciprocity indicated a “permanent mutual commitment” between hustlers, who found 
it advantageous to open up as many avenues as possible for future assistance. They gave 
time, resources, support, recognition, and respect without really having a clear picture of 
how any of these things might be returned. In a sense an immediate return was 
counterproductive since collecting connections was more like building an insurance policy. 
This open reciprocity was what motivated John to give Asha 200 shillings because his 
                                                
122 Parker Shipton (2008) tackles the important concept of a “loan economy” among the Luo.  
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reputation was more important than the small fee. John Chernoff sums up the situation well: 
“In a modern African city, when a money economy is laid over a traditional 
exchange system, people put values on all sorts of surprising things in surprising 
ways…in traditional societies where people are poor, exchanges of any type, even of 
gifts or greetings or smiling faces, bind people together into broader networks of 
relationships that have real value. These relationships can be cashed in, so to speak, 
in times of need” (Chernoff 2003, 62). 
 
The trouble with trying to interpret what was valuable for hustlers in the development field 
was that some treated their participation in the way that Asha did—a means to an end—
while others found the content of development programs rewarding in and of itself. NGO 
hustlers were on a spectrum and deeply entangled in a web of giving and receiving not easily 
mapped. 
Rethinking Development Approaches 
Around the time that I was interviewing young people in Kibera about their survival 
strategies, I began to hear quiet murmurings amongst development practitioners who 
worked in Kibera. Some worried that rising incidences of monetary demands indicated 
Kibera was “ruined.” It was a big public secret that it had become difficult to work in Kibera 
without addressing the community’s demands for remuneration and these demands had 
gotten very expensive. Rates to rent social halls had gone up, in addition to other 
infrastructural needs like renting public address systems, tents, or chairs. I attended more 
than one training or workshop where an agenda had been completely derailed because, over 
a tea break, participants gathered to protest the “exploitation” they were experiencing. The 
rest of the program was then spent with disgruntled participants’ complaining about the lack 
of remuneration. This was, to development practitioners, the ugliest kind of dependency and 
some organizations started to migrate projects to lower profile slum areas in the city where it 
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was thought that the locals would participate more meaningfully and with fewer 
expectations. While complaining, local participants who engaged in NGO activities also 
recognized they needed to ensure that development organizations stayed in Kibera. A 
disagreement over remuneration would lead to a respected youth leader being called in to 
broker a deal as John had done with Asha. Similarly, the bulk of the conversation between 
the participants would happen out of sight of the NGO practitioner. NGO hustlers knew 
that one of the ways to continue hustling was not to appear dependent. 
In Kibera’s hustle economy, development was one of the many informal industries that 
supported the population, and it was a highly desirable one to break into. Asha, John and the 
mama at the fun day were all linked through the development machinery, participating at 
varying levels. As a spectator of the fun day, a trainee in a workshop, or an assistant on a 
research project, each of the three was taking advantage of the opportunity to hustle 
development.123 When there were no NGO activities, they would look to other informal 
sector options. The older woman engaged in other income-generating activities associated 
with her woman’s group so that she would bring something home. Without community 
work, Asha might have joined Jane in Kilimani and advertised herself as a domestic service 
worker. In the past, John dabbled in mjengo work (construction) and got a trade certification 
before he was able to network his way into being a development elite in Kibera. NGOs do 
not prop up the economy of Kibera, but instead offer an attractive, desirable, and 
challenging sector for young people who would likely arise as peer leaders anyway.  
                                                
123 Research projects were treated basically the same as development projects, since Kibera was an incubator 
for many development projects. Many of the young people I knew had gotten involved in research projects and 
were familiar with survey techniques or had been trained on new research technologies like smartphones or 
geographic information systems (GIS). 
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Kibera’s supposed ruination was really a problem of expectations. It was the imagination 
of outsiders that created this idea that an outcome of development work would be a 
transformation of society. They expected participants to be driven by a desire for change, 
and this was unrealistic. In development terms, the community fun day was a “healing 
process”. My own research project was “background, context, and justification” and many of 
the trainings that youth attended were meant to introduce “progressive” or “democratic” 
(read foreign) ideals. I was discovering that this was out of sorts with the interpretation of 
the locals who, like Asha, viewed development as just another option in the unstructured, 
ambiguous, and temporary hustle economy, not something separate or necessarily special.  
In 2012, a journalist from The Guardian newspaper visited Kenya as part of the 
International Reporting Project. They went to Kibera, among other places, and toured the 
organizations and projects that visiting foreigners often saw. The members of local 
community groups and active NGOs in Kibera that were featured in such tours tried to 
show the range and diversity of Kibera. They showed devastating effects of poverty and 
marginalization as a way to encourage donations, but were sure to show signs of progress 
and effect to instill hopefulness as well. This was part of the NGO hustle. On the day the 
reporters visited they seemed to have seen the hustle without understanding it. Robbins of 
the Guardian wrote: 
"And as I looked more closely at the slum that day, other niggling thoughts buried 
deep in my subconscious begin to trace their way to the surface. Why were the 
members of this 'youth' group so old? Why was everyone who spoke to us being 
paid in cash or food? Why hadn't the sick child we saw earlier been taken to the free 
MSF clinic nearby? Who were the gangs of young men standing sentinel by local 
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community facilities? Were we visiting a legitimate aid organization, or a lucrative 
local industry?”124  
 
These questions were an articulation of the cynicism I had started to hear from many 
practitioners, but they were not expository. With a modicum of research he might have 
discovered what “youth” did and did not mean in Kenya. Asking the right questions would 
have revealed that these young men were actively engaged in community projects because 
even if they did not get paid today, belonging to the group increased their likelihood of being 
aware of future opportunities. And why did Robbins assume that the legitimacy of an aid 
organization and the lucrativeness of a local development industry were mutually exclusive? 
The conclusions are attractive because they reflect a wide public resistance to recognize that 
hustling, the predominant way of gaining capital in Nairobi’s slums, could be compatible 
with the development field.  
In practice, remuneration in NGO/development programs also worked in reciprocal 
ways. Participants came to see that the ideas they generated while sitting in a training 
workshop or a community forum were capable of being sold. Because of the network that 
had mobilized them, they expected something in return, such as a sitting allowance or a 
reimbursement for “transportation”.125 Alternatively, “development” was a job field 
regardless of the knowledge being shared or the topic being covered. I often wondered if it 
was even necessary to distinguish between the two forms of possible income when young 
                                                
124 “The missing millions of Kibera” is the first in a five-part series on “Africa’s Propaganda Trail” written by 
Martin Robbins in The Guardian (8/1/2012) http://www.theguardian.com/science/the-lay-
scientist/2012/aug/01/africa-propaganda-kibera. 
125 Forms of remuneration in Kenya development activities were written into budgets as “sitting allowances,” 
stipends, transport, and tea or lunch. Kanyinga and Mitullah (2007) have detailed the breakdown of 
participation in the non-profit sector in Kenya in their report “The Non-Profit Sector in Kenya:  What we 
Know and Don’t Know.” 
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Kiberans did not seem to. Development paid the bills and helped them survive. They 
vehemently disliked it when their hustling was described as “volunteerism.” This implied 
that they were not doing anything of value and demeaned what many had come to see as a 
steady and reliable economic opportunity. A young man once asked me, “How can they ask 
us to volunteer when they visit us in Land Cruisers and live in Gigiri?126”  
Even though I had spent many months in Kibera prior to these experiences, I had only 
seen the development field through the Carolina for Kibera lens.127 My understanding of the 
layers of associational life and how various segments of Kibera residents interacted with 
development organizations had been affected by working with teens and adolescents, not 
young “adults.” I was not aware of the extent to which sitting allowances, incentives, and 
short-term contracts were given out to residents in Kibera regularly to compensate them for 
time spent in community meetings.  
Over the next few years I heard opinions from Kiberan community workers and 
development practitioners about what they thought were the reasons Kibera had been ruined 
by dependency. Idealistic young foreigners came to Kibera and began programs that were 
not locally-owned. Many of these projects were also short term and unsustainable. There was 
bitterness between well-compensated NGO practitioners and the local poor that led to 
youth’s feeling justified in hustling. Finally, the design of some projects made participation 
look and feel like “work” rather than community-building or volunteerism. The claimed 
ruination was mainly a misreading and misunderstanding of the role that NGOs were 
                                                
126 Gigiri is an upmarket neighborhood of Nairobi and headquarters of the UN and home of several foreign 
consulates. 
127 Many of their programs focused on young people who were in high school or who had just become youth. 
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actually playing in the informal economy. 
When we started the Jamii ya Kibera initiative it was designed as a social movement. The 
project was envisioned to be something that Carolina for Kibera supported but ultimately it 
would be taken over by the community. The community knew better. To them, Carolina for 
Kibera had offered a project that could be hustled during a period of time when other 
options in the informal economy had been decimated. The community forums, workshops 
and trainings for the general public common used by many international NGOs in Kibera 
were rare for CFK. On the day of the community cleanup and fun day, we tried to hide the 
fact that Jamii ya Kibera had been supported by CFK, but the community knew. That mama 
may have been genuinely concerned that the day had closed without her finding money for 
the evening meal, or she may have been playing me. Either way, I learned not to blame her 
for trying.  
Development was the hustle and it had become a reliable one. The message of a united 
Kibera, to stop destroying one another and to choose which Kibera its inhabitants wanted, 
did not really matter in the immediate sense. Jamii ya Kibera gave people a chance to talk, to 
gather, to eat together, and to organize, but the funding for peace went as quickly as it came. 
Eventually Carolina for Kibera decided to turn it into a program, alongside their sports 
program, girls group and clinic, but it would never quite fit their primary model of delivering 
social services. Peace building, like many of the “development” projects introduced in 
Kibera, was too ephemeral and fleeting, but hustling was the constant.  
This chapter has looked at the practicalities of hustling NGOs the tangible economic 
outputs it yielded for young people in the development field. The next chapter will explore 












Steve ’s  Story ,  Part  III :  Learning to Lead and Finding his  Power 
 
In 2007, Steve joined a community-based organization that had established itself in the 
Laini Saba area. Some of the members were people he had known from the Catholic Church 
but others had been mobilized from a variety of joints and self-help groups in the 
neighborhood. Even without a steady wage, going to the small office made Steve feel like he 
was working. Officially he was a volunteer, but after successfully helping to organize a public 
peace event that had been funded by a coalition of civil society organizations and 
international funders, he earned a title and position. The same strategies for getting through 
each day still applied, but his purpose in life had changed. Instead of trying to get casual 
labor at the city’s factories or construction sites, he had opened himself up to hustling 
NGOs and positioned himself to be part of the pool of youth who got called to attend 
workshops, trainings, and other big public meetings.  
The shift also meant that he went from being stepped on and overlooked to becoming a 
respected member of the local community. Sometimes his NGO hustling put him into the 
public eye, especially when he was acting in participatory theater productions or when asked 
to be the Master of Ceremonies during public events. His role as the facilitator during peace 
plays performed during the 2008 post-election violence, a period of time when many local 
activists were staying silent, was especially important in developing his role as a public figure. 
When an older woman who sold vegetables near the offices of the community organization 
pulled Steve aside and asked him to help her negotiate with the local chief for a space to sell, 
he knew something had significantly changed in the way he was perceived by the 
community. He was now someone who could get things done rather than being a kijana with 
no power or influence.  
Unfortunately “community work” did not translate back home in the village. He had not 
built a house on his natal land, nor had he gotten married. He was not doing any work that 
could be understood by his parents, and even though he had started to occasionally get small 
contract jobs—having become able to speak the language of development and also translate 
that down to the youth masses—the work was sporadic. Telling his father he was a 
facilitator, community mobilizer, or even a “program officer” was not going to earn him the 
same kind of respect as it would to be a teacher or lawyer. Most of the time he sent money 
home and they never asked where it came from.  
But things were changing, even if he was not achieving the markers of adulthood. 
During one visit back to the village during Madaraka Day, he went to the baraza (public 
meeting) held by the local district commissioner.128  Such events were political theatre, where 
local dignitaries would get a chance to stand before the community and give speeches, make 
political statements, and back national political figures and parties. Women’s groups and 
children’s groups would dance. Representatives of state power, like the local the district 
commissioners, police, or local chiefs would assert their authority in front of the crowd 
                                                
128 Angelique Haugerud’s The Culture of Politics in Modern Kenya (1997) gives an excellent description of the 




gathered through speeches.129 During that holiday, Steve had borrowed a friend’s small car to 
drive home in and had driven his father to the event. This had, of course, shifted the crowd’s 
gaze to them and raised their profiles. About halfway through, Steve got bored listening to 
the rhetoric and stood to go. His father was embarrassed that he would leave the event 
before it was over and pulled Steve aside to reprimand him. Steve bravely told him that the 
days of worshipping these representatives of state power were over, a statement that 
perplexed and dismayed his obedient father.  
The following day, at a pub in a nearby shopping center, he ran into the same District 
Commissioner who had hosted the event. Maybe it was that he had a car or maybe it was his 
audacity to leave the event before it had ended, but for the first time Steve and the DC sat 
and discussed in real terms what was needed for development in the area. They debated the 
merits of a government sponsored water project and Steve joked with the DC about 
corruption. He knew at that moment something had shifted. Without attaining the material 
possessions of adulthood, he had infiltrated a seat of power. The win was a small one but 
nonetheless buoyed his decision to shift his focus from survival to what he saw as a higher 
purpose of creating change in his community.  
 
  
                                                
129 Government officials made their status evident in the order they gave speeches, how they lined up chairs on 
the dais, and in how long they were allowed to speak. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE POLITICS OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT  
Youth who came to Kibera did not begin the practice of hustling non-governmental 
organizations before first hustling their way into Kibera’s vibrant and extensive local civic 
organizations. Young men, especially, found camaraderie in neighborhood joints before 
these evolved into self-help groups or community-based organizations. Eventually local 
groups learned to control NGOs’ access to beneficiaries in the settlement and developed 
niches as project facilitators, translators, mobilizers, and interpreters. It was understood that 
even though community organizations were competing for resources and short-term 
contracts, all of them needed to approach the process in a way that their power, as 
gatekeepers of Kibera, was preserved. There was a balance between maximizing economic 
opportunities in the development field and appearing to be dependent. Youth able to 
maintain their key positions as brokers, and keep the boundaries of the slum in place, 
ensured that development remained a hustling option alongside other informal economic 
options. 
We have learned that the members of small community groups in Kibera were not in a 
position to write funding proposals required by donors and large non-governmental 
organizations as a prerequisite for developing sustained funding partnerships. This in large 
part explained an apparent weakness in youth organizations and the cycle of birth and decay 
that they went through. While they were strong in local networking and mobilization, youth 
lacked financial systems and the kinds of organizational competence in budgeting, 
management, evaluation, or reporting that donors demanded. While this reality left 
organizations at the mercy of larger, more formal organizations for project ideas and funds, 
it was also a logical way to deal with the uncertainty of the development market. Why should 
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small, grassroots, community-based organizations invest time or resources into building 
strong institutions when there were no guarantees of longevity for the projects in which they 
were involved? In times of development drought, when there were no new projects or 
funding ran out on current projects, individual members of local organizations could divert 
their energies to hustling in other sectors of the informal market. When there was a financial 
incentive the organizations would reanimate. 
When I first started to explore community associations in Kibera, I was puzzled to find 
that many of the small groups I encountered were in these cycles. But I also noticed that 
during political elections or boom periods of the development funding cycle, more 
institutions in Kibera would emerge. For example, a survey of organizations in Kibera shows 
that many were formed in 2003 to help orphans and victims of the HIV epidemic, 
coinciding with the influx of funding into Kenya from the President’s Emergency Plan for 
AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) (Ochieng’ and Matheka 2009). Also in 2003, Care Kenya introduced 
group savings and loan projects that trained community groups to pool resources and earn 
interest on their money. In order to participate, groups were required to register as formal 
associations. By 2008, when I first began to intensively interview community organizations 
across Kibera, the remnants of these group savings and loan projects, in the form of 
membership rolls and charts showing how interest was accrued, could be seen on the walls 
of many of the small offices I visited. Coincidentally, these groups’ origins could all be traced 
to the time Care was in Kibera implementing its project. Again in 2008, during the height of 
the post-election violence, more organizations formed to capitalize on the influx of money 
to promote peace and reduce political violence.  
In my role with the Jamii ya Kibera initiative I was able to see the spontaneous inception 
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of an organization firsthand. Newly trained community mediators were broken up into 
smaller committees in order to tackle various thematic activities of the project. One of these 
group was assigned to mobilize and facilitate community forums, another was in charge of 
media messaging, and a third group was tasked with helping the internally displaced 
Kiberans who were temporarily housed at the fairgrounds of nearby Jamhuri Park. This final 
group was constantly pressuring Caleb, who served as the main community contact, to 
deliver remuneration for their work and requesting that we funnel more money into their 
support program. When it became clear that it was not possible since our money had been 
earmarked for other activities, the group ended up breaking off from our initiative—an 
action that Caleb had predicted throughout. In the end, they gave themselves a name and 
sought registration as a self-help group.130 
Community organizations in Kibera spent more time being dormant or defunct than 
they did actively working out community level problems. I soon discovered after visiting 
many “program officers” and “directors” intensely over a few months that organizations had 
learned to talk about their programs in the present tense, even if at the time of my visit they 
were not actively engaged in a project. Much of the revenue for these organizations came in 
membership contributions, which were not sustainable over time. Even when the members 
had original ideas for eradicating some kind of social ill or environmental issue, they 
struggled to get monetary support for implementation.  
This chapter will show that young men and women seeking to accelerate their adulthood 
                                                
130 This had proven to be a lucrative approach. A group of internally displaced persons outside the town of 
Naivasha formed a self-help group and worked to establish a spontaneous town along the Maii Mahui-
Naivasha road which was well-travelled by tourists. Habitat for Humanity, among others, funded the building 
of houses for these IDPs and they now receive visitors and run small businesses from their new location. 
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took turns being in charge of these small and weak institutions as a rehearsal for future 
leadership positions. It first details the historical roots of the institutions of community 
development in Kenya and shows how the traditions of associational life informed the way 
that Kibera institutions operated. Among their peer groups and within the boundaries of the 
settlement youth leaders thrived, but their power only went so far with outsiders accustomed 
to seeing young people as not fully formed. The rise and fall of associations was a part of 
NGO hustling in Kibera—signaling a constant flux and evolution of the economic networks 
of reciprocity in which people engaged. Building institutions mattered for the reasons already 
mentioned, such as creating ready-made partner organizations for NGOs seeking to 
implement programs in Kibera or acting as gatekeeping institutions that controlled how 
development money was funneled down and to whom. But the process itself, of creating and 
breaking apart, was a significant way that the members of the development field in Kibera 
were able to practice power and create hierarchies in what were nominally egalitarian 
institutions. Building community organizations gave young people a chance to collect social 
capital and symbolically mediate their liminality.  However, as this chapter will show, the 
power they earned was situational. 
Harambee and the Kenya’s civil society 
The process of lessening the discomfort of liminality through institutionalization has to 
be seen within the larger context of Kenya’s associational life. Historically, community-level 
development in Kenya coalesced with a community-based movement called Harambee, 
meaning “we all pull together” in Swahili. In Chapter Two, we learned that the political life 
of post-independence Kenya was not democratically nurtured. People lacked the political 
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space to contribute their ideas toward building the new nation; it was instead an era of 
personal enrichment through loyalty to a strong executive. Jennifer Widner argues that the 
newly formed Kenyan government squashed all upward ties of affiliation from grassroots 
communities to the central government. Senior members of the administration and the 
Members of Parliament of each constituency learned quickly that building a top-down 
patronage system was a more effective and efficient way to build voter support. “A notable 
from a village or location could take home a contribution to the community’s school 
construction fund and credibly promise to deliver the votes of an entire village” (Widner 
1992, 44). Other scholars have pinpointed Harambee, a call for self-reliance that was 
promoted at independence, as the forum through which politicians accessed community 
programs to build political support (Chieni 2001; Wilson 1992). In Martin Hill’s (1991) study 
of Harambee he claims that while it was government initiative that propelled the movement 
forward, people on the ground eagerly accepted the call and Harambee became central to the 
ideology of political independence and nationhood. 
Under the first president, Jomo Kenyatta, Harambee was ideologically conceived as a 
mutual self-help movement that would combine the resources and energies of people in 
local areas to raise funds for community amenities like schools, hospitals, clinics, or water 
projects.131  From very early on, observers saw these forms of social organization as an 
indigenous counter-response to the introduced political structures and elitism of the west. 
Harambee was “an attempt to organize the periphery into a powerful bargaining machinery or 
power block born of the marginality of periphery and spearheaded by the displaced national 
                                                
131 For more on Harambee see Thomas (1987) and Waiguru (2006). 
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level party leaders whose most powerful followers are the most marginal of Kenya’s 
populations” (Mbithi and Rasmussen 1977, 32). Politicians were fast to observe that by 
contributing money through Harambee fundraisers they could mobilize and activate their 
rural base.  
During the Moi era, Harambee continued to be a useful tool of political patronage. 
National politicians gave elite status to the leaders of their local committees and 
organizations and this ensured political favoritism. When international development policies 
refocused efforts in the 1980s and 1990s away from state-based aid to bottom-up 
participatory approaches, the policies focused on the institutions of community groups. Just 
as community-based organizations continued to be a repository of political patronage, they 
were ripe institutions to receive direct development aid from Nairobi-based civil society 
institutions and international non-governmental organizations working through local 
proxies. Harambee efforts as well as the machinations of the political elite focused efforts on 
rural Kenya and it was not until the era of multi-partyism in Kenya after 1992 that efforts to 
address poverty shifted the focus toward the city. 
Initially, Harambee was an ingenious way to push development in a country lacking 
resources, but in later years became a conspicuous way to buy votes. By the end of the Moi 
era, Harambees had evolved into fundraisers where politicians made large, public donations in 
order to win over local constituents. They were no longer the grassroots development 
movement that had originally been intended.132 Transparency International found an 
example in Maragwa District where local leaders raised KSh 3.7 million for numerous 
                                                
132 A public Harambee is an event that has been covered in the newspaper, usually detailing the amount of 
money a politician contributed to a cause.  
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women’s groups through Harambee fundraisers, but “most groups reported that they simply 
shared the money among the individual members and disbanded.” (Ndii and Waiguru 2002, 
4) Community groups moved away from being formed mainly as a way to serve under-
developed areas and instead became repositories to perpetuate patronage. 
Harambee is an important institution for understanding how political leaders in Kenya 
managed to build a system that was dependent on powerful top-down approaches. At 
independence, the majority of Kenyans were living in rural villages and Harambee was a way 
for villagers to show support for their new government and shrug off years of colonial rule. 
It also was a powerful tool for local people to gain access to resources. Hill shows in his 
survey of Kitui district that these initiatives were responsible for building many of the 
schools in that district. The Ministry of Community Development and Social Services kept 
records of self-help projects and in the first decade of independence, the value of Harambee 
contributions was £20m. “This included thousands of village nursery schools and primary 
schools, wells and cattle dips; over 250 rural health centres; over 700 secondary schools; and 
various piped-water projects” (Hill 1991, 41).  
An alternative to the government-controlled associations, in the form of an active civil 
society that acted in opposition to the state, began to form in the late 1970s. The academic, 
playwright, and author Ngugi wa Thiong’o fled in exile after his detention in 1977 for the 
political undertones of his community theater play, I Will Marry When I Want. In 1982, some 
members of the Kenya Air Force attempted a coup, which then threatened many Kenyans’ 
civil liberties. Although Kenyatta had managed to maintain a single-party state and deep 
culture of patronage, President Moi was compelled to manipulate the rule of law in Kenya to 
create absolute power. It was at this time that the country legally became a one-party state 
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and through numerous constitutional amendments his executive office soon had almost total 
control over all aspects of the government. Evidence of a representational democracy was 
scarce during this time. The failed coup and subsequent rise in overt state control fuelled 
dissention from civic activists, but many of the early civil society attempts to provide a voice 
of opposition had to be done underground since detention without trial was regularly 
deployed during the 1980s to quiet these voices. 
During the darkest years, from 1982-1990, underground organizations like the December 
12th Movement and the offshoot Mwakenya published materials that spoke out against the 
oppressive and authoritarian Moi regime, but strong sedition laws created a culture of 
silence. Many university student leaders were arrested and detained without trial, alongside 
veteran political activists. Opposition leaders were forced to flee the country or become 
detained at the mere suggestion of their dissention. The government used the excuse that a 
person was affiliated with Mwakenya as a pretext for arrest, but in reality little is known about 
the organization. From their base in Britain, they published newspapers called Pambana (The 
Struggle) and Mpatanishi (The Arbiter) that never had mass dispersal among the Kenyan 
public. Movements like Mwakenya were not organized and “offered no credible replacement 
in the event the regime fell” (Widner 1992, 178). As Widner asserts:  
There were no politicians practiced in building ties with constituents in open political 
competition, no elites with experience in managing large organizations, much less a 
government ministry, and none of the habits of compromise and conciliation 




Even if these early movements were not organized enough to constitute an institutionalized 
civil society, they marked the beginning of the transition to active opposition.133   
During the 1990s, President Moi succumbed to the pressure of foreign investors like the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank and the governments in Europe and the 
United States to allow for democratic elections under a multi-party system. He continued to 
use community organizations as a way for the state to control dissent at local levels. These 
associations remained important for Moi to flex his economic muscle through Harambee 
contributions and were also a way to keep an ear to the ground. Groups that wanted to gain 
access to community funds or gather publicly were required to register with the state. 
Registration had a twofold benefit for authorities. First, registration ensured that local 
administrators were informed about the membership of such groups but it also bound the 
wananchi, or common man, to the bureaucratic process. Second, the stamps and certificates 
community organizations needed to show that they were official were a constant, albeit 
subtle, reminder of state control. Leaders of grassroots institutions presented state 
certificates proudly because they had achieved something in jumping through the 
bureaucratic hoops to get them. The Kenyan custom of building community institutions 
began as a movement to build infrastructure for the new nation, but by the time I went to 
Kenya in 2002 it had become an intricate system that mainly served state power. 
Shifting Priorities 
The youth of the community organizations I followed in Kibera were aware of this 
                                                
133 In 2003, the torture chambers in the basement of Nyayo House in Central Nairobi were opened up for the 
public to see. There has been discussion of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to address the atrocities, 
but it has not yet surfaced. 
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history of associational life and felt a debt to the civil society organizers of the 1980s. 
Simultaneously they took their freedoms of expression and association for granted. These 
youth were coming of age during the rule of Mwai Kibaki, known for his laissez faire 
economic policies and relative allowance of free speech. For youth, civil society activities 
became an opportunity to engage in a formal, official institution when there were no other 
avenues. It was a reaction to their marginality, not state oppression, which motivated 
youthful forays into associational life and they participated despite clear evidence that 
community associations were tools for political patronage and exploitation.  
The proliferation of community-based organizations in Kibera also coincided with the 
landmark UN-Habitat report The Challenge of Slums that came out in 2003 and highlighted the 
rising worries of a global urban crisis. In that year, it was big news that over half of the world 
had urbanized and the majority of residents in the world’s cities were living in informal, 
substandard, and unsanitary slum settlements. Popular films like City of God (2002) and Born 
into Brothels (2004) and popular book titles like Robert Neuwirth’s Shadow Cities: A Billion 
Squatters, a New Urban World (2005) and Mike Davis’ Planet of Slums (2006) supplemented this 
discovery and created the vivid, heartbreaking scenario of a billion urban residents living in 
global squalor and subject to the violence, despair, and insecurity of extreme poverty. Kibera 
was at the center of much of this hype.  
In the beginning of a 2006 documentary called Slum Survivors, released by the Integrated 
Regional Information Networks (IRIN), a woman is in labor in a one-room house in Kibera. 
As she moans and groans, the voiceover tells of how this will be her sixth child, how there is 
no father in the picture, how she is able to find only sporadic work washing clothes, and 
how frequently they have nothing to eat. The camera pans to the children, who wear tattered 
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clothing and whose eyes look withdrawn. Then, on camera, she squats and the newborn 
child is released onto a plastic tarp that has been laid on the ground. Shocking images and 
vivid stories like these were presented as evidence of a new urban poverty of the Global 
South. In response, foundations and philanthropists shifted their foci to the plight of the 
urban poor. Kibera, conveniently located and indescribably large, served as an experimental 
ground for this shifting priority. 
One of the new priorities was related to rising violence and crime in Nairobi in the 
1990s; it was during this time that the city gained its notorious nickname of “Nairobbery.” 
Some scholars have correlated the rise of crime in Nairobi to the fall of the authoritarian 
regime of President Moi (Brown 2003; Barkan 2004). Both the fall of the Soviet Union and 
economic collapse associated with Structural Adjustment Programs led to a reduction in 
Moi’s totalitarian authority. This coincided with public movements toward multi-party 
democracy that emerged in 1990. Kenya has never been without violence, per se, but in 
October 1991 new kinds of “ethnic clashes” erupted (Brown 2003). In resettlement areas of 
the Rift Valley Province, members of the Kalenjin ethnic group began to force people that 
had recently settled into the area from other ethnic areas, namely those from Kikuyu, Luo, 
Luhya, and Kisii groups, to abandon their land and belongings. This also happened along the 
coast in the Likoni area south of Mombasa and in other hot zones where ethnic groups 
bordered each other. During the Kenyatta presidency land schemes had opened up private 
property investment opportunities to members of different ethnic groups, but in the 1990s, 
these landholders, who had acquired land legally in these regions, found themselves evicted 
by their neighbors. These evictions were a starting point for what would eventually become 
more overt tribal warfare (Klopp 2000; Kagwanja 2006).  
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The rise of crime and ethnically rooted violence in areas like Kibera is related to 
historical divisiveness in the Rift Valley, coast and other ethnic borderlands, especially after 
Raila Odinga’s election to Parliament in 1992, when Luo migrants came in droves to rent 
properties from Kikuyu and Nubian landlords in the settlement. Ethnic violence and new 
democratic freedoms changed the dynamics of development in Kibera. Whereas most 
programs existing in the 1990s focused on service delivery, especially in the health and 
education sectors, after a series of clashes in Kibera in 2001, foreign funding turned to peace 
and conflict mediation. Many community-based organizations were careful to establish 
themselves as inclusive and aware of ethnic tensions because they had learned that this was 
attractive to NGOs increasingly interested in working in Kibera. Even before the 2008 post-
election violence erupted in Kibera, programs oriented toward peace building, community 
security, and diversity were common.  
Youth Liminality and the Development Field 
The saturations of NGOs made the development field an attractive sector for youth in 
Kibera to mediate their liminality because it provided order and structure in the informal 
space. Many grew up watching their parents and other extended kin participate in the 
formalized associational life that resulted from the Harambee movement. Joining groups 
represented a step toward the wholeness they sought. Young people in joints and church 
youth groups set out to build community organizations that rivaled and often competed with 
institutions created by older people. This was a social space where intergenerational tussles 
over authority, participation, and connection were possible and even sanctioned. Though it 
was rare to find community-based organizations with intergenerational membership there 
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was a symbiotic relationship between them.  
Varying forms of authority affected young Kiberans lives. State authority, especially, in 
the form of chiefs, district commissioners, or the police service could get in the way of 
Kiberan youth. Youth understood that it was part of the hustling game to ensure that chiefs 
and other representatives of the central government felt included in programs and processes 
and an effective youth organization knew how to develop these relationships. The alternative 
was that government officials would disrupt public events when they were not invited to 
attend. They also used state bureaucracy to extract graft from youth who had not respected 
their leadership. For example, in 2005, a self-help group was building a sorting shed for their 
recycling project in the Kianda area of Kibera but their construction project was halted. The 
local chief sent a gang of thugs to threaten to tear down the new construction because he 
claimed he had not given permission for it to be built. Luckily, this particular self-help group 
had powerful allies at one of the larger non-governmental organizations and they were 
eventually able to navigate the bureaucracy without parting with large sums of cash. Over the 
years I heard numerous stories of youth who had not been able to navigate similar incidents 
on their own. 
The authority of non-governmental organizations also affected youth hustling in the 
development field. We know that outsider NGOs needed the small community-based 
organizations to implement programs to meet their program objectives and reach 
beneficiaries. This meant that they wielded the power and controlled the funds that entered 
Kibera making it next to impossible for community groups to establish niches in community 
work in their own right. Youth organizations had little direct access to businesses or 
foundations that could help them build capacity and infrastructure to design and develop 
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their own programs. This reality was partially responsible for the emergence and 
disintegration of community organizations.  
The Initiative for Sports and Social Arts (ISSA) was an ideal case study for observing the 
interaction that grassroots youth institutions had with the development field—in both 
beneficial and unintentionally harmful ways. The first time I met John he was a member of 
ISSA and he made a startling first impression. I had arrived with my research assistant 
Wycliffe who was making introductions for me at CBOs across Kibera when John quite 
suddenly declared that he would not be interviewed. This distressed Wycliffe, who had set 
up an appointment to meet with ISSA as part of our tour. Sensing this, John assured him 
that if others in the office wanted to talk to me then that was fine, but he was not going to 
participate.  
There were three other young men in the small, dark room, and it was overstuffed with 
tables and the plastic chairs seen everywhere in Kenya, from NGO boardrooms to village 
health centers. The young men were crowded around one ancient computer monitor 
listening to a bootleg mixed CD, each inhabiting a space in the office that suggested a level 
of egalitarian communalism. One of them abandoned a chair, pointed me to it and we settled 
in for the informal interview. John stayed in the room, but sat at a desk facing away from the 
rest of us and reading an old newspaper.  
By this time, Wycliffe and I had been to over a dozen small organizations working across 
Kibera and I proceeded with the general set of questions I had about the organization’s 
origins and activities. We were surveying groups with the ultimate goal that I would connect 
with one or two and be able to engage in extended participant observation, ideally with 
altruistic young people. I was seeking legitimacy at the deeper neighborhood level because I 
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sensed that I was not breaking through the surface in my research. Through Wycliffe’s 
networks we had been successful in reaching out to a variety of community organizations 
and people were generally welcoming and willing to sit with me for an hour. I had found it 
easy to draw people into conversations about Kibera, slum life, and development.  
This was the approach Wycliffe and I had taken for several weeks and I had started to 
grow weary. I could not seem to find the magic connection that would give me access. I was 
being treated like the mzungu I was at all of the organizations we visited. Each group I met 
had a standard story for visitors where they discussed their accomplishments by giving a list 
of the programs and projects in which they were involved, sharing a small amount about 
what the gaps in their programming were, and ending with a veiled request for a donation or 
assistance. Each presented a niche topical focus—like the environment or orphans and 
vulnerable children—but at the same time all sounded eerily similar.  
I came to see there was a clear reason for this. Wycliffe was an outsider who had once 
lived in Kibera, but decided to leave during the violent rent war of 2001. He had continued 
to make a living as a guide and assistant for various research organizations, which is how I 
connected with him. In the prior year he had participated in creating a directory of 
community organizations and so it was these organizations that I was being introduced to. 
One of the ways they made their way into the directory was because at one point or another 
they had partnered with a larger international NGO to implement a project. Each seemed to 
be basically running activities ad hoc with little centralized structure. The rhetoric used by 
these community-based organizations emphasized that ownership of the projects remained 
in the hands of an egalitarian committee, yet something seemed off about that reality.  
It was no different at the Initiative for Sports and Social Arts on the day I visited. When 
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I first walked into the office, all of the young men had proudly announced that they were 
“program officers,” a title of some significance, but quickly shared that they worked as a 
team and that all members had the same amount of power. Their areas of concern were 
wide—from capacity building and human rights to drug prevention, HIV awareness, and the 
environment. Like other organizations I had visited across Kibera, they used the present 
tense to describe all their programs. Had I completed the interview as I had at the dozen or 
so organizations I had met before, I would have left assuming that ISSA was the vibrant, 
active, and successful youth program they told me it was. These young men were very good 
at describing the problems that Kibera faced while representing themselves as uniquely 
situated to address them. The only difference was John, who later told me that on the day we 
met he was feeling especially frustrated by the pattern of development he saw in Kibera. 
This was the reason at first that he refused to talk to me, and also why later, when one of the 
young men started explaining ISSA’s water and sanitation project, he turned around and 
interrupted. 
“Well,” he said, “what really happened was that a local NGO seeking partners in Kibera 
to implement a project on safe drinking water and improved sanitation approached us.”   
He went on to describe that it was not independent resourcefulness that had led ISSA to 
become the owners of a water access point and a toilet block in Mashimoni, not far from 
their offices.134 John said that no one was trained in environmental issues, that ISSA had no 
experience in sanitation, and that the initial start-up capital for the sanitation block had been 
granted to them by a larger NGO that used ISSA as gatekeepers to expand into their Kibera 
                                                
134 This was a popular type of project for a while, since water and toilets were major needs in Kibera and 
organizations like ISSA could make money by selling water and toilet access. 
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village. John also jokingly stated that ISSA’s members were good at telling visitors the story 
of what they would like to do if they had consistent funding, as if programs were currently 
active even if they were not. This was their strategy: to look like important gatekeepers as 
part of their daily hustle to attract outside partners. 
Co-opting Development Processes 
Depending on larger, more visible non-governmental organizations for insecure hustling 
ensured that youth were often exploited in their pursuits—the internal power they wielded 
within Kibera did not translate beyond the borders. The small CBOs that served as 
gatekeeping institutions rarely signed real contracts and much like Asha in the previous 
chapter, the groups entered into activities hoping for fair remuneration but without the 
means to demand it. Asking outright made them look dependent, while not speaking up 
when approached to participate in a project could result in their going home with nothing.  
One of the clearest examples I saw of this subtle exploitation occurred a few months 
after I met the ISSA team. It was October of 2008 and the official report from the 
Commission of Inquiry on Post-Election Violence, also known as the Waki Report, had just 
been handed over to President Kibaki and Prime Minister Odinga.135 The report was 
developed to unveil the major perpetrators of the post-election violence and contained 
interviews that the commission had conducted in regions in the country where the worst 
atrocities had been committed. The report itself did not actually list these perpetrators but 
spoke vaguely of the violence. Before the report was unveiled a rumor began to spread 
                                                
135 After the post-election violence, a power-sharing agreement was made that required passing a constitutional 
amendment to allow for the co-existence of a presidential and parliamentary system of government. Both 
contenders in the election ended up with powerful positions. 
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across Kibera that there was a parallel, secret list that named everyone who had allegedly 
been involved—from those who funded militias to anyone who had been involved in 
protest. A rumor even made its way to Carolina for Kibera claiming that two of the young 
men we trained as peace mediators during the Jamii ya Kibera initiative had appeared on the 
list. Naturally a lot of young men were worried because during the two-month period of 
violence, some of them had picked up stones, and some had even thrown them.136 Figuring 
out who was a victim and who was a perpetrator involved difficult questions about another 
kind of exploitation—had these young men acted of their own volition or had they been 
paid by politicians and leaders to engage? Many of the people involved in the violence 
walked this line and had spent the previous six months healing their internal scars and trying 
to forget. Like the rumors that spread in Kibera during the post-election violence, the 
allegations of a list threatened to disrupt the relative peace that had been restored since the 
beginning of the year (Osborn 2008).  
Even though no official list of Kibera offenders was ever released, young men continued 
to fear what might happen to them. To ease this, John along with Shadrack and Otoyo, who 
were also occasionally members at ISSA, came up with an idea to construct a popular 
version of the report that they called Waki Mtaani (“Waki on the Streets”). More fear had 
spread in Kibera even after the final Waki Report was released. It was over 500 pages long 
and written in a legalese that the youth in Kibera could not readily understand. Waki Mtaani 
would ensure that youth were brought into the conversation and given the straight facts in 
the form of a written pamphlet and through workshops, rather than relying on word of 
                                                
136 This emerged from a focus group discussion where one young man blurted out that he had raised a stone 




Ideally Waki Mtaani would have been distributed to youth organizations in areas like 
Kibera, Naivasha, Eldoret, Kisumu, and Nakuru where the violence had been the most 
intense. Youth organizations would use the pared down, simplified version to spread 
accurate information to their peer networks, in language by the youth and for the youth. John, 
Shadrack, and Otoyo knew they had come up with a brilliant project but did not know how 
they would be able to implement it. They needed to find a foundation willing to take a 
chance on them and concurrently build up the basic infrastructure of ISSA to be able to 
execute. The slow, dusty computers they used to watch music videos would need to be 
repaired and they would need to build better administrative and financial systems. They 
recognized that by the time it would take to do all of these things, while simultaneously 
maintaining their own daily hustles since none of the program officers at ISSA actually got 
paid, the project would no longer be relevant. So they sought out John’s friend at PeaceNet, 
a national civil society NGO working on peace issues that had funding for violence 
prevention activities. PeaceNet liked the idea and ended up producing a popular version, 
even using the original project title of Waki Mtaani. While ISSA got an acknowledgement in 
the final printing, John, Shadrack, and Otoyo ultimately lost all control over the project 
including access to financial resources or any money for its implementation. They regularly 
complained to me that the development process was exploitative and this served as a good 
example. Even though they did not gain financially from the project, they did feel pride in 
their accomplishment of getting Waki Mtaani into the public space. This was the Catch 22 
for youth organizations: they could either horde ideas because they did not have the capacity 
to implement them or let their ideas be overtaken by organizations with more resources and 
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greater access to funds. 
There were two obvious ways for ISSA to have avoided this exploitation. The first 
would have been for Shadrack, Otoyo, and John to invest in their group’s capacity so they 
could get their own funding and negotiate terms. But in the time I knew them—over a 
period of four years—their membership fell apart frequently because there was not enough 
money to keep people interested. The organization would go dormant for months as 
members pursued side hustles. The other solution would have been for them to get jobs 
with the national or international NGOs where they could be more effective with their ideas. 
However, their lack of university credentials made this a challenge. They also suspected that 
staff at larger NGOs wanted to keep them in the community (and out of the NGOs) 
because they needed gatekeepers. John and his friends knew that the implementation of 
development work depended on “altruistic” hustlers like them. 
The co-optation of the Waki Mtaani project was not the first time ISSA had experienced 
a takeover of ideas and resources in their hustling pursuits. In late 2008, Otoyo met a 
Kenyan man named Patrick at a workshop. Patrick ran an international foundation from 
Boston, Massachusetts where he lived. He liked Otoyo and told him he saw a lot of potential 
in ISSA and they discussed the possibility of working together to develop a youth resource 
center in Kibera. The idea was that they would build a partnership with one of the public 
universities and run distance-learning courses at a computer center that both Patrick’s 
organization and ISSA would build together. The ISSA team was very excited by this 
prospect. When visitors came to the office during tours of Kibera they would speak about 
this new technical component, where young people could come and learn about computers 
  
182 
and do online classes, as though it was already happening.137   
ISSA wanted it to be a project that included space for youth in different joints to gather, 
take computer classes, and stay out of trouble. They knew that the most vulnerable period of 
time was during a youth’s lost years when a young man’s options were limited mostly to 
tertiary education or kibarua work. Because associational life for him was limited to the 
neighborhood joints, there was always a possibility a youth could stray down a path to 
negative and criminal hustling. There were very few organizations in Kibera that focused on 
this demographic of 18-21-year-olds and the group at ISSA saw their youth center as an 
important step in reducing crime and improving civic responsibility. 
It took several months after the initial meeting for Patrick, who travelled in and out of 
Kenya, to inform ISSA that the partnership with the university was still in the process. 
Waiting for a project to surface was a normal part of the NGO hustle and they remained 
hopeful that Patrick would follow through. Six months later, at the end of 2009, Patrick 
returned to Kenya and announced he was ready to start building the infrastructure to get the 
project going. To facilitate this, ISSA sought out space in a larger, newer building 
constructed of concrete. They needed the space to be secure in order to house the 
computers they were being promised. The rent was much higher for the two rooms they 
needed, but they had the word of Patrick that this would be covered.  
After securing their new office, the youth at ISSA also knew their project hinged on 
accessing the Internet. Most of the established organizations worked on Kibera’s edges, 
closer to the main road with access to services. ISSA wanted to be the first organization to 
                                                
137 At the time, there were internet cafes on the fringes of Kibera but none down in the kijiji.  
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operate down in the kijiji, where access to the Internet was limited to the spotty 3G mobile-
phone network. Stable access, at the time, required the construction of a 30-foot mast that 
could read a signal from the nearest tower over a mile away. Internet companies wanted 
clients to pay for the installation of infrastructure to remote areas that would then end up 
serving everyone else living around them. The power company in rural Kenya used the same 
model where one pioneering, and wealthier, individual pays for the infrastructure that then 
serves everyone else. That would have been an added boon for ISSA because they would 
have gained social capital for bringing this kind of accessibility to the neighborhood. 
Unfortunately, installing a mast was prohibitively expensive and once again they could not 
find Patrick to consult for advice. 
ISSA was attached to the project idea, so even with Patrick’ absence they continued to 
try to find ways to fund it. When a call for projects on youth civic education came out in 
2010, ISSA wrote a proposal that included operational expenses to fund the youth center in 
the budget. The proposal incorporated funding for the center, participatory educational 
theater, and a strong peer-to-peer strategy for disseminating information. The proposal did 
not include workshops and trainings, because ISSA’s members knew those were avenues for 
hustling.138 It was disappointing and frustrating for the members when they did not receive 
the grant after putting in a lot of time and energy into the proposal.  
In 2010, Patrick finally returned with money. He brought six computers and some desks 
and gave six months of rent to ISSA’s landlady—the group was never given cash directly. He 
promised them again that the partnership with the university was in the works and that the 
                                                




ISSA team would soon have a vibrant curriculum to use in their implementation. Shortly 
afterwards, ISSA discovered that the computers Patrick brought were just cheap clones.139  
They hired a local youth with a computer certificate to teach basic computer literacy anyway, 
but the computers quickly filled with viruses from the infected USB drives learners brought. 
The computers slowed down and two broke completely. Worse, without access to Internet 
ISSA was unable to fulfill the income-generating side of the project. 
Meanwhile, ISSA’s membership was in flux. Besides John, Shadrack, and Otoyo, there 
were only three or four other steady members of the group who participated regularly as a 
team, but they all felt it was important for ISSA to maintain an appearance of a functioning, 
successful organization. They kept the big, two-room office mainly as a means to continue to 
attract foreigners as volunteers and potential partners, but the frequent failure to build 
sustainable, long-term projects caused intra-organization friction. The group had frequent 
fall-outs, especially if one person thought he had not been given his share of a resource. 
When one of the individuals appeared to have more economic opportunities than the others, 
he was maligned and outcast. 
This continued for a year and a half as the ISSA team continued to wait for word from 
Patrick. Their computers were broken, the rent went unpaid, and the organization neared 
disintegration. At one point they were almost evicted because they owed the landlady several 
months in rent. The core leadership team was formed with reciprocity and equality in mind, 
but they were growing up and desperately seeking adulthood. They wanted to get married, 
have children, and find greater stability. They also knew that others in the Kibera 
                                                




development field thought of them as leaders and elites and it was painful to not live up to 
community expectations. Their attempts to seek projects that would have raised their 
prestige or built a better ISSA had largely failed. Project proposals were rejected and NGO 
partnership promises went unmet. Waiting for projects to come to them, and worrying over 
who made the contact and who would be in charge, had also created interpersonal tensions. 
The members of ISSA started to look for hustling opportunities that did not have to be 
shared. 
Patrick had been silent for over a year and half when John got a spontaneous phone call 
from a woman who worked with an oversight board for the public universities in Kenya. She 
and her colleague wanted to come to the ISSA offices to see the progress of the project. It 
was not unusual for ISSA to receive random visitors so John walked over to the District 
Commissioner’s office where they were waiting and took them down to the kijiji. When they 
got to the office and saw the television that had been donated by an organization called Film 
Aid that contracted ISSA to do film screenings, the visitor turned to her colleague and said, 
“That must be the TV we have on the list.” John was puzzled. What list?  
It soon became evident that the visitors came to Kibera with a report of the project that 
Patrick had submitted. It showed expenditures for items that had been officially reported to 
the government and they were there to do an audit. According to the reports, ISSA was to 
have received a dozen computers, several furniture items, soccer balls, and office supplies as 
part of a contract the university board had signed with Patrick’ organization. When the 
woman asked John how much they had paid for Internet, John started laughing. After all of 
the frustrations and delays involved in funding their project, he discovered that Patrick had 
written a report in absentia claiming the center had been built and was running at a cost of 
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almost two million shillings ($25,000), inclusive of ever-elusive salaries for the youth. What 
ISSA received instead was six months of rent worth approximately $350, six generic 
computers, and some cheaply built jua kali furniture.  
When Otoyo was first approached by Patrick to be a partner for the youth center in 
Kibera he had no idea that it was part of a larger Kenyan government program that sought 
to bring distance learning to the informal neighborhoods of Nairobi. Patrick was a corrupt 
hustler who used ISSA to serve his own interests. ISSA believed they were entering into a 
partnership with a US-based foundation that saw their potential and wanted to help them do 
something important in the community. In reality, they were fulfilling a contract to provide a 
service. For three years they had been under the impression Patrick’s inaction had to do with 
the fact that they were youth, when all along he was using their status as youth in absentia.  
Even though community-based organizations often experienced exploitation, corruption, 
and intense competition for resources, ISSA’s members knew that they were better together 
than apart, which is why despite their frequent threats to disband, they always reunited. By 
building and breaking institutions they found better and more substantial ways to mediate 
and lessen the effects of their liminality. The strategy of hustling was done primarily with an 
economic goal—young people seeking ways to buy into adulthood through the accumulation 
of resources. In the process they developed connections and reified their place within their 
community. The big assumption in accumulating resources was that it gave youth a way of 
improving their low social rank. Participating in institutions provided a way for them to not 
only maximize the networks needed for hustling, but also to attain symbolic power even if it 
was only within their group or within the confines of Kibera.  
A source of frustration was that John and his friends were actually interested in creating 
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real plans for ISSA. They brainstormed and developed different solutions to Kibera’s 
problems than those that were presented to them. They would frequently partner with an 
organization, even if they knew the project being promoted would not work, hoping that by 
building networks they would be entrusted to get funding for their own unique project. The 
problem with this kind of top-down development model was that youth never had real 
ownership over the work. The best way to maximize the opportunity in development work 
was to keep the internal social structures loose and flexible and redefine what success looked 
like. John recognized that what he and the others were doing was merely a rehearsal for the 
day he would get a better opportunity. The next chapter discusses how that better 
opportunity came as a byproduct of hustling NGOs. Instead of accumulating resources to 
buy their way into adulthood, the youth elites of Kibera’s development field got an 




Figure 18. Lebour Youth advertisements sponsored by Yu, a mobile phone company 
(Photo by Tonny Mateng'e) 
 
Figure 19. A community worker in Kibera leading a workshop about clinic services (photo 




Steve ’s  Story ,  Part  IV: An Alternat ive  Rite  o f  Passage 
 
Steve’s transformation had been gradual. It had started with a generous mother and a 
loving grandmother, both of whom taught him to feel responsibility for his family and the 
larger community. He was later inspired by the Mexican youth pastor at the church, who 
encouraged him to think about structural problems in Kibera and how his poverty and 
misfortune was directly related to political action and social stereotypes. It continued when 
he met young people from different economic backgrounds at conferences and discovered 
that he could surprise middle class Kenyans with his energy, intelligence, and engagement.  
He started to recognize similar qualities in other people like the directors of non-
governmental organizations, university professors, young artists, and human rights activists 
who served as mentors and role models. Though each of them was still operating within a 
system that rewarded the obedient, Steve bet on NGO hustling as a guiding principle for 
entrance into a different kind of society. 
Steve was not a rebel. He was not one to stand on the corner at Kamukunji grounds in 
Gatwekira and spout off Marxist rhetoric on Sundays as some did.140  He did not even think 
his stance against the district commissioner during the Madaraka Day celebration was 
particularly rebellious. The DC was a representative of the state; the state is a democracy; in 
a democracy there is freedom; so he knew that he could not be held hostage to old 
gerontocratic, paternalist modes of authority any longer. He had Authenticity, Freedom, and 
Democracy as his guides now and these were the guiding principles for how he would build 
his future relationships. He was not rocking the boat but finding a position where the boat 
could become more stable, secure, and fair. 
In his early 30s, after years of hustling, Steve was finally recruited by a Kenyan-run NGO 
in Kibera to organize a youth and democracy event as part of a larger civic education 
initiative. His connections, skills, and experience overcame his lack of a degree. After the 
success of the event, he was hired on full-time as a program manager within the initiative, 
working with now much younger men and women in Kibera. He did not make a lot of 
money, but it was secure. Even better was that fact that it was meaningful and provided a 
way to complete his liminal youth years. 
 
  
                                                
140 Kamukunji was an open air space where people gathered on Sundays to give open-air, politically charged 
speeches. These mainly took place in the Dholuo language, spoken by members of the Luo ethnic group. 
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CHAPTER SIX: COMING OF AGE IN KIBERA 
Through the process of institution building, we know that young people created social 
capital by developing new categories of authority. The young men and women who gave 
themselves titles like “community worker,” “program officer,” “director,” or “coordinator” 
at the small grassroots organizations in Kibera symbolically asserted themselves into 
positions of power. They were literally empowering themselves. If a young person acting in a 
director role did not bring resources, partnerships, or opportunities to the group he was in, 
he could easily reinvent himself as a program director somewhere else. The most necessary 
part of the accumulation of social capital was that he had other young people call him by a 
title and follow his lead. Part of the hustling process meant returning the favor and 
recognizing the authority of others within the institutions that had been personally created. 
Every participant at ISSA was a “program officer” when I first visited. This positioning 
was deliberate and achieved two things: it lifted ISSA’s members above the youth regularly 
mobilized for activities and it made everyone equal. We’ve seen that this egalitarian model of 
community-based organizations was important when all of the young people were in the 
same relative economic position. At the end of the day, program officers at ISSA found it 
better to establish ‘sameness’ as a long-term hustling strategy as opposed to creating power 
structures that could not be sustained. When a potential funder or partner emerged, only one 
of them would take the lead and nurture the connection. He would act as the leader in the 
group as long as the program or partnership was active—for a single day or a long-term 
engagement. But if there was no active programming, the group tried to appear without 
hierarchy.  
Of course, egalitarianism within community structures was more symbolic than literal. 
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The idea of equality was easily abandoned when an individual found a more promising 
opportunity and left the group. A good example of this happened shortly after ISSA’s 
founding in 2003 when the members decided that anyone who was able to obtain steady 
work through a referral from the organization was expected to share.141 ISSA’s core 
leadership team referred two female members for salaried, but low-level jobs at a partner 
NGO. The rest of the group was left behind to continue hustling in informal wage labor, 
with an expectation that the ladies would return 10% of their wages back to the group as a 
sign of solidarity and gratitude. Despite the agreement, no one was surprised when the 
women stopped answering phone calls shortly after leaving. The women chose their new 
jobs over maintaining their local networks with ISSA. 
Youth also kept their options open to become members of other groups. Even though 
community-based organizations across Kibera competed for the same partnerships, funding, 
and connections with NGOs, they also collaborated because individuals earned social capital 
by building local reputations for fairness, tolerance, and inclusiveness. Whereas it was 
important to maintain a flat hierarchy within their own group, they were constantly trying to 
position themselves as the most powerful among the network of small organizations. Much 
of this had to do with youth groups appearing like they had access to and control over 
resources, even when they did not. Ultimately this helped a group negotiate better with 
NGOs. ISSA would call on the local joints (a level below them, by generation and status) to 
attend forums and programs, but never the reverse. And other equal status community-
based organizations, like the Kibera Community Youth Programme, could mutually share 
                                                
141 This historical background of ISSA was gathered during strategic planning activities I engaged in with the 
organization from 2010-2011.  
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opportunities with ISSA. The key was the two organizations had been formed around the 
same time and shared membership.  
Once a youth organization had been identified for a potential partnership with an NGO, 
they immediately transformed from their flat organization into one with fully formed 
organizational structures. Based mainly on seniority or age, a few members became the 
leaders in the partnership and the rest followed. The individuals in the institution who made 
the initial contact became the leaders of the new program by default and were immediately 
given the command and respect needed to get the work done. Since these leaders inevitably 
needed to mobilize young people from other ethnicities, groups, and locations, it was 
imperative that they had the ability to reactivate networks. The group leaders were not 
project managers, but they were expected by the other youth in their group to maximize 
opportunities. Leaders, especially, were charged with ensuring participants received 
satisfactory remuneration. If they bargained for too little, they risked alienating youth and 
affecting their local ties of obligation; if they bargained for too much, they risked irritating 
donors and looking like clumsy hustlers.  
This story of youth in Kibera has discussed the transition to adulthood as it connects to 
capital: the symbolic capital associated with moving beyond the margins and building 
hierarchies in groups; the cultural capital of gaining networks through reciprocity and 
exchange; and the economic capital associated with accumulating property, money, or 
children. The approaches in Kibera’s development field focused on helping youth attain a 
combination of these types of capital in varying forms, even if they were not designed with 
the specific outcome of resolving protracted liminality. Participating in a multi-ethnic 
football club did not reduce the stigma of being a youth, even if it temporarily resolved 
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interpersonal tensions, nor did the provisions of health or social services by non-
governmental organizations take Kibera youth out of their marginal states. As evidenced by 
how they combined hustling with institution-building, it was the youth who seized the 
opportunities available because of the presence of NGOs to collectively advance their way to 
adulthood. The youth wanted personal achievement, but they also fundamentally recognized 
that coming of age meant productively contributing to something bigger. 
This final substantive chapter shows how hustling NGOs inevitably led youth in Kibera 
to emerge as leaders and authorities not only in their small grassroots institutions, but also in 
the spread of new ideas in their neighborhoods. In the process of mediating their liminality, 
they were also able to attain new knowledge that served them personally and contributed to 
new forms of civic knowledge. More than just gaining symbolic authority through the 
institutions of development, they became thought leaders in the community. Eventually 
some youth found that a broadening of opportunity and their exposure to new ideas opened 
them up to positions beyond Kibera. 
Chaos and Opportunity 
A Swahili word I heard frequently was fujo, or chaos. When Nubians allegedly burned 
down a church near Karanja Road, the young woman who told me about it called it fujo. 
When John encountered mob justice on his way to meet me, it was fujo that explained his 
delay.142 Fujo was a frequent occurrence and an acknowledged reality of Kiberans’ lives. But 
the beauty about chaos in Kibera was that it gave way to opportunity—both good and bad. 
For example, in the two months of chaos that followed the 2007 election, some young 
                                                
142 “Mob justice” is the act of a crowd taking justice into their own hands through public beatings or shamings. 
This was frequently used to discourage theft.  
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hustlers chose to loot and steal, while others emerged as community mediators and leaders. 
The youth leaders of constantly changing organizations saw that disorder could be positive. 
The common moments of fission were not unlike the classic “social dramas” described by 
Victor Turner where chaos was important in reaching resolution. Shared marginalization and 
the collective experience of liminality signaled another of Victor Turner’s concepts—
communitas, or the intense feelings of social togetherness and belonging (Turner 1974, 47).  
Youth were sometimes even involved in manipulating fujo for community development. 
A good example of a constructed “social drama” and rehearsed communitas in Kibera was 
illustrated to me on a late afternoon in 2010 when I witnessed a young man and woman get 
into a fight at a busy intersection where two main pathways in the Silanga village of Kibera 
met. The area was filled with informal pubs, food sellers, shoe repair stalls, clothing markets, 
and charcoal dealers and was crowded with travelers shopping for meal provisions and 
heading home at the end of the day. Some of these people paused and looked on as the 
young woman screamed out in pain when the man pulled her hair and kicked her. She pulled 
away from him only to hear his denigrations. “Cheater! Liar! Whore!,” he called out to her in 
a mix of English, Kiswahili, and Sheng. Angered by his insults, she spit at him and in her 
attempt to hit him back, slipped and landed on a pile of rotting cabbage. From her position, 
she could have done little to hurt him, but he kicked at her anyway. Just before he kicked her 
in the face, some members of the crowd intervened. 
A young female spectator helped the woman up and consoled her near a vegetable stand, 
trying to stop her crying and calm her nerves. Several other males held back the young man 
to keep him from attacking again. Despite the protests of his handlers, the man told the 
crowd it was his right to beat his wife. He said that the only way she would learn from her 
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betrayal would be if he handled it right there and right then, with force. There was a slur in 
his voice and a sway in his swagger, indicating intoxication. A few of the young men, while 
continuing to hold the husband back, started to voice their own opinions about whether or 
not they should let the beating take place. In one camp were those of the opinion that it was 
a domestic issue and, therefore, none of their business. The husband could sort his wife out 
however he saw fit. Was it not correct that by beating his wife, he was not only disciplining 
her suspected infidelity, but also showing that he loved her and was willing to fight to keep 
their relationship intact? Others thought that because the beating had taken place in the 
street, where others could see them, it had become a public problem and they should take 
the couple to the chief’s office, where the matter could be dealt with judicially. A bold young 
woman consoling the wife yelled out that it was never right for a man to hit a woman. She 
claimed the chief would not see that, and that here in modern Kenya the crowd should know 
that the practice of hitting women should be abolished. Lots of murmuring happened across 
the area. Onlookers who were passing through this busy area of Kibera and who had 
stopped to see what the commotion was about also started to voice their opinions. The 
husband vocally and vehemently insisted that he be granted permission to beat his wife, 
while she remained crumpled on the ground, despondent and shaking.  
A young man who had been observing from the sidelines stepped into the middle of the 
crowd and halted the rising fujo. He started to ask questions of the onlookers. What was 
going on here? Do we even know the whole story? Was there possibly more to this issue 
than a man’s supposed “right” to beat his wife? Why did some amongst the crowd feel like a 
beating was acceptable, while others thought that the practice was outdated, archaic, and 
ethically wrong?  
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An older man beside me who had stopped to watch the action muttered under his 
breath, “Oh, it is only a play”. Upon recognizing that it was an NGO activity, he turned 
around and walked on, but most others in the crowd were drawn into the moderator’s 
queries. They wanted to solve the puzzle and work through this problem, contributing their 
opinions without caring whether it was real or not. The actress playing the wife told the 
crowd that she had not been unfaithful and that her “husband” had made an assumption 
that she was cheating merely because she had purchased a new dress and had spent some 
money on having her hair done. He assumed the money for such luxuries had come from a 
lover, when in fact she had received a small windfall from her sister who had recently 
procured steady work. When the husband came home from the pub and saw his wife’s hair, 
he overreacted and went to hit her, and she scurried into the street. The crowd loved this 
twist in the story and many turned on the husband for not recognizing that his wife was just 
trying to look good for him.  
Eventually, through heated discussion and the moderator’s facilitation, the crowd 
resolved that it was, perhaps, a bad thing to hit women, that there were better ways to 
express dissatisfaction than hitting, and that maybe both parties in a relationship needed to 
find better ways to communicate their issues. The moderator began to use the usual 
development jargon to talk about gender-based and other types of violence that had 
permeated Kibera and implored those who had witnessed the event to think about how they 
might react in the future to incidents such as this one. The audience was given a small lecture 
and directed toward resources available to report incidents of domestic violence. The 
moderator asked that everyone try to make the community a more cohesive, peaceful place 
to live. The wife, the husband, the consoling woman, the group of young men who had 
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participated in holding him back and the moderator all signaled the play was over with a 
shared look. They then broke character and shook hands with each other and members of 
the community. Leaving behind a few lingering onlookers who were still gossiping and 
animatedly discussing what had just occurred, the group collectively headed back to the 
office to get paid and make plans for the next event.  
Even though most of the external observers who happened to pass through the 
intersection eventually realized that the event was fiction, they participated in the collective 
resolution anyway. It was a play put on by the youth of a local community based 
organization who had been contracted to do performances as part of a larger Kibera-wide 
campaign against domestic violence that included participatory theatre, film screenings, 
workshops, and forums. Participatory educational theater in Kenya was a modern fusion of 
the Brazilian revolutionary dramatist Augusto Boal’s Theater of the Oppressed (2000) and 
the Kenyan playwright Ngugi wa Thiongo’s People’s Theatre and had become the umbrella 
term for a series of performative activities that gave benefactors, like the passersby in Kibera, 
an opportunity to “probe, reflect on, and respond to issues which concern them” (Cornwall 
1997, 23). It was common enough in Kibera that at the moment the moderator stepped in it 
became clear what was going on to some of the onlookers, like the man who had been 
standing near me. However, it provided enough drama and intrigue to be a relatively 
successful way of approaching sensitive and personal topics by asking an audience of 
strangers to attempt to solve a problem many of them have experienced directly or within 
their neighborhood or family. Participatory educational theater does not work unless the 
event that is dramatized is realistic. The scene has to be recognizable—the fujo must fit into 
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the script of everyday life. It must be a conflict that can be animatedly debated and then 
easily concluded.  
Over the years that I followed youth organizations in Kibera, I watched numerous 
performances like this that were meant to shape social commentary, shift ideologies, and 
influence “behavior change”. These were predicted outcomes that were hard to measure. 
What was most interesting about the events was that the subjects and words could be 
controversial and taboo, broaching sensitive subjects like rape, incest, sexually transmitted 
diseases, and ethnic tension, without resulting in even greater fujo. There was a certain way 
the information was disseminated that gave development practitioners and youth community 
workers permission to bring up these highly sensitive in mixed company without there being 
a major breach of the social agreement. The design and implementation of these programs 
involved a real sophistication on the part of the young people involved. It was also evidence 
that the young people had moved beyond being passive learners to active teachers. Beyond 
the higher status that imbued, it signaled that they were now in charge of creating knowledge 
rather than just repeating it. In the youth-saturated environment, young people were capable 
of being active citizens and knowledge producers. 
The University of Kibera 
Another byproduct of NGO hustling was that some young people began to see that it 
provided an alternative to the higher education opportunities they missed. In October 2014 
the messages below popped into my Facebook feed. I have redacted names to maintain 
anonymity, but the participants in the conversation were the same young men who have so 
far been featured in this text. The post was an invitation from one young leader asking 
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friends and colleagues to attend an event in Kibera, which he pitched as a reunion. The 
responses to the original poster are spontaneous and delightful—reaffirming the idea that 
this group of people, in this period of time, made a difference together. Perhaps even more 
importantly, the conversation shows that they had begun to see that their residence in 
Kibera did not deter their advancement to adulthood, but contributed to it instead. One of 
the respondents, who hustled his way into a formal sector job with an international NGO 
writes that they have more skills because they came-of-age in a “complete society.” Another 
calls Kibera a “school of highest learning.” The last respondent succinctly defines Kibera as 
one of the world’s greatest universities. None of these young men were able to complete 
university degrees, but it is easy to see that they are able to reflect that Kibera had prepared 
them in unknowable ways. And like Kepha, whose writing opened this dissertation, it 
remains important for all participants to see their personal transitions as a collective effort.  
Kibera’s NGO hustlers had found a university to attend, even if it was a university that 
gave no papers. At a literal level, the saturation of non-governmental organizations across 
Kibera offered a broad range of “courses” on wide-ranging subjects. Youth, who had not 
had the ability to attend institutions of higher education, still attended trainings or 
workshops where they would studiously take notes while facilitators laid out information on 
flipcharts. Coupled with the experiential components of “work” at community-based 
organizations, the metaphor was apt. Youth who hustled NGOs were not just conversant in 
the themes, trends, and language of the development field—some of the information that 
was taught in those trainings and workshops sunk in. They understood the underlying 
factors of inequality and supplemented their activism with social theory. These youth had a 
complex understanding of the hegemony that disparaged informality and the communalism 
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prevalent in urban slum survival. They knew that this hegemony prioritized the formal and 
capitalist structures of Nairobi’s moneyed classes. The most impressive part was that the 
education they received was experiential, combining theoretical learning with true practice. 
 
Figure 20. Facebook Post from October 2014 (names redacted) 
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One day John got into a heated debate with my friend, another American researcher, 
about Nairobi’s middle class. My friend thought John was being too critical of some of her 
informants who were born in the 1980s in the middle class suburb of Buru Buru. John told 
her that it was the middle class’ conspicuous consumption that led to the great income 
disparity in the country. He was frustrated because he felt that the civil servants, professors, 
white-collar professionals, and small businessmen who had comprised Kenya’s middle class 
since independence had sold out their own. While corrupt politicians grabbed land, pilfered 
the country’s wealth, and allowed corruption to poison the young democracy, John blamed 
Nairobi’s middle class for being complicit. He thought that this class of people had adopted 
the myth of meritocracy, perpetuated by the inaccessible education system, as a way justify 
their affluence and that the pervasive ideology that the urban poor deserved their poverty 
was constructed by this class of people who benefited. John also thought that their desire to 
buy nice houses in urban estates, hire cheap domestic labor, and participate in the 
segregation of Nairobi ultimately came at the cost of the exploited urban poor. In turn, the 
poor accepted class divisions with no way to question its fairness.  
John’s argument was a classic philosophical assessment of capitalism, without having 
ever been schooled in Marx, Gramsci, or Foucault. His “uneducated” assessment was a 
sharp diversion from the prevailing narrative of hegemony peddled by Kenya’s civil society 
and the public at large, which blamed politicians and the superrich for Kenya’s widespread 
economic and social problems. In that narrative, everyone else in the country, including the 
middle class, were victims of autocracy and corruption. John was certain his analysis of 
inequality was the true picture of why some had what they needed and others did not—a 
signaling of independence and critical thinking that was key in his coming of age. 
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The youth in Kibera’s development field created an ideology and way of seeing the world 
together that equated to a novel form of progressiveness. This was the case especially 
because the youth in Kibera bridged their hustling activities and aligned them with the 
perceived altruism of the social movements designed by Kenya’s civil society. These were 
young people who prided themselves on being nationalists and being neutral in an ocean of 
“tribalism.” Regardless of ethnic connection, the fight was for the oppressed and these 
young people were now dedicated to equality, fairness, and respect for human rights as the 
only direction for Kenya. They were idealists and optimists who believed Kenya was moving 
forward and that there would be a place for them in its future. 
Not all young Kiberans graduated from the University of Kibera—it really was reserved 
for the youth who participated in the activities connected to the development field and who 
emerged as its thinkers, leaders and doers. In spite of the presence of these vibrant young 
people, there was a lot of misunderstanding about youth’s potential. In 2013, one of the 
Kibera NGOs held a meeting to try to understand how to increase the hire-ability of the 
youth who participated in their programs. I was invited to attend the meeting along with a 
cross-section of youth serving organizations working on various aspects of job training, 
youth advocacy, and urban poverty. When asked what could be done to increase the 
likelihood of young people’s getting jobs, one of the participants said, “The youth lack 
exposure. They wear the wrong clothes, they do not know how to talk proper English, and 
they do not know how to present themselves to potential employers.” He followed it up 
with, “I have never met a youth with the right attitude who did not have a job.” A statement 
like this would seem like hyperbole, especially since it was well known that the stock of 
available formal sector jobs did not meet the demands of unemployed youth. Yet he was 
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saying what I suspected that many people just wanted to believe—working hard and doing 
things the right way would lead to success. When I looked around the room others were 
nodding in approval.  
John, Shadrack, and Otoyo told me they eventually decided to make inroads to gain 
acceptance outside Kibera deliberately. One day, one of them had extra cash to buy the 
others beer and they headed to the Prestige Plaza food court rather than going to the small 
bar in the kijiji where they had learned to drink.143 The beer cost double at this middle-class 
shopping center, but they were deliberately choosing to experience life beyond Kibera’s 
border. It was a small thing, really, to buy a beer at Prestige, but it shifted how people 
perceived them, both in the kijiji and outside of it. Development practitioners who worked 
in Kibera held meetings at the food court in Prestige Plaza. The food was expensive for a 
lunchtime meal, but the bright and open space had plenty of tables for spreading out laptops 
and notepads. For a while, there was even free wireless Internet. It was a convenient place to 
hold meetings about the future of Kibera’s development and having easy access to clean 
water and nice public toilets was a bonus. By choosing this venue for beer drinking, even 
though it was not a fiscally prudent decision in the short run, John, Shadrack, and Otoyo 
knew they would run into the power brokers of Kibera development field who controlled 
the projects and programs that were being implemented. Thus, they elevated their status 
from being the beneficiaries of youth programs to join the crowd of program architects. In a 
sense this was only possible because they felt they had “graduated.” 
                                                
143 A young person “learned to drink” alcohol and did not just begin to drink it. The ability to handle alcohol, 
as well as to understand the rules involved in buying beer, was something that also signaled adulthood. 
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Becoming a consumer in locations outside of Kibera was only one of the distinctions to 
which University of Kibera graduates paid attention. They also changed their style, language, 
and self-presentation. They spent their early years in Kibera putting the slum on in order to 
build social networks and cultivate belonging in the kijiji, but now to be taken seriously 
beyond the slum, they had to take it off. The ways that they did this entailed using English as 
a primary form of communication, even in the company of other Kibera youth, and 
dropping Sheng from their vocabulary especially at formal meetings and gatherings. It meant 
wearing the official uniform of collared shirts and pressed trousers on weekdays in the off 
chance they ran into potential employers or collaborators. These were the details that really 
mattered to them. For example, one afternoon I was with four young men from ISSA 
walking out of the kijiji. We were heading to the matatu stage to eat at a restaurant in the 
nearby suburb of Kilimani to celebrate the successful launch of their strategic plan. Before 
we could get on the matatu, all four sat down at the shoe shining station outside the district 
commissioner’s compound to have their shoes wiped and polished. It was so beautifully 
symbolic. They were literally wiping the slum off before heading to another part of town.  
For some time, I saw these behaviors and assumed youth were practicing 
cosmopolitanism like the urbanites featured in Ferguson’s Expectations of Modernity (1999). 
The cosmopolitans in the urban Zambian copperbelt town in that monograph used style, 
based on a definition put forth by Dick Hebdige (1979), to distinguish themselves from the 
localists. The behavior established distance from their rural relatives, appeared like “rule-
breaking,” and showed an individualism and selfishness that separated them from the more 
conservative localists who saw their behavior as rebellion. To Ferguson, these stylistic 
decisions were a gesture of “anti-membership”. The cosmopolitans were deliberately 
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positioning themselves to look and act modern. For the youth in this story, their motive to 
grow up as a result of NGO hustling was not resistance to Kibera. They needed it. But they 
were positioning themselves better as brokers that were neutral and inclusive. John, Shadrack 
and Otoyo wiped their shoes at the end of the day, but they also wiped them in the morning. 
These were youth who now sought an authenticity of behavior that enabled them to 
command respect both within and without Kibera. Rather than alienation they were 
attempting to create norms to be accepted anywhere. 
The graduates from Kibera also sought to transcend the traditional age hierarchies in 
their upcountry homes without causing rifts. For instance, Shadrack’s family and nearby 
neighbors in western Kenya hosted my students for a week in 2010. At the end, we held a 
party at his father’s home. We slaughtered two goats, hired a local children’s choir to serve as 
entertainment, and asked some of the local women to prepare a feast. All the host parents 
were invited. After entertainment and eating, the official speeches began. Shadrack served as 
the master of ceremonies and translated the proceedings for the American students in 
attendance. His youthfulness stood in sharp contrast to the rotation of elderly men called 
upon to give speeches. The local chief spoke, as did Shadrack’s father. Several of my 
students were asked to say something. I also gave a short speech in Kiswahili about the 
importance of cross-cultural interaction and thanked the families for their participation. 
Bishop, an older gentleman who was a high-ranking officiant in the Apostolic Church, was 
then given the floor. He began to speak in a mix of Kinyore and English about the goodness 
of international exchange and how important it was that young people were able to gain 
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exposure through learning about other people144. He spoke of Shadrack specifically—a 
young man of the village who had gone to Nairobi and brought all of these wazungu to share 
with his community and bring resources and knowledge. He said Shadrack was a shining 
light and that others in attendance should strive to be like him.  
We rehashed the events of the day later that night in a local village pub and Shadrack 
admitted that he was both embarrassed and pleased that he had received such praise from an 
elder in his community whom he had no real relationship with. Shadrack had not built a 
house in his father’s compound, had not moved from the small one-room house in Kibera 
that he shared with his wife and young son, and he had not obtained steady professional 
work. Even without these, the bishop had honed in on qualities that Shadrack was 
deliberately cultivating as part of his “education” in Kibera. He had transformed from being 
seen as a lazy youth activist in an urban slum to a respected community member. It was clear 
Shadrack had developed another way to escape liminality.  
After several years of watching my friends deal with exploitation, manage their liminality, 
hustle NGOs, and shift hierarchies, I was finally able to place their struggle into the larger 
economic context and see that they were actually inventing both an education and 
occupation which had not previously existed. As Austin and Willard noted “[y]oung people 
are not without power in their interactions with socializing institutions, they reshape and 
even appropriate such institutions for more self-directed purposes” (1998, 8). This power 
might not have always translated back to the village elders or parental figures who judged 
                                                
144 Kinyore is the language of Anyore people, a sub-ethnic group of the southern Luhya. 
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their adulthood based on narrow definitions of success, but what it did was resolve liminality 







Figure 21. Young NGO hustlers  





Faced with the compounded factors of lingering traditions of age set progression, failed 
youth policies, economic underdevelopment, income disparity, urban marginality, and a shift 
in the life-course trajectory towards rites associated with formal education, youth in Kibera 
struggled to pass into adulthood. Many development agents in Kibera recognized that youth 
lacked power and focused on empowerment as a solution to the cross-cutting issues of 
environmental degradation, informality, violence, and lack of opportunity. Unfortunately, 
empowerment programs alone failed to solve the problem of the discomfort and pain 
associated with protracted periods of liminality. During my time in Kibera, the situation for 
youth seemed bleak. Even when they did create symbolic structures of power within the 
frame of Kibera’s development field, they were subject to exploitation and abuse and found 
that they still had little control over the design and implementation of programs meant for 
them. Hustling was activity that helped to both alleviate their economic burdens and create 
complex systems of reciprocity, but was maligned because it happened within the realm of 
informality.  
However, hustling NGOs provided an alternative avenue for some young people to 
become whole. The graduates of the figurative University of Kibera who gained skills in 
leadership, teamwork, creativity, and adaptation were able to lessen the feelings of liminality 
plaguing other youth. They learned how the development field worked and how to present 
themselves in order to change others’ expectations. They became elites within the slum and 
this gave them the confidence to position themselves among extended kin, government 
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authorities, development practitioners, and even their peers. Most importantly, hustling 
NGOs gave them a way to change what it meant to become whole.  
The descriptions of Kepha, Steve, John, Otoyo, Shadrack, and Caleb’s journeys to 
adulthood are fixed within a tradition in anthropology interested in the tension between 
change and continuity. Fredrik Barth (1967) introduced the idea that cultural stability should 
be examined simultaneously with the study of change because continuity is in opposition to 
change, and is needed (as in development jargon) as a baseline. At the time Barth suggested 
this shift in thinking, anthropology had been slow to examine social change and had chosen 
to instead study “cultures” in isolation. Social life was approached through cultural patterns, 
categories, and customs, but these were approaches that did not account for idiosyncratic 
individual behaviors. Instead, Barth encouraged anthropologists to move away from seeing 
representative actions in order to observe change through how individuals conceive of 
meaning. In fact, the youth leaders in Kibera sought specifically to assimilate their shifting 
values and knowledge to maintain acceptance within their social networks. The rites of 
passage, like attaining property, getting formally married, or becoming parents, continued to 
be important moments for young people and symbolized their becoming a whole person. 
That did not stop them from pursuing and creating the new opportunities that emerged on 
the margins. 
In the previous chapter, we explored James Ferguson’s monograph, which examines the 
social experience of decline in urban Zambia. The copperbelt mineworkers in his text live in 
a location that once held the promise of global inclusion and modernity, but as the industry 
that sustained the town fell apart, they had to face their own doubts and anxieties about a 
secure future and in the process developed a cynical skepticism. The metanarrative of 
  
211 
modernity fed to them during the boom years of Zambia’s copper success had broken down. 
“Zambia’s recent crisis is not only an economic crisis, but a crisis of meaning” (Ferguson 
1999, 14). The post-modern state of his informants and his own perplexity over how to 
understand a whole knowable social world in an urban space is reflected by his 
questioning—“what happens to anthropological understanding in a situation where ‘the 
natives’ and the ethnographer lack a good understanding of what is going on around them?” 
(19). His approach to uncertainty was to examine cultural style as it manifests itself in the 
cultural categories of “localism” and “cosmopolitanism” (20). Style is an embodied form of 
shared knowledge. It is an expression of knowing how to behave, act, or be in society. To act 
cosmopolitan is to express that you know how to be modern. The young Kiberans in this 
monograph also resided in a world where maximizing opportunity involved maintaining 
sliding scales. They desired to be able to be acknowledged across locations—from 
Shadrack’s hearing from a man of his grandfather’s generation that he had become “a light” 
to Steve’s ability to flout the rules of convention at a government meeting. Their position as 
brokers, in the cultural as well as practical sense, was especially key to the continual re-
creation of meaning. 
This monograph has mainly explored youth’s marginality and liminality through the lens 
of their interactions with the shadow aid economy. When I left Kenya in 2012, I carried 
home a heavy dose of cynicism about the effectiveness of youth programming to tackle the 
fundamental structural causes of exclusion and the failure to reach adulthood. The presence 
of the shadow aid economy was a big part of this cynicism. The meetings and workshops 
that young people in Nairobi’s largest slum were invited to had become so mundane and 
predictable that some of the young men I knew who worked as facilitators and cultural 
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brokers had grown tired of the work. There was no challenge anymore for them to mobilize 
participants for a focus-group discussion. They no longer found it interesting to facilitate at 
meetings for NGOs. The older youth quietly took younger apprentices and began to mold 
them into facilitators. When an NGO contact came to them seeking a venue in Kibera to 
host an event, they would pass the menial labor off to their younger counterparts—having 
them do the legwork like tracking down participants and dealing with logistics. In the end, 
this arrangement ensured that the older youth got all the credit. Considering how long it 
took many of the youth who hustled NGOs to build up reputations and networks of 
contacts, they did not see anything wrong with this cycle of work and it reflected the still 
persistent gerontocracy of everyday life. They prepared for adulthood by using those 
younger than them to advance. 
My cynicism also stemmed from seeing that the concrete skills youth picked up as 
program managers, facilitators, accountants, mentors, and advocates rarely translated beyond 
the slum. While appearing to be very formal and rigid, the development field was no 
different than the informal economy, which was responsible for young people’s exclusion 
from the formal sector of the city. As long as youth were kept apart and separate, the 
exposure they received at the University of Kibera did not seem to have any tangible 
benefits. Once these community development workers grew tired of the very arduous 
footwork of development, they had nowhere to go. The obvious choice was for them to 
transit into formal civil society organizations and non-governmental organizations outside 
Kibera. Some did that—returning to the bottom of the totem pole in order to make the 
transition. They still did not have formal university degrees and their five to ten years of 
community work did not count as comparative experience. The more accessible option for 
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the aspiring young community workers I knew in Kibera was to start another organization in 
the hopes that it could yield more short-term contracts and potentially lead to their getting 
discovered.  
I had hardened against the idea that talking about youth as a separate block of the 
population was a useful endeavor and thinking about the urban poor as apart only reinforced 
their marginality. This kind of discourse did not make sense since youth were the majority in 
many places. The discussion of their apartness reflected the broken system—a system that 
spanned across the educational, civil society, international development, and political 
spectrums. Like clockwork, depending on the current trend in the field, another youth crisis 
was proclaimed. The results of massive campaigns to shift behaviors and create fundamental 
change in certain geographical regions and among certain populations were miniscule in 
comparison to the millions who still had the deck stacked against them. The few here, like 
Shadrack, Otoyo, or John, who found their way out of Kibera, did so because they changed 
the meaning of the systems they were confronted with.  
Finally, my growing cynicism was also based on the rampant misrepresentation of 
Kibera. Even before the 2008 post-election violence splashed Kibera across the front pages 
of global newspapers, the vivid imagery of poverty, misery, and despair had been highlighted 
in a variety of media sources. In the 2005 Hollywood blockbuster, The Constant Gardener, 
Kibera provides a backdrop for the telling of a John LeCarré story about the abuse of power 
and ambiguous ethics exercised by pharmaceutical companies running drug trials in Kenya. 
We are led to believe that these drug trials took place in Kibera slum while the white, 
western, female protagonist watches from a watchtower. As Christopher Odhiambo Joseph 
(2012) pointed out in his analysis of the film, it was about intervention in Africa against the 
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greed and exploitation of a global company, but it still showed the Africa of the “other.” 
Sites highlighted in the film show Kenya, not just Kibera, as “abject, desolate, and derelict; in 
direct opposition to the universalized, normalized, and orderly Euro-American civilization 
and modernity” (97). The film “frames and imagines Africa as a site literally waiting for 
external intervention” (ibid.).  
 When Jeffrey Sachs (2006) writes of one-sixth of humanity’s not being on the 
development ladder, he does so with the intention of addressing what he sees as large-scale 
human rights abuse due to the poor of the world’s being more susceptible to disease, 
physical isolation, climate stress, environmental degradation, and extreme poverty. 
Unfortunately, not being on the “ladder” assumes a universality of progress, of hierarchies, 
of systems, and of structures, many of which might not necessarily matter, nor should they. 
His is alarmist language that prioritizes some needs, like the millennium development goals, 
more than others, like making sure young people reach adulthood whichever way it is 
societally defined. Development asks for measurements to prove effectiveness, but the 
mediation of youthful ambiguity is not easily quantified.  
One of the other issues with how development models approached social change in 
Kibera had to do with a misunderstanding of who was responsible for change. For example, 
there was a path from the village of Makina down, across the railway line, to Mashimoni. 
One of the fastest ways to get to the offices of the Initiative for Sports and Social Arts, 
which I visited frequently, was to take this route. One must descend to the railway, jump 
over a small stream filled with the remnants of plastic bags and other refuse, and then 
continue on past a small nursery school where the children sing out “howayou,” a sing-song 
greeting reserved for foreigners wandering around Kibera. The area near the railway was 
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noticeable for its unbearable stench. Over the five years that I traversed the railway, I had to 
hold my breath as I passed. A clear sanitation problem needed fixing, but at this particular 
location, despite the persistence of the stench, no solution to the problem had ever been 
attempted. This was ironic, since the office of another community-based organizations in 
Kibera was located at the junction. In general, residents recognized that sanitation was an 
issue, but it was not something any individual could tackle. Kibera’s sanitation was part of 
the larger landscape of poor infrastructure and large collective problems that residents 
assumed would be tackled by outside, or foreign, interventions. So the problems persisted 
and every time I passed that junction I was reminded that it was this confusion of 
responsibility that was had led to the stench.  
Rampant misrepresentation of Kibera was coupled with what looked like stagnation in 
an environment of NGO saturation. If the Kibera community, along with the development 
practitioners who worked there, could not come up with a solution for physical urban blight 
under the lights of so much international attention, how could they be expected to tackle the 
more underlying structural issues of marginality or liminality? Of course, it was the 
marginality and liminality that were partly to blame for the physical appearance of the slum 
in the first place. Many of the development projects provided “bandaid solutions,” while 
proclaiming to be participatory, grassroots, and community-focused. It was easy to fall into 
the trap of thinking the results of these solutions manifested in the “dependency” exhibited 
by Asha, who wanted money for information, and by the mama at the Jamii ya Kibera fun day, 
who thought she would get something small.  
It was only when I started to pay attention to the evolution of the young people I had 
known for five or more years that I recognized that the development field had become more 
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than the direct impact of projects and activities. Instead, it was the indirect presence of the 
development field in everyday life that provided youth the ability to conceive of success and 
their life course in new ways. In their youth groups, where they copied the structure of non-
profits and encompassed the jargon into their everyday language, it was not just mimicry. 
The building and breaking of institutions served as a space for young people to practice for 
entrance into the economic and social hierarchies they would surely encounter if they moved 
beyond the slum. It was also a way for youth to build social capital and networks of 
reciprocity, which allowed them to connect with other young people who shared ideological 
interests and common purpose. The institutions were not necessarily “effective” in that they 
barely scratched the surface of the infrastructural and social ills of Kibera, but what they did 
do was create a social space where youth could feel less liminal and more connected. The 
diversity that came with the urban environment, and was promoted in the development field, 
had as a byproduct a more inclusive, tolerant, and informed youth.  
This realization that fleeting and transitory institutions were the key to understanding the 
world of these urban youth belongs to a larger anthropological conversation about social 
change. Context was significant to understand fluctuations in their behaviors, but the 
assumption I made that little had changed in Kibera without outward changes in its physical 
environment was wrong, mainly because fluctuations remained within the individuals (Barth 
1993, 335). Fredrik Barth’s model of meaning assumes change and flux as inevitable in the 
transformation of knowledge, while Pierre Bourdieu’s work enlightens the theoretical 
concerns of anthropologists working on social fluctuations. His practice theory stands in 
contrast to other anthropological traditions that interpreted symbols and form. Bourdieu 
attempted to find a way to talk about social rules without forcing order. His use of the 
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concept of habitus provided a form of “culture” in the American sense as a combination of 
ethos, affect, and value (Ortner 1984, 147). Habitus was like the cultural continuity that 
Barth had paired with change. It was a structure of “practices and representations which can 
be objectively ‘regulated’ and ‘regular’ without in any way being the product of obedience to 
rules” (Bourdieu 1977, 72). Bourdieu also made the distinction between official and practical. 
The official discourse was always misrecognition because people used language to know 
what they were supposed to do and how the world appears to be, but what is real cannot be 
talked about. The practical is the world where individuals act without knowing exactly why 
they act. Bourdieu concluded that the best way to discern meaning was through indirect 
evidence. The youth did not know that they were changing, but eventually were able to see 
that in their NGO hustle, they had seized opportunities to come of age. 
A quote from John Chernoff’s (2003) life history of a West African bargirl sums up the 
state of current anthropological inquiry on social change. “In our contemporary world, 
people understand that all knowledge is bounded, relative to perspective and position and 
thus is somewhat like fiction, for one person’s truth can be another’s lie” (6). Chernoff’s 
Hustling is Not Stealing is a text that deals with individual ambiguities, contradictions, and 
personal strategies by interpreting them as little as possible. Hawa, the lead figure, narrates 
her own history and gives her own explanation of what events mean. Chernoff accepts that 
there is no official version that adequately describes all the uncertainties in culture and 
chooses instead to let them play out through the strategies of a single individual. This 
strategy of looking to individuals in order to understand uncertainty and contradiction has 
been employed herein.  
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It was the environment of the city that provided opportunities for the young to adapt to 
a changing economy and political environment. Many of the youth in this dissertation came 
of age after the election of Mwai Kibaki—when economic spaces, communication 
infrastructure, and civic knowledge were opening up. Young people knew they were learning 
to navigate the world differently than their parents and grandparents and in many ways, 
social change was the most constant pressure they experienced. Nairobi and other urban 
areas provided them a space of freedom where they could engage in activities that were not 
under the constant scrutiny of parents or extended kin. 
The city had faults and weaknesses—crime and illegality, moral quandaries and 
inequalities, institutionalized fujo, and chaos—but was the only real space for youth to be 
trained to comprehend the social changes that came with the new political order. Their 
integration into society occurred at larger, more national, and more global scales. What this 
signified was a ready-made category of inclusiveness that shifted the focus from a young 
person’s status that derives from achieving specific life stages to statuses that emerge from 
broader connectedness. Theirs were shifting, adapting, and malleable identities. They became 
bridges and in the process found ways to mediate the pervasive and constant pangs of 
liminality. 
What was evident from observing young people navigate Nairobi was that the social 
functions of the city, functions that helped them develop networks for reciprocity and 
survive in the informal economy, continued to be missing from the conversation about 
youth development. In 1937, Lewis Mumford asked “What is a City?” and urged urban 
planners to focus not just on the historical facts of urbanization, but to examine them as 
growing, ever-changing social institutions. “The city,” he wrote, “is a related collection of 
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primary groups and purposive associations: the first, like family and neighborhood, are 
common to all communities, while the second are especially characteristic of city life… [it] is 
a geographic plexus, an economic organization, an institutional process, a theater of social 
action, and an aesthetic symbol of collective unity” (Mumford 1937, 7). Youth in Kibera 
who felt disconnected from the larger city also missed the chance to enjoy both the rights of 
civic engagement and its responsibilities. Without inclusivity as a main goal for development, 
there seemed little hope that the dichotomies of insider/outsider or informal/formal would 
merge, or broaden. The slum upgrading efforts in Kibera were a clear indication that the 
rhetoric of grassroots, people-centered development did not consider the already-present 
urban livelihoods, institutions, or networks valuable. Kibera was a self-sustaining city as 
defined by Mumford: bounded, formed, and governed on the basis of a set of shared rules 
and institutions that function for the residents there. Refusing to see these functions 
doomed the residents to further negligence and continued urban “crises”. 
Still Hustling 
During a return visit to Kenya in 2013, I met up with John, Shadrack, and Otoyo at a 
pub in the Kilimani area, just a mile from Kibera, late on a Friday night. It had been a while 
since I had seen all of them together and in the years since my intensive fieldwork down in 
the kijiji all three had come–of-age. They were not yet adults by policy or government 
definitions, but the scrawny young men who had opened up the secrets of Kibera’s 
development field to me had become men. Only Shadrack was married and had a child, but 
all three had steady relationships with strong women. They all had found wage-earning, 
contracted jobs in respectable non-governmental organizations, and John and Otoyo were 
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doing part-time university classes in the evenings. Shadrack and his wife rented a two-
bedroomed house in Olympic Estate, but both John and Otoyo had moved out of the 
Kibera area completely and had settled into formal housing in Nairobi’s middle-class estates. 
When it was just the four of us, I said something to the effect of “you won’t need to 
hustle anymore,” to which all three disagreed almost in chorus, “oh no, we are still hustlers.”   
“But you have jobs now,” I said, “and you have extra money and are making new friends 
and meeting people outside Kibera,” 
“Why do you think you are still hustling?” I asked.  
And just like always, when I tried to ask  “why” questions, they shrugged their shoulders. 
They just were. No need for explanation. 
The development field taught them a lot, including giving them the tools to solve their 
failed adulthood but they did not feel like they were escaping hustling. In an online chat with 
Otoyo after this visit, he clarified that even though he worked with an international NGO 
forty hours a week and had the security of a paycheck now, nothing was permanent. They 
knew too many Kiberans who had fallen from this kind of “success.”145  Hustling was a tool 
and a skill that would always be there to cope with impermanence and insecurity. As long as 
Otoyo knew that he could animate the old bonds of mutual assistance, he felt secure. It was 
not about having a single connection to opportunity, like his new job, but rather about 
continually reinforcing bonds with people with whom he had history. He told me he would 
                                                
145 A particularly notable example was a Kiberan who had gone to work for a big multi-lateral aid agency and 
got caught giving favors to his sexual partners. He landed back in Kibera after flaunting his wealth and success 




always find his way back into Kibera and that he would always need it as long as his 
connections in Kibera needed him.146    
There was another young man, Robert, with us that night. Like Shadrack, Otoyo, and 
John, Robert had been part of the same circles of youth elites who were involved in 
participatory educational theatre and served as mobilizers and brokers for the youth 
development NGOs that did various projects across Kibera. He was slightly older than them 
and already technically an “adult,” but Robert had not crossed over. He had not moved out 
of Kibera, nor did it look as if he would in the near future. He had also not found the same 
kind of formal work that his friends had. His wife had left him and taken his small daughter 
with her, which devastated and distressed him. He was still hustling NGOs and maintaining 
connections with the old youth organizations as a way to make money. It was fairly clear that 
something had kept Robert back while his friends surged ahead.  
Robert had been transformed by NGO hustling. He was remarkably tolerant, patient, 
and honest—probably more so than any of the other three. He understood the issues of 
Kibera’s development as well as they did and had built strong community bonds and 
institutional networks. He enjoyed acting a great deal and even played a lead role in a film 
produced by an international NGO about domestic violence. Much to his chagrin, it came 
with very little pay. Robert’s altruism was to his detriment. Shadrack, Otoyo, and John dealt 
with each other as friends but also as competitors, Robert could not bring himself to betray 
others. He never really learned how to manipulate institutions and draw power and strength 
from them as his counterparts had done. Perhaps most significantly, he had not developed 
                                                
146 Many of Otoyo’s extended family members still live in Kibera, so this is a probable reason for staying 
connected. His niece even stood for election as a Member of Parliament.  
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the tools to be able to cross over from being a community leader and able hustler within the 
boundaries of Kibera to standing on his own in the formal non-governmental institutions 
beyond.  
The differences showed up in the details. Robert was not at ease with wazungu and talked 
too swiftly for them to be able to understand his accent. He wore clothes that were too big 
and shoes that were not polished.147  When outside of Kibera, he assumed beer or food 
would be purchased for him and he had not figured out how to show appreciation.148  He 
was a clumsy NGO hustler, like Asha in chapter three. Unlike Asha, however, Robert was 
much more giving of his time and available resources, frequently to his own detriment. He 
was bad at negotiating his own and others’ wages in the development field and did not do 
well using competition to build power and authority. When youth elites like Shadrack and 
Otoyo were disagreeing over methods to hustle NGOs and build on opportunities, Robert 
would wait for something to happen. All of this led to Robert being left behind. 
The truth is it really was a rare event for young men without university degrees to find 
their way across the border between informality and formality in order to find meaningful 
work. There were more young men like Robert, engaged and active within the development 
field of Kibera, building security through the strength of their connections. Like Steve at the 
beginning of his journey they were drawn into the promise of a joint and a community group 
and for many, this was enough. They made a little money, built security in social and 
                                                
147 He once remarked to me, while pointing at his shoes, that he had not been allowed to enter a Westlands 
nightclub. I looked at my own tattered and dirty flip-flops and recognized the terrible double standard for 
young African men and wazungu.  
148 A key difference for these Kibera “graduates” was that they knew that wazungu and members of Kenya’s 
middle class expected to hear thank you spoken out loud—this was not something required or necessary in 
Kiberan or rural life. The person who does the inviting, to a party or a pub outing, is expected to pay. Good 
hustling means knowing when you are the inviter and when you are the invitee.  
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economic capital, and eventually aged into adulthood the old-fashioned way at the age of 35. 
The NGO-saturated environment of Kibera provided the right environment for young 
people like Shadrack, Otoyo, John, and Steve, and others to be able to move beyond a state 
of protracted liminality affecting the youth in Kibera. The progression through the life 
stages—those defined either by the cultural and ethnic backgrounds they came from or 
through the educational system—was not guaranteed for the marginal members of the urban 
space. Therefore, each young person I met had to find and create a new pathway to social 
mobility. Attitudes about this ranged widely between those young people who accepted the 
hierarchy of age-determined power structures, hustling to just reach the bare minimum of 
adulthood through the “normal” life course, and others who wanted to upend the whole 
system. Importantly and beyond their individual, personal growth, this collectivity of young 
people, the young lions, were responsible for significant changes in Kibera. Together they 
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